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LCHAPTER 1.0
RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
1.1 The Economic Worth of a Space Shuttle System
I.i.I Results of the May 31 r 1971 Analysis
The major findings of the economic analysis of new Space Trans-
portation Systems reported on May 31, 1971, which was prepared for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, are concerned with the
analysis of the economic value of a reusable Space Transportation System
without any particular concern as to which, among the many alternative
Space Shuttle Systems would, in the end, be identified as the most economic
system.
Figure I. l shows the summary of the major results of the May 31,
1 971 analysis. In this analysis we report only the results of the "Equal
Capability" Analyses, the most conservative approach to evaluate new tech-
nologies. "Equal Budget" analyses were also performed and those calculations
give even more favorable economic results (see also May 31, 1971 analysis).
On the horizontal axis the numbers of Space Shuttle flights between 1978 and
1990 are shown as ranging between 450 and 900 flights for that period. On
the vertical axis the allowable non-recurring cost for the development of the
launch vehicle -- that is, the Space Shuttle as well as the Space Tug and the
required launch sites -- are shown in billions of undiscounted 1970 dollars.
The benefit lines shown in this figure showy how the allowable non-recurring
costs -- that is, the benefits to be associated with a fully reusable Space
Transportation System -- increase as the flight level expected for the 1980's
increases between 450 and 900 flights. Overall, this is very much a function
of the particular rate of discount (or social rate of interest) chosen and applied
to the analysis. Three summaries are shown in Figure i. I: the results
of 5%, i0% and 1570 social rates of discount respectively. We may wish to
use them interchangeably. Since all the costs as well as the calculated cost
savings were expressed in constant dollars, the interest rates applied are
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RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
I.i The Economic Worth of a Space Shuttle System
I. i. 1 Results of the May 31 r 1971 Analysis
The major findings of the economic analysis of new Space Trans-
portation Systems reported on May 31, 1971, which was prepared for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, are concerned with the
analysis of the economic value of a reusable Space Transportation System
without any particular concern as to which, among the many alternative
Space Shuttle Systems would, in the end, be identified as the most economic
system.
Figure I. 1 shows the summary of the major results of the May 31,
1 971 analysis. In this analysis we report only the results of the "Equal
Capability" Analyses, the most conservative approach to evaluate new tech-
nologies. "Equal Budget" analyses were also performed and those calculations
give even more favorable economic results (see also May 31, 1971 analysis).
On the horizontal axis the numbers of Space Shuttle flights between 1978 and
1990 are shown as ranging between 450 and 900 flights for that period. On
the vertical axis the allowable non-recurring cost for the development of the
launch vehicle -- that is, the Space Shuttle as well as the Space Tug and the
required launch sites -- are shown in billions of undiscounted 1970 dollars.
The benefit lines shown in this figure showy how the allowable non-recurring
costs -- that is, the benefits to be associated with a fully reusable Space
Transportation System -- increase as the flight level expected for the 1980's
increases between 450 and 900 flights. Overall, this is very much a function
of the particular rate of discount (or social rate of interest) chosen and applied
to the analysis. Three summaries are shown in Figure i. i: the results
of 5%, 10% and 15% social rates of discount respectively. We may wish to
use them interchangeably. Since all the costs as well as the calculated cost
savings were expressed in constant dollars, the interest rates applied are
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Lreal interest rates which do not include elements of inflation. As shown at a
10% rate of interest, the allowable non-recurring cost would vary from about
$12.8 billion around 500 Space Shuttle flights in the 1980's, up to $20 billion
at a flight level around 850 flights for the same period. The shaded vertical
lines in Figure 1. 1 show, first, the average U. S. flight level in terms of Shuttle
flights between 1964 and 1969 (61 flights per year) and reflect also the funding
average between the years 1963 and 1971. Also shown are the average USSR
flights for the period 1965 to 1970 (65 flights per year). Furthermore, the
baseline mission model of 736 flights, at that time, is shown on the right side
of the darkly shaded area where the left boundary of that area is defined by a
reduced mission model of around 600 flights for Space Program 3 in that
analysis. Since then, we have used in our present analysis a reduced base-
line mission model of 514 flights with a potential overall level of 624 space
flights. Thus, in the last six months the analysis of the Space Shuttle System
has been extended downwards to cover substantially the region between 450 and
600 flights. Also shown in Figure 1.1 are the then estimated non-recurring costs of
$12.8 Billion for a two-stage fully reusable Space Shuttle System"" as well as
the Space Tug and the required installations. We show the estimated economic
potential of a reusable Space Transportation System in terms of allowable
non-recurring costs as a function of several economic variables, among them
the expected space activity level, the social rate of discount, and the type
of cost-effectiveness analysis. The major findings of that effort are:
The major economic potential identified for Space Transportation
Systems in the 1980's is the lowering of space program costs due to the
reuse, refurbishment, and updating of satellite payloads. The fully reusable,
two-stage Shuttle is the major system considered in the May 31, 1971 report,
but not the only system to achieve reuse, refurbishment and updating of pay-
loads. Payloads were assumed to be refurbished on the ground, with refur-
"The selected Space Shuttle System is no longer a two-stage fully
reusable system and has substantially reduced non-recurring costs
[see section 1.2].
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bishrnent costs varying between 30% and 40%. The launch costs of the Space
Shuttle and Space Tug needed to recover and place the refurbished payloads are
also allowed for. We strongly recommended in May that other systems be
studied to determine the extent and the cost at which they can achieve reuse,
refurbishment t and updating of payloads.
The cost reductions identified originate in three distinct areas:
(a) The research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E) phase of new payloads (satellites);
(b) The construction and operating costs of payloads
(satellites) for different space missions;
(c) The cost of launching payloads into orbit.
The projected non-recurring cost associated with developing the
Space Shuttle and Tug as configured in May, 1971, (a two-stage system) is
shown by the economic analysis to be covered by the identified benefits pro-
vided the United States intends to operate a space program with the number
of flights equal to the unmanned space program activities of the United States
in the 1960's. The direct costs (payload and transportation) of space activity
carried out by a Space Shuttle System are expected to be about one-half of
the direct costs of the current expendable transportation system.
Manned space flight options -- for example, a manned lunar option --
are also analyzed. They show that a Space Shuttle System offers economic
advantages also in terms of transportation costs for some large lunar and
planetary (or defense) space flight options for the 1980's. These advantages
were not considered when formulating the basic conclusions of the economic
study, due to the great uncertainty of these options being adopted by the United
State s.
•The choice of the social discount rate has a major influence on the
economics of a new Space Transportation System. Differences in the rate
applied to the analysis outweigh many other important issues usually raised
-- and analyzed -- in the context of large scale RDT_E projects, including
uncertainties in the cost data. As shown in this report, the social rate of
discount influences not only the overall worth of a new Space Transportation
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System, but also the choice of specific technical configurations in deciding
among alternative technical approaches to bring about a reusable Space
Transportation System.
The May 31, 1971 report concludes that the economic justification
of a reusable Space Transportation System is not tied to the question of
manned versus unmanned space flight. Space programs used and analyzed
are in line with the activity and funding levels of the unmanned United States
space program of the 1960's (NASA, DoD, and commercial users included).
If substantial manned space flight were to be undertaken in the 1980's, a Space
Shuttle System would also contribute significantly to lowering the costs of
such missions and activities.
The May 31, 1971 report analyzes the economically allowable non-
recurring cost of a reusable Space Transportation System. It is the
task of the present report to identify the economically best reusable Space
Transportation System among all the possible required alternatives.
A major point of the May 31st report is: any investment can only
be justified by its goals. This applies to business as well as to government,
hence also to NASA. A new, reusable Space Transportation System should
only be introduced if it can be shown, conclusively, what it is to be used for
and that the intended uses are meaningful to those who have to appropriate
the funds, and to those from whom the funds are raised, as well as to the
various government agencies that undertake space activities. The space
goals can be political (rivalry with the space programs of other countries),
military (to meet military space efforts of other countries who use the
potential of space to meet needs of national security), scientific (for example,
astronomy), or commerical (for example, earth resources applications). All
these goals will, of course, be mixed into one national space program, repre-
senting to various degrees a joint demand for space transportation with a
varying mix of payloads.
1.1.2 Updated Economic Results On The Economic Worth of A Space
Shuttle System
Since May 31, 1971 our efforts concentrated on two major questions:
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first, to what extent is the overall economic worth of a Space Shuttle System
modified by new inputs given to our study; and, second, which of the many
alternative Space Shuttle configurations is the most economical.
The new inputs reflect a substantially modified NASA and DoD Base-
line Mission Model for the 1980's, and make a new assessment of payload
effects for different missions; very importantly, new alternative Space Shuttle
Systems that still promised the achievement of most of the objectives of the
Space Shuttle program but at considerably reduced non-recurring costs in
the 1970's, were considered.
On each of these changes a substantial set of alternative calcula-
tions was made, in keeping with the analyses and methodology already developed.
The results of the updated economic analysis are shown in the next
three figures. These figures and the back-up data are described in more
detail in Chapters 6 and 8 of this report. In Figure 1.2 the estimated non-
recurring costs of alternative Space Shuttle Systems are shown on the hori-
zontal axis. These non-recurring costs include the full non-recurring costs
of the Space Shuttle System with at least the same capabilities as those given
by the expendable Space Transportation System. Where the economic
analysis of a space program indicated the continued use of expendable rockets
-- e.g., Scout Rockets -- then these system costs have been included as
Space Shuttle System costs. Similarly, in the time of the Space Shuttle System
phase-in -- to replace expendable Space Transportation Systems -- the cost
of expendable systems, as required, is also included as a Space Shuttle cost.
Most important, the non-recurring costs of the Space Tug, which gives the
Space Shuttle System the capability to deploy and bring back payloads from
all earth orbits when economically justified, are fully included. Finally, the
non-recurring costs, as used in our analysis, also include the costs of two
launch sites, (ETR and WTR). It is on the basis of these non-recurring costs
that the economic evaluation of the Space Shuttle System has been carried out.
The estimated non-recurring costs also include fleet investment.
An estimated five Space Shuttles will be required to fulfill the NASA and DoD
Baseline Mission Models for the 1980's. Fleet investment includes the
orbiter procurement cost for all configurations considered,but reusable booster
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Lcosts have been amortized as a recurring cost except for the manned flyback
booster case.
Not shown in Figure 1.2 are the RDT&E and investment costs
to the First Manned Orbited Flight (FMOF) of the Thrust Assisted Orbiter
Shuttle (TAOS), estimated now by NASA at $5.5 billion. The estimates of
alternative Space Shuttle Systems in Figure 1.2 are grouped into two classes:
first, the modified two-stage reusable Space Shuttle Systems that were
investigated in the past months as alternatives to the two-stage fully reusable
Space Shuttle System of May 31, 1971. These systems all have associated
with them lower non-recurring costs than the estimate for the original fully
reusable Space Shuttle System. The technical reasons for this are described
in detail in Chapter 5 and the cost considerations are given in Chapter 6. Con-
siderable variation existed with regard to the non-recurring costs of these
modified two-stage (manned booster) systems. In addition, therefore, we
show the mean of these estimates as well as the standard deviation (if) of
the non-recurring cost estimates of these systems. As shown in Figure i. 2,
the mean of the non-recurring costs of such modified two-stage Space Shuttle
Systems is $II.5 billion, the standard deviation is $1.44 billion.
Similarly, also shown in Figure I. 2 are estimated total non-recurring
costs of Thrust Assisted Orbiter Space Shuttle Systems (TAOS) that include
a wide variety of technical choices, all having in common that only the
orbiter is manned, with external hydrogen/oxygen tanks and all are assisted
at take-off by either solid rocket motors or pressure fed rocket systems.
Again, these technical alternatives are described in great detail in Chapters 5
and 6. The mean of the non-recurring co_t estimates of such systems is $7.5
billion. These include about $i. 6 billion for the non-recurring costs of the
Space Tug and the additional required launch site. They also include a fleet
of 5 Space Shuttles, each estimated at about $300 million. _/-hen Space Tug
and WTR costs are excluded ($1.6 billion), as well as 3 Space Shuttle vehicles
(about $900 million), then the estimated non-recurring costs in the 1970's (con_-
parable, roughly, to FMOF costs) are estimated to be $5.0 billion (1970
dollars). The standard deviation of this estimate is $900 million, again in 1970
dollars.
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Using these alternative Space Shuttle Systems, a comprehensive set
of economic analyses was performed along the lines of the May 31, 1971 report
to determine the econo_ic benefits of a Space Shuttle System. The particular
calculations performed are reported in Chapters 6 and 8.
In Figure i. 3 the results of the equal capability cost-effectiveness
analysis are shown, at a 10 percent social rate of discount, directly comparable
to the results of May 31, 1971. The benefits are again expressed in Allowable
Non-Recurring Costs, thus making the benefits shown directly comparable
to the estimated non-recurring costs of Figure i. 2.
Major variations were introduced in the space program activities
of the 1980's, concentrating on the lower role of expected space activities
of the 1980's and beyond. While in the May 31st analysis the area of interest --
based on historical, unmanned activities of the United States (and the Soviet
Union) -- was confined to between 500 and 900 Space Shuttle flights in the
1978 to 1990 period, the present analysis was confined to look at the range
of Space Shuttle flights between 400 and 650 Space Shuttle flights, with major
variations in the analysis at 514 and 624 flights.
Two separate benefit lines were arrived at and are shown in
Figure I. 3: first, the analysis concentrating around 514 Space Shuttle flights
shows the economic results with the exclusion of some DoD missions that
are particularly suited for Space Shuttle operations; second, the analysis
concentrating at around 624 Space Shuttle flights takes the same NASA
mission model, now, however, including on the DoD side the missions
omitted in the first analysis.
With regard to the lower benefit line, we conclude that at 514
flights in the 1979-1990 period, the estimated benefits of a Space Shuttle
System are $10.2 billion in 1970 dollars with a variance of $940 million --
expressed in allowable non-recurring costs. The economic "break even"
point is reached at an annual space activity level of about 30 Space Shuttle
flights, carrying satellite payloads. This annual level of NASA and DoD
space activity in the 1980's and beyond will justify the development of the
TAOS Space Shuttle at a social rate of discount of 10 percent.
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The Economic Benefits of a Space Shuttle System
When, on the other side, Space Shuttle related DoD missions are
included, the economic analysis shows, at 624 Space Shuttle flights in
the 197 9 to 1990 period, an estimated benefit of $13.9 billion of allowable
non-recurring costs, with a standard deviation of__+ $1.45 billion. As
activity levels are increased or decreased around these space programs,
the expected benefits of a Space Shuttle System increase or decrease as
shown by the two benefit lines in Figure 1.3. The backup of these results
is given in Chapter 8. The TAOS Space Shuttle System will "break even" at
an annual activity level of about 25 Space Shuttle flights, carrying satellite
payloads, when the "624" mission model is taken as representative of U. S.
space activities in DoD and NASA for the 1980's.
Again, we want to emphasize that these results reflect the benefits
of a Space Shuttle System when applying a 10 percent real social rate of dis-
count to the complete economic analysis.
By combining Figures 1. Z and 1.3, we can directly judge the results
of the economic analysis of a Space Shuttle System.
In Figure 1.4, we show on the vertical axis the estimated non-
recurring costs -- as developed in Figure 1. Z -- and also the benefits of a
Space Shuttle System in terms of "allowable non-recurring costs" as devel-
oped in Figure 1.3. The estimated non-recurring costs of the TAOS Space
Shuttle Systems are emphasized and the expected standard deviation of
these costs is shown by the shaded area around the non-recurring cost esti-
mate of TAOS. Similarly, the benefit lines as developed in Figure 1.3 are
shown; the standard deviation around these estimates is indicated again by
the shaded areas.
From the results as shown in Figure 1.4 WE CONCLUDE THAT
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TAOS SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM IS ECONO-
MICALLY JUSTIFIED, within a level of space activities between 300 and 360
Shuttle flights in the 1979-1990 period, or about Z5 to 30 Space Shuttle flights
per year, well within the U. S. Space Program including NASA and DoD. If
the NASA and DoD mission models are taken at face value (624 Space Shuttle
flights in the 1979-1990 period), the estimated benefits of a Space Shuttle
System are estimated to be $13.9 billion with a standard deviation of +-
$1.45 billion expressed in 1970 dollars (at a 10% social rate of discount). If
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Lparts of the expected U. S. Space Program are substantially modified (514
Space Shuttle flight level in the 1979 to 1990 period), the estimated benefits
of a Space Shuttle System are $I0.2 billion r with a standard deviation of
$940 million (at a 10°70 social rate of discount).
The estimated non-recurring costs directly comparable to the
benefits expressed in "allowable"non-recurring costs of a TAOS Space
Shuttle System are $7.5 billion vv-itha standard deviation of $960 trillion.
Since the complete economic evaluation of the Space Shuttle
System as summarized here reflects the results when using a l0 percent
real social rate of discount, the economic results in support of the TAOS
Space Shuttle development have to be resarded as very strong in the con-
text of United States national priorities.
1.2 The Most Economic Space Shuttle Configuration
As shown in Figure i. 2 there exists a great variety of
alternative Space Shuttle configurations that have been studied in the past
months and years to achieve the ultimate goal of a reusable Space Trans-
portation System. If all of the Space Shuttle Systems had the same recur-
ring costs (roughly the cost per flight) and differed only in the expected
non-recurring costs, as shown in Figure I. 2, then the economic problem
of choice among the proposed systems would be straightforward: find the
system with the lowest non-recurring costs (IZDT&E and investment).
However, the economic task is not that simple: most of the
reductions in non-recurring costs are achieved by increasing,, in one way
or another, the operating costs of the Space Shuttle System in the 1980's
and beyond. It is the economic tradeoff between non-recurring cost savings
in the 1970's versus expected increases in operating costs in the 1980's and
beyond that becomes the subject of economic analysis when determining the
most economic Space Shuttle configuration. It is only through such an
analysis that a single system or family of systems can be identified with
confidence among the wide variety of alternative choices. This was done
extensively by our group.
The economic methodology of determining the most economic
Space Shuttle System has been put forth in detail in Chapter 3. This effort
will have to take into account a variety of economic factors. Foremost
among these are (i) the objectives to be achieved by an investment like the
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Space Shuttle System, (2) the identification of cost-effective Space Shuttle
configurations, (3) the identification, among the cost-effective configura-
tions, of a single most economic Space Shuttle System which again will
depend on (a) the activity level to be expected in the 1980's and beyond, (b)
the social rate of interest to be applied to the investment decision and, (c) the
anticipated payload effects of the Space Shuttle System in the area of re-
ducing payload costs, and making possible the reuse, refurbishment and
updating of payloads. The estimates of the economic benefits are also de-
pendent on the type of cost-effectiveness analysis used within the range of
equal capability and equal budget analyses. Most important are the objectives
within which the analysis is carried out. We, therefore, state these here
explicitly.
I. 2. I The Objectives of a Reusable Space Transportation System (STS)
In the economic analysis of this report the principal objectives
of a Space Shuttle System are considered to be:
(a) A new capability of meeting all now foreseeable space missions
in NASA, DoD and elsewhere, including manned space flight capabilities.
Thus, whenever a proposed system cannot meet all requirements, the costs
of the required expendable systems are fully included as part of that Space
Shuttle System.
(b) Reduction of space program costs (manned, unmanned, NASA,
DoD, commercial users) over the present expendable Space Transportation
costs through reuse, refurbishment, maintenance, and updating of payloads.
The Space Tug is therefore included as an" integral part of a reusable Space
Transportation System.
(c) Reduction of space transportation costs for all missions (low
energy, high energy, manned).
(d) Option of later transition to a fully reusable system.
The above four objectives were considered to be the principal
motivations for the investment in a reusable Space Transportation System.
Additional objectives supporting the major objectives were considered to be:
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(e) A low non-recurring cost to meet funding constraints.
(f) Assurance of a low cost per launch. Launch costs of up to
about $10 million are justifiable when payload costs and effects are considered.
It is with these objectives in mind that the results of this report
hold. Had the objectives been different, for example, to maintain a manned
space flight capability only, or to undertake a limited technology program
in support of future Space Transportation only, then a different economic
analysis would have to be made, since the benefits of the Space Shuttle
development -- the promised capabilities -- are analyzed here v_ithin the
Context of overall Space Transportation capability.
i . 2.2. Space Transportation Systems Considered
Over the last two years, but particularly in the effort of the past
six months, many alternative Space Shuttle concepts have been considered.
It is difficult to follow and appreciate all the different ideas proposed to
achieve the objectives listed in the previous section. Several basically
different approaches were investigated, among them two-stage fully reusable
systems, two-stage systems with some external (expendable) tankage, manned
orbiters with a variety of unmanned boosters, single orbiters with parallel
burn and rocket assists, single stage to orbit concepts, stage and one-half
concepts, and others. When variations of technical options within each
of these approaches are considered, then literally hundreds of different
Space Shuttle Systems have been studied by NASA, the Phase B Study con-
tract ors and other interested parties. It can be affirmed that seldom, if
ever, before has a single investment program of the scope and size as the
Space Shuttle System been studied in such detail -- both technical and economic
-- as to alternative approaches to achieve the objectives listed. The config-
urations listed and discussed in the subsequent pages are already the result
of an extensive technical and economic elimination process. Some of these
systems are described in detail in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, large economic
differences still exist between these configurations.
This study examines in detail the economics of the following alter-
native Space Transportation Systems for use in the decade of the 1980's:
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A. The Current Expendable System
The system envisages continuing use of the types of expendable
launch vehicles presently in the United States inventory.
B. The New Expendable System
As its name implies, this envisages use of a new family of expend-
able vehicles designed to have better (economic) performances than the
Current Expendable vehicles. Where economically justified, payloads
were redesigned to take advantage of the New Expendable System performances.
C. Space Shuttle Systems
Systems considered within this category differ in concept from the
previous systems in implying reusable rather than expendable launch vehicles.
Two major elements are employed in each of these: a Space Shuttle which
operates between the earth's surface and earth orbits of at least 185 kilometers;
and a Space Tug which can be transported within the Space Shuttle and which
can operate from the relatively low orbit of the Space Shuttle to high earth
orbits such as the synchronous equatorial orbit (35,500 kilometers). Only
the combined Space Shuttle and Tug systems provide a reusable launch system
able to place payloads into all widely used earth orbits, and also able to
recover payloads from these orbits. The capabilities, performances and
operations of the Space Tug were assumed as given and fixed for purposes
of this study, which concentrates on identifying the most economic Space
Shuttle among the alternative configurations. The following systems were
analyzed extensively across a wide variation of expected mission models and
levels of demand for Space Transportatiorlin the 1980's:
a. The two-stage fully reusable Space Shuttle. The baseline used
also in the evaluation of the May 31, 1971 report aimed at determining the
economic potential of a reusable Space Transportation System.
b. Two-stage Space Shuttle Systems with external hydrogen tanks
on the orbiter.
c. Two-stage (F-l) Flyback Space Shuttle System also known as the
Reusable SIC. The orbiter used in this version is the present baseline orbiter
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(with external hydrogen and oxygen tanks t a 60 x 15 payload bay); the ultimate
capability of this system was considered to be 40K pounds to polar orbit of
185 by 185 kilometers.
d. Series Burn Pressure Fed Booster (SPFB) Shuttle System, with
the present baseline orbiter.
e. Series Burn Solid Rocket Motor Boosters (SSRM) Shuttle System,
with the present baseline orbiter.
f. (Twin) Pressure Fed Booster (TPFB) Shuttle Systems, with the
present baseline orbiter and parallel burn at takeoff. (TAOS)
g. (Twin) Solid Rocket Motor Boosters (TSRM) with the present
baseline orbiter with parallel burn at takeoff. (TAOS)
h. Identical Vehical Space Shuttle System, with two identical orbiters
and three drop tanks sandwiched between them.
Each of these systems has associated with it a considerable amount
of non-recurring costs, (research and development costs as well as initial
fleet investment costs), and substantially different cost per flight of the
systems varying from $4.5 million per launch to over $15 million per launch.
The total non-recurring costs, including the cost of the Space Tug and two
launch sites varies from a low of $6.9 billion to a high of $14 billion (see
also Figure _. 2).
D. A Space Glider Combined with a New Expendable Space Trans-
portation System
The Space Gliders considered had payload bays of 60 x 15 feet and
40 x 12 feet; they would be launched on expendable vehicles. Costs per flight
of these systems are in excess of $30 million per launch.
• In addition to the above configurations, other variations in the Space
Shuttle were also considered as alternatives. One such alternative is a 40 x 12
payload bay with 30K pounds of equatorial launch capability for the Space
Shuttle System.
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The cost estimates and breakdowns for the alternative Space Shuttle
configurations are given, in detail, in Chapters 6 and 8.
In Figures i . 5 to i. 7 the major alternative Space Shuttle configura-
tions are shown as identified and recommended by the Phase B study con-
tractors in their reports of September i, 1971 (Figure 1.5), November 3,
1971 (Figure 1.6) and December 15, 1971 (Figure 1.7). The non-recurring
costs of the alternative Space Shuttle configurations are shown on the vertical
axis of each of these figures, while the contractor estimated costs per flight
of each alternative configuration are shown on the horizontal axis of each of
these figures, all expressed in constant dollars. Chapter 6 gives more
details on the cost estimates.
In Figure I. 8, all of the systems are shown that were studied and
proposed in the past six months. Among these the most economic Space
Shuttle configuration has to be identified.
1.2.3 Results of the Economic Analysis on Alternative Space Shuttle Systems
The methodology for the determination of cost-effective systems,
the meaning and significance of the economic tradeoff line, as well as the
theoretic identification of the most economic systems among cost-effective
systems is described in Chapter 3. Chapters 6 and 8 give the corresponding
backup and actual calculations for the alternative Space Shuttle Systems and
space programs of the 1980's and beyond. Here the results are represented
in convenient diagrammatic form in the next figures.
In Figure i. 8 we show two important results: first, among the
different concepts investigated and reported on by NASA and Industry there
emerge the following families of systems as cost-effective: the original
two-stage fully reusable Space Shuttle System at an estimated non-recurring
cost of $12.8 billion and the lowest expected cost per flight of $4.6 million,
a family of cost estimates associated with F-I Booster technology, also
known as the Reusable SIC, and shown by the shaded area in Figure i. 8
reflecting December 15 variations in industry estimates; a family of cost
estimates associated with series burn and parallel burn pressure fed
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Space Shuttle Systems, all having in common the new baseline (manned)
orbiter and unmanned recoverable pressure fed booster systems; a family
of cost estimates associated with Solid Rocket Motor boosters and the
new baseline orbiter, using parallel burn operations (i. e., orbiter engines
are ignited at take-off); and a family of cost estimates for series burn
solid rocket motor boosters, again using the new baseline orbiter. Also
shown are all the other cost estimates since September 1, 1971 of alternate
Space Shuttle configurations. And not quite accurately shown, due to the
high cost per launch, is the Space Glider concept discussed by different
agencies and NASA with a cost per flight of $30 million or more and a non-
recurring cost of between $2.8and $4.1 billion. Within the economic analy-
sis and the objectives of the Space Shuttle program stated in the previous
section, the Space Glider is a cost-effective system, but clearly not the
most economic system among the alternative devices as the further econo-
mic analysis will show.
The black-shaded areas in Figure [.8 show, with emphasis, the
likely cost estimates for the two most interesting alternative Space Shuttle
Systems, the "twin pressure fed parallel burn booster" Space Shuttle and
the "twin SRM, parallel burn" Space Shuttle concepts, emphasizing the
most recent and frequently quoted recurring and non-recurring cost esti-
mates for these systems in industry. Closely associated, economically,
with the "twin parallel burn PFB" Space Shuttle are the alternative, series
burn pressure fed booster systems, as shown in Figure 1.8.
Finally, also shown in Figure 1.8 is the cost-effectiveness
frontier as defined by these alternative tehhnological choices: systems
above and to the right of this cost-effectiveness frontier are all possible
and feasible; many of these have been studied in Phase B of the Space
Shuttle study effort, and some of these are indicated in Figure 1.8. The
existence of systems to the left and below the cost-effectiveness frontier
as shown in Figure 1.8 can, by now, be excluded with some confidence;
their existence would imply that, within the range of the deftned objectives
of a Space Shuttle program lower non-recurring and recurring cost com-
binations were feasible; although the existence of such systems can never
1-23
be excluded with complete certainty by anybody, it seems highly unlikely
that such opportunities were missed in the effort of the past months and
years (within the present state of technology and know-how).
The economic analysis was carried out within the cost estimates
-- and their uncertainty estimates as shown in Figure i. 8. The next
three figures, Figures I. 9 , i. I0 andl. ii, summarize the results of the
economic analysis: within the expected activity levels of space programs
in the 1980's, a reasonable variation in the social opportunity cost of in-
vestment funds in the 1970's and a considerable variation in the expected
payload effects due to repair, reuse, refurbishment and updating of pay-
loads the "SRM-PARALLEL BURN BOOSTER", and the "PRESSURE FED-
PARALLEL BURN BOOSTER" CONCEPTS (TAOS) EMERGE CLEARLY AS
THE MOST ECONOMIC SPACE SHUTTLE ALTERNATIVES, with the
"SERIES BURN PRESSURE FED BOOSTER" SPACE SHUTTLE AS A POSSI-
BLE THIRD ALTERNATIVE CHOICE.
In coming to this conclusion, the "Economic Tradeoff Function, "
measuring the tradeoff between non- recurring cost variations in the 1970's
versus recurring cost changes in the 1980's and beyond, is of decisive
importance. The Economic Tradeoff Function is defined and calculated in
Chapters 3 and 8. Figures I . 9 to i. II show the results of these calculations
combined with the non-recurring and recurring cost estimates of Figure i. 8.
In Figure I. 9, the position and slopes of the Economic Tradeoff
Function is shown as it varies with different activity levels in the 1979-1990
period at a I0 percent social rate of discount. Systems above the Economic
Tradeoff Function are not economic when compared to an Expendable Space
Transportation System in the 1980' s; systems below and to the left of the
Economic Tradeoff Function are, economically, better than an Expendable
Space Transportation System in the 1980's at a i0 percent social rate of
discount. The three activity levels shown for the 1979 to 1990 period cor-
respond to three basic space program alternatives that were used by us in
the economic analysis, with considerable further variations (see Chapters
6 and 8): the NASA and DoD Baseline Mission Model for 1979-1990 (624
-k
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Space Shuttle flights), the modified NASA and DoD Mission Model (514 Space
Shuttle flights, modified in the DoD part under exclusion of some missions
particularly suited for Space Shuttle operations) and the former (May 31, 197!
report) NASA and DoD Baseline Mission Model (about 736 Space Shuttle flights).
With each of these activity levels the slope of the Economic Tradeoff Function
does not change significantly over the range of interest. The inost economic
Space Shuttle System is then defined as the System along the cost-effectiveness
frontier where the Economic Tradeoff Function is tangent to the cost-
effectiveness frontier; it is the Space Shuttle System most distant from the
Economic Tradeoff Function, when measured orthogonally to that function.
In this case, both TAOS systems (TPFB and TSRM) are equally preferred
over any of the other systems proposed; with higher activity levels the
advantage of the TPFB-TAOS system increases, as the slope of the Economic
Tradeoff Function increases slightly, and at activity levels below 624 Space
Shuttle flights the advantage of the TSRM-TAOS system increases slightly.
In each case the series burn PFB system is a third best alternative.
In Figure i. i0, three alternative Economic Tradeoff Functions are
shown (for a 514 flight space program from 1979 to 1990) for three different
social rates of discount: a 5 percent rate, a i0 percent rate and a 15 percent
rate. At a 5 percent social rate of interest and accepting the non-recurring
and recurring cost estimates as given by industry, the TPFB-TAOS is the
most economic choice among all the technical alternatives. It means that at
the relatively low social opportunity costs for investment funds (as expressed
by the 5 percent rate) it may be indicated to spend the additional funds on
more advanced booster programs in the form of pressure fed reusable systems
with the promise of a lowering in the cost per flight in the operating phase
of the Space Shuttle System. (Again, the point of tangency determines the
most economic Space Shuttle System along the cost-effectiveness frontier).
At a I0 percent rate of social interest, recommended by the Office
of Management and Budget, the TSRM-TAOS and TPFB-TAOS are about
equally preferred to all other systems with a slight economic advantage of
the TSRM-TAOS; both lie close enough to the slope of the Economic Tradeoff
Function that one cannot be preferred to the other based solely on economic
criteria. The TPFB-TAOS involves higher risks but promises lower operation
L_
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Lcosts. The TSRM-TAOS involves lower risks and non-recurring costs
but possibly higher costs per flight. At a 15 percent social rate of discount,
that is with high social opportunity costs for investment funds in the 1970's,
clearly the TSRM-TAOS system emerges as the preferred Space Shuttle
configuration andpossibly the only system, the development of which is
justified on economic grounds.
Finally, in Figure i. ii alternative Economic Tradeoff Functions are
shown, as the payload refurbishment and updating costs are varied from 30
percent of satellite unit costs to 50 percent of satellite unit costs, the band
of variation within which alternate payload refurbishment costs were esti-
mated by LMSC (Lockheed) and Aerospace Corporation as part of this
economic study. The Economic Tradeoff Functions all reflect a i0 percent
social rate of discount and an activity level of 514 Space Shuttle flights in
the 1979 to 1990 period. As shown in Figure i. ii, again, the TSRM-TAOS
and the TPFB-TAOS emerge as the preferred economic systems over any other
Space Shuttle configuration.
Thus, the results of the economic analysis indicate that: "Parallel
Burn Solid Rocket Motor Booster" Space Shuttle System (TSRM-TAOS) and
the "Parallel Burn Pressure Fed Booster" Space Shuttle Systems are econo-
mically the best Space Shuttle choices. Insofar as the "series burn pressure
fed booster" Space Shuttle offers nearly the same advantages as the TPFB-
TAOS, it has to be considered as a third viable economic choice among the
many alternative system configurations. At very high social opportunity
costs for investment funds, the TSRM-TAOS is the clearly preferred choice,
at lower social opportunity costs for investment funds the TPFB-TAOS is
preferred.
Insofar as a Space Shuttle development program can be defined,
the economic choice facing NASA seems to be between the development of
the Parallel Burn Solid Rocket Motor TAOS or a TPSB-TAOS, with the
TSRM-TAOS as a technical fall back position, at some additional cost. A
mixed development strategy by NASA may be the best development choice,
and particularly if a fixed funding limit were imposed on the Space Shuttle
development in the 1970is. Yet insufficient detailed information was available
to us to make any such recommendation between these two choices.
L
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LThe TAOS concepts forego the development of manned booster
stages in the Shuttle System. With the use of thrust assist of either solid
rocket motors or pressure fed systems -- which can be made in part
reusable for low staging velocities -- the TAOS concept promises a re-
duction in the non-recurring costs (RDT&E and initial fleet investment,
Space Tug included) from about $i0 billion or more (two stage systems,
including reusable SIC's) to about $7 billion or less, with an acceptable
recurring cost increase in the operating phase of the TAOS systems. The
decision between the twin pressure fed and the series burn pressure fed
TAOS Space Shuttle System is basically a tradeoff function between the
higher non-recurring costs as well as higher risks in the development of
the series burn pressure fed booster as against the lower non-recurring
cost, lower risk, but possibly higher recurring cost per launch of twin
pressure fed systems.
The detailed economic justifications of the TAOS concepts --
when compared to any two-stage reusable system are:
i. The non-recurring costs of TAOS are estimated by industry
to be $7 billion or less over the period to 1979 or to 1984-1985 depending
on the objectives and choices of NASA.
2. The risks of the TAOS development are in balance lower but
still substantial. Intact abort with external hydrogen/oxygen tanks is
feasible; lagging performance in the engine area can bemade up by added
external tank capability. A large reusable manned booster is not needed.
3. The TAOS's that were analyzed promised the same capability as
the original two-stage shuttle, including a 40,000 pound lift capability
into polar orbit and a 60 x 15 payload bay.
4. The TAOS can carry the Space Tug and capture high energy
missions from 1979 on.
5. The most economic TAOS would use the advanced orbiter engines
immediately. Our calculations indicate that among the alternative TAOS
2_
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Lconfigurations an early full operational capability and high performance engines
on the orbiter are economically most advantageous and feasible within budget
constraints of $I billion peak funding or lesso (Also, see next section).
6. The TAOS avoids the immediate need to decide on a large
reusable booster and allows postponement of that decision without blocking
later transition to a fully reusable system, if and when desired. Thereby,
a TAOS eliminates or lowers the risk and potential cost overruns in booster
development.
7. The TAOS would use "parallel burn" concepts which, if
feasible, may change the reusable booster decision. Of course, a TAOS
orbiter with a series burn pressure fed booster is also possible.
8. Technological progress may make the expendable parts of
the TAOS system (involving mainly tank costs, and thrust assisted
rocket costs) less expensive thus further aiding TAOS concepts when com-
pared to two-stage concepts or fully expendable concepts.
9. The TAOS funding schedule makes an early Space Tug develop-
ment possible. The Space Tug is an integral part of the Space Shuttle System
and may be developed by Europe.
i0. The TAOS assures NASA the major objectives stated pre-
viously of a reusable Space Transportation System.
I. 3 Funding Constraints: The Development of the Space Shuttle System
and the Projected Budget for NASA
The space programs analyzed in'both the May 31, 1971 report as
well as in this report are well within the budgetary limitations of the U. S.
space program of NASA and the Department of Defense in the 1960's for the
unmanned space program as well as some reasonable, conservative exten-
sions of these activities for the 1980's. The particular mission model
provided by NASA, which includes a set of missions for the Office of Space
Science, the Office of Manned Space Flight, and the Office of Applications
of NASA, as well as for the Department of Defense, are described later in
this report as well as in the work of Aerospace Corporation in support of the
L_
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present study. As in the earlier May 31 st report, wide variations were
applied to the mission model and programs supplied to us by NASA and the
Aerospace Corporation. In all, close to 200 different mission models were
examined over the past six months.
Underlying the conclusions of this analysis are first, funding require-
ments for a thrust assisted shuttle with an Initial Operating Capability (IOC)
date of 1979 as identified in the selection of the most economic Space Shuttle
System, and second, the mission model of 514 Space Shuttle flights in the
1980's including NASA, the DoD, as well as commerical applications. For
each of the major alternative systems, that is, the competing expendable
systems versus the most economic Space Shuttle System, i.e., the thrust
assisted orbiter shuttle, a detailed analysis of the life cycle costs of each of
the systems was undertaken. Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 describe the detailed
life cycle cost summary data for the period of 1972 to 1990 (fiscal years) for
the current expendable, the new expendable and the thrust assisted orbiter
shuttle transportation systems. The thrust assisted orbiter shuttle system
considered was a typical system among the TAOS systems identified earlier.
In each of these tables, annual total costs of a given typical Space
Transportation System are divided into non-recurring costs and recurring
costs. Both of these costs are then sub-divided into launch vehicle and pay-
load costs. Furthermore, for non-recurring launch vehicle costs of expend-
able systems, the RDT&E costs and the investment costs are identified
separately. For the current expendable and new expendable systems reported
in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, the RDT&E costs, the investment costs for the launch
vehicles were identified separately year hy year for a 1979-1990 space
program. The research and development costs basically concerned the
development of a space program to maintain the option of manned space
flight in the 1980's. The investment costs are the costs associated with
producing the necessary vehicles for launch operations in the 1980's. The
actual launch costs are shown under the recurring costs. In obtaining these
cost estimates the payload costs for NASA (the Office of Space Science, the
Office of Applications, the Office of Manned Space Flight) as well as the DoD
and commercial applications were separately identified and costed. Notice
z
1-32
Table 1. 1
LIFE CYCLE COST SUMMARY DATA
SCENARIO 32 - TYPICAL TAOS AND TUG, 1979 IOC
CURRENT EXPENDABLE SYSTEM
(MILLIONS OF UNDISCOUNTED 1970 DOLLARS)
FISCAL
YEAR
NON-RECURRING COSTS
LAUNCH VEHICLE PAYLOAD
RDT&E INVEST. RDT&E
RECURRING COSTS
LAUNCH PAYLOAD TOTAL
!
_o
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
50 0 38
l_0 10 114
290 62 450
250 I05 1018
140 145 1163
60 135 1193
5 125 1364
5 75 1264
0 0 1273
0 0 929
0 0 632
0 0 476
0 0 418
0 0 365
0 0 242
0 0 64
960 657 11003
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 88
0 1 285
114 303 12].9
302 989 2644
643 1221 3312
896 1320 3804
912 1456 3862
899 1700 3945
882 1698 3853
948 1796 3673
954 1592 3178
i020 1872 3168
1008 1716 3142
982 1781 31Z8
743 1282 2267
292 327 683
10595 18834 42049
Table I.2
LIFE CYCLE COST SUMMARY DATA
SCENARIO 32 - TYPICAL TAOS AND TUG, 1979 IOC
NEW EXPENDABLE SYSTEM
(MILLIONS OF UNDISCOUNTED 1970 DOLLARS)
FISCAL
YEAR
NON-RECURRING COSTS
LAUNCH VEHICLE PAYLOAD
RDT&E INVEST. RDT&E
RECURRING COSTS
LAUN CH PAYLOAD TOTAL
Oo
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0
1975 60 0 38 0 0 98
1976 190 I0 114 0 1 315
1977 355 80 441 81 308 1265
1978 315 194 978 240 883 2610
1979 195 193 ll21 460 1163 3132
1980 60 135 1133 605 1311 3244
1981 5 125 1285 812 1423 3650
1982 5 75 1212 758 1639 3689
1983 0 0 1241 751 1649 3641
1984 0 0 905 806 1750 3461
1985 0 0 606 799 1580 2985
1986 0 0 455 837 1656 2948
1987 0 0 409 856 1684 2949
1988 0 0 362 834 1739 2935
1989 0 0 242 653 1261 2156
1990 0 0 64 269 328 661
TOTAL 1185 812 10606 8761 18375 39739
1%rl
Table 1. 3
LIFE CYCLE COST SUMMARY DATA
SCENARIO 32 - TYPICAL TAOS AND TUG, 1979 IOC
SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
(MILLIONS OF UNDISCOUNTED 1970 DOLLARS)
................................................... _ ....................................
NON-RECURRING COSTS RECURRING COSTS TOTAL
FISCAL LAUNCH VEHICLE PAYLOAD LAUNCH PAYLOAD
YEAR RDT&E INVEST. RDT&E
1972 17 0 0 0
1973 230 0 0 0
1974 504 0 0 0
1975 756 28 0 0
1976 978 90 0 0
1977 973 411 93 252
1978 939 944 294 814
1979 740 1049 358 976
1980 ' 631 1048 299 1128
1981 466 I136 260 960
1982 420 1089 279 I021
1983 344 1104 269 1057
1984 211 841 234 1195
1985 127 558 315 1028
1986 90 422 414 859
1987 27 400 495 952
1988 0 362 495 1038
1989 0 241 495 989
1990 0 66 495 419
17
230
504
784
1068
1729
2991
3122
3106
282Z
2809
2774
2481
2028
1785
1874
1895
1725
98O
TOTAL 7453 9879 4795 12687 34724
Lthat the estimated costs provided in the tables are based on a particular space
program known as the reduced baseline mission model with 514 flights,
covering the period 1979-1990. The costs of all space missions for the period
before 1978 have not been included. Since the new Space Shuttle System is
not expected to be available before 1979, these earlier missions would have
to be accomplished by an expendable system regardless of whether a new
Space Shuttle System is to be developed or not.
The current expendable system exemplified a typical space prograrn
along the lines of present knowledge and reflects the potential of space
applications in the 1980's. The cost data of such a system are presented in
Table l.l . In our cost effectiveness analysis, the other systems were re-
quired to compete against this known technology. The major systems con-
sidered are a new expendable launch system, that includes major modifica-
tions and adaptations of payloads to better provide for the needs of space
transportation in the 1980's, and the Space Shuttle System, in this case
particularly, the TAOS. Table i. 2 shows the comparable life cycle costs,
non-recurring costs as well as recurring cost data for the new expendable
transportation system which basically represent an extended Titan III
system adopted for both lower payloads as well as very large payload launch
requirements. Finally, in Table i. 3, the cost data of a thrust assisted
orbiter shuttle system (TAOS) are provided. It must be pointed out that many
alternative space programs were also analyzed on a mission by mission and
a launch by launch basis, each implying different budget levels and activity
levels for the 1980's. We believe that these tables represent a likely, and
possibly, somewhat conservative, outlook- for the space activities in the 1980's.
In Figure I. 1 2 the annual launch and payload costs of the new
expendable system and the Space Shuttle System are shown for the period from
1972 to 1990 for a typical space program of the period 1979 to 1990. As one
can see from Figure i. 12, a considerable part of the space program costs for
the space program after 1979 has to occur with either system before the IOC
date of 1979. This is due to the fact that payloads to be flown from 1979 on
have to be developed and built in part before that time with a usual lead time
of between 3 and 5 years for individual payload programs. Similarly, the
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Lnecessary launch site as well as new expendable or shuttle payload fl_ets
have to be developed. It is therefore only the shaded area represezlli_lg the
budget difference between the new expendable syslem and the Space Sl_uttle
Systenlin the period before 1979 that shows the potential net budget impa¢:t
of the Space Shuttle decision on the NASA budget requirenaents in 1970 dollars.
On the other side, the shaded area of the 1980's shows the net cost difference
that a Space Shuttle System would imply for a national space program in the
United States along the actix_ity lines outlined in a 514 flight program. It is
the expected cost sax_ings in the 1980's and beyond that have to justify the net
investment cost outlay implied by a Space Shuttle Systena, in this case the
TAOS system of the 1970's. The overall economic margin within which
such a decision will have to be made was fully reported in the May 31, 197l
report.
However, by inspection of Figure 1. 12, it is also apparent that
all the costs shown are only related to a space program after 1979. Between
1972 and lq79 a continuing space program of NASA is of course planned and
will take its course xx-ithin very lin_ited and very restricted budget considera-
tions. The overall question was, as formulated in the May 31, 1971 report,
whether the additional expenditures, or "hump" problem of the Space Shuttle
decision could be important with regard to the NASA budget. As a result
of this effort, we have undertaken an analysis of the net impact of a Space
Shuttle decision. In Table 1.4 the cost differences between a Space Shuttle
System and a new expendable transportation system are shown from the
years from 1972 to 1990, in terms of millions of 1970 dollars. In Ylgure
1.13 the net cost differences between the Shuttle System and the new ex-
pendable system are shown again for the years 1972 to 1990. We take into
account that considerable expenditures, mainly associated with the develop-
ment of new payloads, are also associated with the new expendable
or a current expendable system for a space program starting in 1979 and
lasting until 1990. A fully operational space program (launch vehicles, pay-
loads and operations) from 1979 to 1990 implies substantial expenditures
before 197Q and a gradual tapering off of expenditures for the period 1988
to 1990, as shox_m in Figure I. 12 . This tapering off of costs and benefits
_/
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Table 1.4
TOTAL FUNDING REQUIREMENTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE STS, AND
DIFFERENCES FOR 1979 - 1990 U. S. SPACE PROGRAM (NASA AND DOD)
(MILLIONS OF UNDISCOUNTED 1970 DOLLARS)
Space Shuttle
Budget
1972 17
1973 230
1974 . 504
1975 784
1976 1068
1977 1729
1978 2991
1979 3122
1980 3106,
1981 2822
1982 2809
1983 2774
]984 2481
1985 2028
1986 1785
1987 1874
1988 1895
1989 1725
1990 980
TOTAL 34,724
Current Expendable
Budget
0
0
0
88
285
1219
Z644
Difference = SH-CE
+ 17
+ 230
+ 504
+ 696
+ 783
+ 510
+ 347
Budget
0
0
0
98
315
1265
2610
New Expendable
Difference = SH-NE
+ 17
+ 230
+ 504
+ 686
+ 753
+ 464
+ 381
IOC DATE OF
3312
3604
3862
3943
3853
3673
3178
3168
3142
3128
2267
683
42,049
SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
]9O
- 498
-1040
-1134
-1079
-1192
-1150
-1383
-1268
-1233
542
+ 297*
3132
3244
3650
3689
3641
3461
2985
2948
2949
2935
2156
661
39,739
I0
- 138
- 828
- 880
- 867
- 98O
- 957
-1163
-1075
- 947
- 431
+ 319.
* The costs shown in this table refer to the complete life cycle costs of a 1979 to 1990 Space Program.
From 1988 to 1990 this program comes to an end. In 1990 no payloads are refurbished or updated,
nor are new payloads developed (for 19901 ), thus showing again an advantage for expendable systems.
Of course, if we have a Space Program also in the 1990's, the advantage of the Space Shuttle
would continue to hold.
i !
around 1990 makes the data for these years somewhat misleading. The true
expenditures in these later years would be at about the same level as the
mid 1980's, but most of them would be associated with flight programs in
the 1990's and can therefore not be included in 1979 to 1980 Space Program
costs and benefits. The overall net cost impact between a Space Shuttle System
and an expendable system is considerably less than the overall development
cost and investment cost of the Space Shuttle alone would indicate. It is this
net cost impact that is really associated with the option of developing or not
developing a Space Shuttle System and not the absolute costs of the Space
Shuttle System as shown in the life-cycle cost of Table i. 3. Notice that
cost streams as shown in Tables i. 1 to 1.4 as well as Figures i. iZ and
i. 13 do not include any allowance for space expenditures in the 1970's
that are related to the space program of the 1970's.
In order to assess the impact that a Space Shuttle invest-
ment might have in addition to the potential NASA expenditures for the
1970's, we attempt a completely new approach in order to determine or project
what the likely NASA budget might be in the 1970's. As reported already in
the May 31, 1971 report, there are many factors that affect the budget of an
agency like NASA and that determine the amount of space activities that a
nation like the United States can carry on. The past NASA budget and the
development of the trends of the appropriations for its individual offices are
only some of the many variables that influence such a decision and outlook.
There are several other very important economic variables that also deter-
mine the overall level of NASA budget projections and of the national space
activities in the United States. Among these, general economic conditions
and, in particular, the overall level of federal purchases of goods and
services as well as monetary conditions (eo go, the rate of inflation) have
important, though indirect, effects on the ultimate budget that NASA may
expect. In addition, there are political decisions (as for example the deci-
sion to land a man on the moon in the 1960's) and institutional considerations.
Nevertheless, in Chapter 7 we tried to develop a macro-economic explanation
of the expected NASA budget if only economic conditions were to determine
1 -40
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the NASA budget in the 1970's, taking into account the past history of the
NASA budget in the 1960's.
To a large extent, the formulation of a long-range program, like
that of NASA's space program, must necessarily rely on our knowledge
of the two-way relationship between the national economy in general and space
activity in particular. Furthermore, whether a particular long-range space
program can be successful depends largely on our ability to gain such know-
ledge and to apply it to obtain reliable forecasts of economic conditions and
space activity. If plentiful resources are available, space activities can be
expected to increase. If on the other side, the demand for national resources
is high when compared to their availability due to the existence of many other
national priorities, the general level of space activity can be expected to be
less than under the first hypothesis. It must be realized however, that an
economic analysis would naturally have certain limitations since it does
necessarily involve numerous simplifications.
Despite these limitations, we hope to have demonstrated that
macro-econometric approaches to projecting national space expendi-
tures can provide useful information for a rational long-range planning of
space exploration. In order to project expected space expenditures, as a
function of economic conditions in the 1970's, a macro-econometric model
has been formulated. Emphasis has been placed on the possible influence of
economic conditions of the level of the space budget. Furthermore, we have
also attempted to show how the future economic conditions may be affected
by different fiscal and monetary policies. By investigating the possible
relationship between the level of the space budget and economic conditions,
which to some extent may be affected by governmental fiscal and monetary
policies, we hope to have demonstrated that a suitably formulated micro-
econometric model can be useful for investment decisions in long-range
planning for various agencies of the federal government such as NASA.
The macro-econometric model implemented in the present report
is a dynamic system of 28 equations which includes 8 equations for the govern-
ment sector dealing with both receipts and expenditures. In addition, this
i-4Z
system of equations includes not only the relationships of production, con-
sumption, and investment activities, but also the relationship of wage and
interest determination and personal income as well as corporate profit. The
econometric model with the parameters estimated from annual observations
from 1929 to 1941 and 1947 to 1964 was evaluated by comparing several alter-
native simulations with the observed values from the period 1965 to 1970 and
found to be reasonably satisfactory. In particular, the simulation results
of the government sector were found to be significantly superior to those of
trend extrapolation of a more conventional single equation model. Following
the evaluation of the model, several alternative simulations were made for the
period 1971 to 1980. Both short term and long term projections as well as
the implications of alternative fiscal and monetary policies appear to be
quite reasonable.
Finally, the alternative simulations for the period 1971 to 1980,
representing expansionary, neutral, and restrictive policies, respectively,
were then used to project the future space expenditure. In order to achieve
this purpose, we demonstrated that the level of current space expenditure may
be explained not only by the level of past space expenditure but also by the
level of government spending in general and other economic conditions such
as the rate of inflation. Based on such an additional empirical relationship
obtained from the annual observations of 1958 to 1969 together with alterna-
tive simulations of the econometric model, several alternative projections of
the level of space expenditure were provided for the period 1971-1980. It is
found that under the expansionary policy with relatively high rates of inflation
the projected level of space expenditure ia generally lower than that of the
alternative restrictive policy. According to the neutral policy, the level of
space expenditure is expected to rise gradually from $3.3 billion in 1971 to
$4. 1 billion in 1980 (in terms of 1970 constant dollars). According to the
expansionary and restrictive policies, the level of space expenditure is
projected to rise from $3.2 billion in 1971 to $3.7 billion and $4.6 billion
respectively in 1980 (again, in terms of 1970 constant dollars). Among the
alternative projections, the results of the most conservative projection (in
1970 dollars) from 1972 to 1980 are shown in column 1 of Table I. 5.
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Table I.5
IMPACT OF SPACE SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT ON
NASA BUDGET OR ACTIVITIES
1972- 1980
(IN BILLIONS OF UNDISCOUNTED 1970 DOLLARS)
FY
Projected Space
Expenditure s,
(1970 dollars) (1)
Maximum Budget of Rest
Difference Expected of NASA if (I)
SH/NE (2) NASA Exp. (3) is max. (4)
(I) plus (2) (I) minus (2)
Projected
Inflation
R ate s
7
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
$ 3.20
2.91
2.88
2.91
3.02
3.10
3. 3O
3.48
3.70
$ .02 $ 3.22
.23 3.14
.50 3.38
.69 3.60
.75 3.77
.46 3.56
.38 3.68
-.01 3.47
-.14 3.56
$ 3.18
2.68
2.38
2.22
2.27
2.64
2.92
3.48
3.70
3.22
3.46
3.56
3.55
3.48
3.56
3.44
3.51
3.48
%
As seen from these projections, the budget of NASA would not vary substantially
around an average of $3 billion in the 1970 period with initial projections of
slightly below $3 billion using 1970 dollars ($2.91 for 1973 and $2.88 for 1974).
We once again stress that this restricts itself to economic factors. However,
the inclusion of several possible economic futures will hopefully account for'
political considerations implicitly.
In analyzing the impact that a Space Shuttle System would have on
such a projected NASA budget level, two alternate extreme approaches are
possible within which the decision would have to lie: first, the total net cost
impact of a Space Shuttle development may be added to the projected NASA
budget, considering the previous projections as the levels that one could
anticipate without such a major decision like the Space Shuttle System develop-
ment. Column 2 of Table I. 5 shows the cost difference of the Shuttle over
the new expendable development in the 1970 period for the space program be-
tween 1979 and 1990 as shown in the previous tables. This column, when
added to column l, gives the maximum expected NASA expenditures in column
3 of Table I. 5 . This would be the maximum expected budget even with a
Space Shuttle development of the type of a Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle
analyzed and identified in the previous sections. As shown, any of the pro-
jected budgets for the 1970 period would not exceed $3.77 billion. Of course,
the closer one gets to the year 1979 the more of the total NASA budget will
be taken up by activities that go to the planning, preparation and initiation of
programs beyond 1979 as shown in the previous tables. On the other side
one could also take the other extreme view regarding the projected space
expenditures shown in column l of Table £.5 as the absolute maximum that
NASA can expect with or without a Space Shuttle System. In this case, the
net cost impact of the Space Shuttle would have to be subtracted from the
projected space budget as shown in column l in order to arrive at the
remaining resources that NASA will have after an affirmative decision on the
Space Shuttle is made. The remaining budget for other operations, there-
fore, is shown in column 4 of Table I.5 . It also implies the margin that
NASA is giving up for the period before 1979 with a development of a
Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle. Again, a substantial part of this budget
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Lwill be taken up in the later years of the 1970's for activities and missions
that have to do with space programs in the period of 1979 and beyond. The
net impact of the Space Shuttle decision, however, is again only the net
cost difference between the Space Shuttle and the new expendable system
since both of these try to meet equal capabilities as projected for the 1980's.
The economic projections of the NASA budget as well as the
mission model used to analyze the Space Shuttle decision lend themselves
to surprisingly strong conclusions. Since the mission model analyzed
for the 1980's was done with activities of the 1960's of the unmanned space
program as a baseline, one would have expected some agreement among the
projected space budget activities of NASA and the activities in the 1980's.
Yet the close agreement and relative stability of the NASA budget for the 1970's
which were arrived at on an econometric statistical basis and the 1980's
budget under the new expendable system which were arrived at by a mission
by mission and launch by launch planning basis lend very strong support to
the economic conclusions drawn here. Figure 1.14 shows on one side for the
1972 to 1980 period the projected budget level under the new expendable
system of space transportation and the activity and mission models as given
to us from the space program of the United States for use in this analysis.
Of course, many external factors will influence the overall level
of the NASA budget in the 1970's as well as the level of U.S. space activities
of the United States in the 1960's. If a decision is made to go ahead with a
substantial manned program for the exploration of the moon or the planets
in the 1980's, then these manned space flight activities would have to be
added to the projected alternative space budgets (Shuttle versus New Expen-
dable) for the 1980's as shown in Figure 1. 14 . Similarly, other factors
could influence the projected U. S. space activities in the 1980's either
through new technological developments, international developments, or a
decision to forego any manned space flight. Within these projected alterna-
tives, we regard the space budget shown in Figure 1.14 to be conservative.
If alternative one in the previous discussion of the impact of the
Space Shuttle were taken as the baseline, i. e., the net impact is added to
L_
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1985 1990
the original projections of NASA budget, then Figure 1.15 clearly shoves
such a consequence. The figure shows first, the projected space budget for
the period from 1972 to 1990; second, the net impact by adding the differences
of the Space Shuttle System over the new expendable cost system for the
period of 1972; and third, the part of the NASA budget taken up, in the 1970's,
by the Space Shuttle System and payload development required for the space
program for the period 1979 to 1990. As shown in Figures I. 15 through i. 18
a decision to build the thrust assisted orbiter shuttle in the 1970's would not
impact dramatically on the overall level of space expenditures_ as was pre-
viously the case with the two-stage Space Shuttle System analyzed in the
May 31 r 1971 report. In Figure 1.16 , the total of the funds taken up in the
1972 to 1980 period by the Space Shuttle development as well as the payloads
for the 1979 to 1990 period are shown separately. In no case do the antici-
pated program costs in both the launch vehicle developments as well as pay-
load cost developments exceed the econometrically projected space budget
for NASA in this period.
If the other view were taken, that is, the economic projections of
the NASA budget are the maximum funds that NASA can expect within the
present environment of the United States economy, a hypothesis not at all
unreasonable, then the net cost impact of the Space Shuttle decision on the
NASA budget is shown by Figures I. 17 and i. 18. The total net cost difference
is subtracted from the projected space budgets of NASA for the period of 1972
to 1980. Again, the dotted line in Figure I.18 shows the total funding that
the Space Shuttle as well as the development of the payloads for the 1979 to
1990 period would take up out of this total. Again, a compatibility is found
between the econometric projections of the possible NASA budget in the 1970's
as well as the detailed cost estimates for the Space Shuttle System and the
required payload development for the 1979-1990 period. All the other
activities of NASA, of course, would have to be financed out of the remainder
between the total projected NASA budget and the total Space Shuttle develop-
ment funds as shown in Figure 1.18. In each case, that is either Figures
1.15, 1.16, 1.17, or 1.18, the projected budget for the 1980's is shown
for the New Expendable System and the Space Shuttle System assuming an L
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equal capability approach. The difference, i.e., the direct cost savings
expected from a Space Shuttle development is shown by the shaded area. It
is the cost savings that justify the added outlays and expenditures in the 1970
period for the Space Shuttle development.
While in the May 31, 1971 report, the total non-recurring cost of
a Space Shuttle System development of $12.8 billion or more was a consider-
able problem with regard to the NASA budget required in the 1970's, it now
seems that a development of a TAOS Space Shuttle System t including a Space
Tug and the required launch sites t may well be within reasonably projected
budgets for space activities in the 1970's and 1980's.
Thus, the crucial questions that remain are:
First, what are the expected levels of space activities in the 1980's
beyond or possibly below those projected in the present mission models for
NASA (The Office of Space Science, the Office of Applications, the Office of
Manned Space Flight), the Department of Defense, commercial applications
and potential foreign demand for United States space transportation services.
It is ultimately these objectives as exemplified by past as well as future ex-
pected space activities that go to justify the development of a new, reusable
Space Transportation System. If the activity level in the 1980's or beyond
were to increase substantially, the development of a fully reusable Space
Transportation System(i.e., using a reusable Flyback booster) in the 1980's
oi" 1990's may be justified, again on a cost-effectiveness or benefit-cost basis.
Second, the choice of the most economic booster assist remains
open. Among the alternate configurations identified to lie within the region
of the most economic Space Shuttle configurations, there remain uncertainties
as to the most economic booster that should go with the development of the
orbiter. The choice seems now to lie between three alternate, substantially
different systems, all of which should not influence the basic orbiter
decision: (I) a (Twin) Parallel Burn Solid Rocket Motor Booster System,
(2) a (Twin) Parallel Burn Pressure Fed Booster System, (3) a Series Burn
Pressure Fed Booster.
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LOverall, it seems that a minimum non-recurring cost program and
minimum technological risk program for the 1970's will favor a Solid Rocket
Motor Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle System. On the other side, pressure
fed systems of either the twin pressure fed type or the series burn pressure
fed boosters maybe justified if the technological risks as well as the higher
non-recurring costs are justified by confidence in the estimated lower costs
per flight and higher activity levels in the 1980's. Thus, the ultimate
decision among these boosters is an economic tradeoff decision among non-
recurring costs, development risk, activity level, and the level of the
social rate of discount (the opportunity cost of economic funds) in the 1970's
and 1980's.
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CHAPTER Z. 0
THE INVESTMENT DECISION PI_OCESS OF
NEW SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
2. 0 Preface
This chapter is a revised version of Chapter 3 of the May 31, 1971
report, "Economic Analysis of New Space Transportation Systems'_. Some
of the quoted numbers have been changed in this revision. In particular,
the Space Shuttle System identified as the most economic version -- or the
Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle (TAOS) -- has substantially reduced non-
recurring costs in the research and development phase as well as the
initial investment phase. Yet, the major points made in the May 31, 1971
report remain valid, and are therefore quoted again, with elnphasis. The
substance of this chapter remains unchanged and gives the framework within
which the economic analysis was carried out.
2. 1 Goals of the Space Program
In this chapter we propose to raise a number of fundamental issues
which present themselves in connection with the task assigned to
MATHEMATICA. The task is to determine with reasonable reliability the
probable economic costs and benefits of various new forms of Space Trans-
portation Systems (STS's) which may become technically available during
the next decade and beyond. The problem is one of decision making for large
scale government investment in a new technology under conditions of uncer-
tainty. The decision-making process is long and complicated. There are
many forces at work representing confiicting interests and attitudes. Infor-
mation about future costs and benefits is difficult to establish, but a sincere
effort has been made to arrive at as good figures and numbers as can be
had. However, uncertainty, being one of the fundamental characteristics
of existence, can never be fully removed, either here or elsewhere. To make a
decision is to choose among alternatives. These were exhaustively enumerated
for the Space Shuttle System and those not rejected outright must each be
examined in proper detail prior to a final decision.
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The techniques for evaluating the costs and benefits of feasible alter-
native systems have been described and were used in the economic analyses
in our May 1971report. The intent there was to find that Space Transportation
System which will accomplish certain well-defined missions at minimum costs.
The present report extends these earlier analyses and attempts to examine
various configurations of several alternative Space Transportation Systems in
much greater detail. In particular, many possible configurations of the Space
Shuttle Transportation System have been evaluated and the most economical
ones identified. The Space Glider System which was not covered in our
earlier analysis has also been evaluated in the present effort but proved uneco-
nomical when compared to the TAOS.
Since the time spans over which research and development costs for
the Space Shuttle arise-- eight to ten years -- are great by any standard, and
since benefits (i.e., the fulfillment of missions at reduced costs) begin to
accrue only in an even more distant future and are spread out over many
years, it is necessary to bring both costs and benefits to a common point, the
so-called Net Present Value (NPV), by using social interest or discount rates.
The rates used in discounting may vary significantly from low (4% or less) to
high (10%or more) and have a great influence upon the results of the computa-
tions as was shown in earlier M_ATHEMATICA reports[_. Opponents of a
project will want to use high rates; advocates, low rates. Also, high rates
indicate a rel_tive scarcity of resources, while lower rates indicate relatively
fewer claims made on public monies. In addition, a high discount rate can
reflect relatively greater urgency than does a lower rate. In business such
differences in the rate selected are less pronounced because of the information
provided by the investment market which largely determines when an investmeni:
is rational. But in government the rates used often differ substantially from
one public investment (agency or department) to another. The choice of rate
is thus frequently the outcome of a game played by the various parties involved
in the decision-making process. Such are the procedures that accompany the
objective evaluation of cost and benefit calculations. The impact of these
differences is clearly shown in Chapters i, 3 and 8.
Whatever the result of computations of the above nature, they do not
suffice by themselves to arrive at decisions as to what is to be done. That
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would onlybe possible if the whole problem would reduce to the question of
finding the most economic Space Transportation System. But this question
can only be posed when the preliminary questions leading to the alleged
need for new systems have been formulated and answered positively.
The principal question is this: What are the goals of space
activities? Does their fulfillment require a new transportation system, and,
if so, when is it needed? To what extent does the system to be chosen
match the goals? In the usual benefit-cost analysis or cost-effectiveness
analysis it is difficult to consider such issues adequately. The tacit assump-
tion is that the goals are given, at least within broad limits, and that the
choice is only between alternative technical systems implying that all systems
under discussion are equally fit to accomplish the given tasks, i.e., to pro-
duce the same benefits.
It is true that in both our earlier and the present reports a wide
variety of different space programs of the 1980's were analyzed. The programs
(Scenarios) ranged from extremely low-level NASA and Department of
Defense activities -- well below the levels of the 1960's -- to programs in
line with major projections for these agencies. They sometimes included --
and at other times excluded -- manned-space-flight activities although the
option of undertaking manned-space flights was maintained in each case.
Some programs also included a lunar program allowing for nuclear rocket
technology in the operating costs. The analysis was also put into the histori-
cal framework of 1965 to 1970 space activities of both the United States and
the USSR.
The results of our analyses show a substantial economic margin
for reuse, refurbishment and updating of payloads with the new STS. However,
even if this were assumed to be true, it does not follow that there is no further
interplay between space goals and supporting systems. For example, a given
system may reach its optimal point in costs only when a certain use-intensity
is postulated, and that intensity may be either too low or too demanding as
far as the general goals of the space program are concerned. Also the
goals should be spelled out quantitatively, and their economic justifications
documented wherever possible.
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Lcertain goals involve entire systems which are embedded in still wider
systems so that the capability of these may have to be altered as a result of
adjustments in the former brought about by the STS, thereby inducing costs
not directly related to transportation. For example, it is conceivable that,
in order to make a Transportation System "cost effective", it may be
necessary to place so many satellites into orbit that, possible production
and scheduling difficulties for satellites notwithstanding, the ground data
processing facilities would have to be enlarged far beyond anything now con-
templated. These costs must also be considered part of the new venture,
particularly in evaluating the potential commercial demand for space trans-
portation. In other words, the Transportation System is only part of the larger
system within which it must function. Rigorous cost estimates for this kind
of joint supply should therefore also include the interaction of the Space Trans-
portation SyStem with the larger system, and ultimately with the entire United
States space program under whose scope fall NASA, the Department of Defense,
and many other users. This interaction will tend to be very complicated and
thereby requires a thorough analysis thatis largely beyond the scope of this
assignment. Within the limits of unmanned U.S. space acitivites in the 1960is
and early 1970's we have dealt with these complete systems costs. If, as a
result of the Space Shuttle development space activities were to expand con-
siderably more, then such additional system effects will have to be allowed
for. The detailed NASA mission model used for our analysis is described in
Chapter 4.
We state here with emphasis: any investment can only be .justified
by the goals. This applies tobusiness as well as to government, hence also
to NASA. A new STS should not be introduced unless what it is to be used
for can be conclusively shown and that these intended uses are meaningful
both to those who must appropriate the funds and also to those from whom the
funds are raised. These space goals can be political (rivalry with the extensive
Soviet Space Program), military (competitive with Soviet military space efforts,
and/or for other new U. S. military purposes), or specifically space oriented
(scientific space exploration and/or commercial uses of space). All these
wili_ of course_ be mixed into one program to various degrees representing
a joint demand for space transportation with a varying mix of payloads.
L
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Whatever the true situation may be, it is the direction from the goals down-
ward that must be pre-eminent in the decision process. The economic
analysis was carried out strictly within the limits of 1965-1971 U. S. space
activities.
However, it should also be recognized that when the possibilities of
such a new technology are made known, new goals can come into sight and
reach. This may very well be the case with the new Space Shuttle System, but
this too requires a demonstration.
Thus, the present goals -- if they are well and clearly formulated
at all, will also undergo shifts. Future space activity cannot be judged
adequately on the basis of our present technology alone; new goals will have
to be projected as well. In many cases even this will be inadequate, since new
goals will arise from the scientific discoveries which will surely be made
both during the anticipated lengthy development period or perhaps even more
so during the first few years of the new Space Shuttle System. Even when this
happens, the ultimate justification is always on the basis of the goals, be they
recognized or only anticipated, but never solely by technological possibilities.
Finally, with a drastic decrease in the incremental (marginal) costs of space
transportation, as well as an increase in the reliability of space-based systems,
the demand for commercial as well as scientific and military applications of
space technology may increase substantially, thereby feeding back into the
decision on systems choice and reinforcing the decision to develop a Space
shuttle System.
2.2 Characteristics of Space Programs
The fundamental requirement for the justification of introducing
any new Space Transportation System -- and even for maintaining the
present one at whatever level of use -- is that there be a clearly formulated
space program characterized by the missions. While this is obvious, the
task is very difficult to fulfill. We shall not describe or analyze here the
various reports (which were used in part in our analyses) in which efforts
were made to accomplish precisely this. The goals formulated in those
reports were often stated in too general terms and without ranking as to their
L_
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relative importance, which is insufficient for our purposes, at any rate.
We note, however, that the problem of ranking is a very difficult one, both
from the analytical as well as from the political point of view. One input
needed and provided to us is a detailed program stating, e.g., the number
of observation satellites, their expected lifespans, the number of launchings,
their spacing over time, the expected costs of satellites, and the scheduling
of the different missions. For the purposes of this study, several such
programs (the Baseline mission model) without any further ranking -- were
given to MATHEMATICA for NASA, the Department of Defense, and other
users.
Applied to the Space Shuttle System this means that there must be
specific information about the correspondence between the required rate of
STS use (i.e., the rate of Space Shuttle use to be cost-effective when com-
pared to the Current Expendable Systems) and the possibility of matching
these activity requirements with the number of flights demanded by space
exploration. For example, if the Space Shuttle were to require at least
45 flights per year in order to achieve cost effectiveness, is the space pro-
gram capable of using this many flights in a sensible manner? This is a
difficult matter since the Space Shuttle vehicle is precisely that: a vehicle
that can accommodate a great variety of satellites, propellants, men, etc.,
in many combinations. The space program must require at least that many
flights, and this requirement must be fulfilled optimally. It is not sufficient
that the Space Shuttle makes them possible. In other words, it must be
demonstrated that the overall United States Space Program as such demands
that many flights at given alternative costs. It would not be proper to justify
the Space Shuttle on the grounds that, "it makes so many flights possible '%
Of course, if there should be a drastic cost reduction per flight for a parti-
cular STS -- including the cost of payloads -- new demand may appear as
was stated previously and therefore the demand for space flights (and appli-
cations) is not independent of the STS choice.
There is some specific information of this kind available. There
is also the historical evidence of what the United States, the USSI_ and other
nations did in the 1960's. But more detailed information will help in
_L
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deciding what reasonable space activities can be expected in the 1980's and
beyond in the United States (civilian and defense) and to confirm the reason-
able, if not conservative, activity levels used for purposes of our study --
with a low of 400 Space Shuttle flights in the 1979-1990 period, or 34 flights
a year. This issue has to be faced squarely as it will unquestionably be
raised by those involved in the whole process of decision making and, in
particular, for purposes of funding.
The present report, therefore, operates on the basis of the
assumption that demands exist for space transportation. This assumption ex-
presses the conservative belief that patterns of the 1960's will at least per-
sist on that level in the 1970's and 1980's, not allowing for the Apollo program.
Even in the absence of more information, it is possible to estimate in a
general manner what demands might be made and to study their impact on
the economics of the Space Shuttle System.
Figure 2. 1 on the following page is a classification of prospective
uses. This broad classification is clearly incomplete and only intended to
be illustrative since by, say, the year 1985, entirely new uses of satellites
(and possibly of man) may have appeared. Thus, it is not only a question of
the projection of the intensity of the present demands over time (with possibly
great fluctuations), but also of predicting new kinds of demand, particularly
with the existence of a Space Shuttle System. There may be no new kinds of
demands, or there may be some that could overshadow those now listed,
leading even to the abandonment of these new kinds of demand since they would
be superceded by better uses of the Space Transportation System.
A case in point for the latter possibility is the role of man in
space. At present his role is neither proven nor disproven; it is being
argued about forcefully, but as yet not conclusively. It is possible that, as
instrumentation for automated spacecraft becomes more refined and power-
ful, there may be less need to have men in space. On the other hand, man
in space is a decision maker and active experimenter, with perhaps a special
importance for biology. It is also possible that, as technology develops,
man may have an easier life in space than he has had so far and that, there-
fore, his scientific and technological values will increase. There are, at
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Figure Z. 1 The Potelntial Demand for U. S. Space Transportation (1971-1990)
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present, insufficient indications that either tendency is strong enough so
as to advocate with proof that an STS choice should be closely tied to manned
operations or should not be so tied.
This is a dilemna, but the Space Shuttle can easily be modified
in either direction or be independent of both. Clearly, this will again be
a question of costs; they were not considered significant in the present
study. In this and the previous MATHH_MATICA reports, we have included,
therefore, a minimal manned space flight program when analyzing the eco-
nomic margin for the development of the Space Shuttle System.
At any rate, a new STS should not be tied one way or the other to
any present position regarding the role of man in space. This is in full
consideration of the fact that the Space Shuttle is frequently even identified
(at least by the public) with the construction and operation of large, manned
space stations as its primary goal. We exclude the possibility that "man
in space" will become once more a political prestige goal in competition
with similar activities of the Soviet Union or other countries. In that event
normal cost-efficiency calculations are of little avail as the decisions then
are of a strictly political character, pushing considerations of costs, as
wellas scientific benefits, into the background. Such decisions, of course,
also have financial bounds but they are of a less significant nature, as was
the case when the Apollo program was approved.
The successful development of the Space Shuttle may even do away
with the need for a Single, large manned space station, given the great orbital
flexibility the Shuttle would bring to the space program. On the other side,
if Skylab holds exceptional promise, as'some scientists think, the Space
Shuttle can serve a large space station or several small space laboratories
well. However, proof of the advantage of one over the other is needed.
It is not our task to comment even briefly on each of the items
included in the above classification. This list serves only to indicate some
activities which, when run at different intensities, will have an impact on
any future STS. The fundamental point we make, and shall make over and
over again, is that the justification of the Space Shuttle System depends
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solely on the power with which these demands make themselves felt. In
viewing the previous classification of the prospective uses of any Space
Transportation System, we may note also the fact that there are essentially
four categories of users:
(I) Scientific activities (government or civilian)
(2) Government operations (either for civilian,
other than scientific, or for military purposes)
(3) Private business
(4) Foreign users (government or business)
Space science involves government operations into which there are
private inputs apart from the dominating non-governmental demands of the
scientific community to which the government yields. There are also
scientific activities that are wholly reserved for the government. Operations
under (3) are carried out by NASA though they may be paid in part or fully by
private interests or other government agencies (Department of Interior,
Department of Agriculture, etc. ). Though their importance will rise over
the years, especially as the price for missions goes down, they are at
present of minor significance. The military uses are secret, though obviously
primarily concerned with surveillance; the placement of nuclear weapons
into orbit being forbidden by international treaty.
The Department of Defense missions of the 1980's used for the purposes
of this analysis cover the major options that the Department of Defense is
contemplating for the 1980's. They are not documented in this unclassified report
in the detail that would be needed for a full insight into the work clone by
MATHEMATICA, in cooperation with two other contractors. MATHEMATICA
did look at the cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost comparison of alternate
STS's of programs in the Department of Defense, as well as those of NASA.
In doing so on a mission-by-mission basis, MATHEMATICA confined itself
to inputs provided directly or indirectly by the Department of Defense.
Essentially, the military planning followed strictly the capabilities of
Expendable Space Transportation Systems. Being both military and secret,
the Department of Defense's activities may carry comparatively little weight
in the present political climate, although they do contribute towards justi-
fying the creation of a Space Shuttle System requiring large investments. On
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the other hand, the military is usually greatly concerned with marginal
differences in established technology, even though these may be very
costly to obtain, claiming these differences to be crucial relative to the
capabilities of a potential enemy.
This passive -- i.e., financially non-contributory -- partici-
pation through highly secret activities of the military is thus a decided
drawback for NASA as long as this participation is of major importance
and the military makes no contribution to the initial investment. It is
reasonable to open up a new general STS to all kinds of users: domestic,
foreign, civilian and military. However, the excessive secrecy of mili-
tary missions is a complicating factor of the first order. It is not easy to
determine whether these missions could also be carried out by other
methods, whether they are needed at all, or whether these activities should
be increased substantially. This leaves a gap in the series of arguments
which may speak for or against the Space Shuttle. Not knowing the value
of such missions further impairs the justification. In the economic analysis
we, therefore, substantially varied the mix and activity levels of the Depart-
ment of Defense space mission programs for the 1980's. This is also
reflected in the results of the economic analysis as presented in Chapters
1 and 8.
It is also possible that, for example, very important civilian
earth resources inspection might be able to use the same devices and
information the military employs, but cannot do so because of the secrecy
shrouding DoD hardware. Thus, there might conceivably be expensive duplica-
tions of efforts and there is here a potential undesirable inefficiency. If there
are no differences, then there is no need for secrecy. This matter ought to
be most carefully analyzed. We do not propose now to develop the various
arguments any further.
So there remains the mixed scientific, military and applied fields
all in government hands. Here it is a question of how important the govern-
ment, Congress and the public think pure science is, especially space science.
The prospects are not good. It suffices to look at the budget of the National
Science Foundation which over the last five years (1964-1970) moved from
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$310 million to $490 million, in which last figure allowance should be made
for inflation. At the same time, the Federal Budget rose from $119 billion
to $185 billion and GNP allegedly from $632 billion to $932 billion. In terms
of the proposed budget for Fiscal Year 1972 the basic imbalance is continued:
though the proposed budget for the National Science Foundation was increased
by $149 million to a total of $516 million, this still represents less than the
cost of two Apollo missions of about $350 million each. This cost compares,
similarly, with total funds for basic and applied research by the U. S.
Atomic Energy Commission of $411 million ($423 million in Fiscal Year 1971).
The total proposed government budget for research and development, though,
increased in Fiscal Year 1972 by 7. 6070to $16.7 billion, a figure slightly
above the previous peak funding in Fiscal Year 1967 of $16 billion in current
dollars (i. e. , before allowing for substantial inflation). If space science
activities are ranked purely within this pool of government research and
development programs, there may appear to be an overemphasis on space
science; if seen in the context of the overall economic resources of the United
States, science, research and development may be underfinanced. The total
NASA budget, including all of manned space flight, amounted in 1970 to hardly
0. 3°70 of GNP.
The undeniable undercurrent of hostility against science in the
country, and to some extent even in Congress and the government, will make
it particularly necessary to put forward a strong and convincing case for
space science. For NASA, science is -- other pronouncements notwith-
standing -- in many ways a side issue, though it should be a primary concern
since in the last analysis science is NASA's chief business. Most scientists will
not need to be convinced, though, that their relationships with NASA could be
greatly improved; they are aware of the enormous debt science owes to
astronomy. The recent astonishing astronomical discoveries are heightening
further expectations. The mood of the public, however, cannot be turned
around very quickly.
A strong case can be made successfully for general benefits
derived from communications, mapping, navigation and, in particular, earth
resources and other activities. All have potentials that have so far hardly
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been described and quantified, let alone exploited. We know of no exhaustive,
carefully determined economic estimates of probable benefits, or of their
distribution over time for different economic activities, regions, countries,
etc. For example, NASA services might easily be integrated in United
States foreign aid programs via weather forecasting, crop reports,
mapping, etc. Such often vital services would not burden the American
balance of payments, or even involve noticeable additonal money outlays.
A better understanding of these magnitudes -- and they would likely be
considerable --would contribute significantly towards a better evaluation
of NASA's activities, especially if they were integrated with a sound esti-
mat-ion of expected uses of future scientific achievements which in their
turn would open up new applications so far not calculated or even envisaged.
These operations involve an intertwining of government and pri-
vate interests, the intricate nature of which ought to be understood and
clarified. This would significantly contribute towards a better ordering of
NASA objectives and the setting of priorities within the overall NASA
program. It is clear that this would influence the NASA budget possibilities
within the framework of the Federal budget. If there were clarifi-
cation in that respect and if it can be shown conclusively how the new Space
Shuttle System can be used to take care of the projected goals, the outlook
for obtaining the necessary continued funding would be greatly improved.
The determination and ordering of goals thus far discussed re-
lates principally to goals within NASA; i. e. , the space agency has to deter-
mine what it wishes to do with a fixed amount of money, or how it can claim
specific funds from Congress presenting an ordered array of projects. Even
when Congress has set an overall amount for NASA, there is the alternative
of either letting NASA settle within the organization how various programs
should be treated given this total amount, or for Congress to approve indi-
vidual projects leading up to the same total. The first alternative may be a
desirable way for the country to treat NASA. But even then the total
amount has to be determined, and it is exceedingly unlikely that any sizable
amount -- several billion dollars -- could be fixed without Congress demand-
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Ling prior information about specific programs and without wanting to decide
upon them separately whenever any individual ones are sizeable. The new
Space Shuttle System certainly falls into this category. The economic analysis
used by M.ATHEMATICA separated the issue of specific NASA programs for
the 1980's and the economic decision on the new STS. The space programs
analyzed and evaluated by MATHEMATICA more than cover the expected lower
range of space activities by either NASA, the Department of Defense or other
outside users. The results of the economic analysis were summarized in a
fashion that leaves the issue of what specific programs NASA_ DoD_ or
Congress will decide upon completely open. No built-in bias or assumptions
were made by MATHEMATICA with regard to future specific programs.
l_ather, the economic summary results lend themselves to rational decisions
by NASA, and by Congress on whether the Space Shuttle System is justified
once the President and Congress, in cooperation with NASA, have decided
on a space program for the 1980's.
The range within which an economic justification for a new STS
lies is well within very low estimates of space activities in the 1980's, and
actually below the level of either United States or USSR space flights in the
1970's. Yet, even this fact does not detract from the ultimate need to be
very specific about the goals which the STS is to support. It is our considered
opinion that no such firm program of sufficient detail has yet been worked out
by NASA. This is by far the weakest point in the entire NASA effort, over-
shadowing the uncertainties in costs and timing of the new Space Shuttle System.
2.3 Limitations of "Benefit-Cost Analysis"
It must be pointed out that what has been called in our reports a
'_enefit-cost analysis actually uses the term '_enefit" in a ver_ - specific and
restricted manner: savings in the cost of space programs, both in the
launch costs and the cost of payloads. Furthermore, the time pattern of the
different missions and their interrelation are crucial in many respects and,
afortiori, this information is also wanting in certainty. MATHEIVLATICA
did use in its economic calculations very specific payload programs for the
period 1979-1990. What we question is the accuracy and finality of these
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specific projections. Furthermore, not only is there considerable
uncertainty associated wif_h these specific projections of space programs,
but the reliability of the cost data as provided to us by the Aerospace
Corporation cannot be determined with complete confidence. It is under-
stood that the Aerospace Corporation has made a considerable effort to
obtain the cost estimates which were provided to MATHEMATICA.
Despite their best efforts, in view of the difficulty of such a task, we
must expect considerable uncertainty to remain in the cost data.
One possible source of uncertainty in the cost data is related to
the estimation of the reliability of launch vehicles and payloads. To take
the effects of the possible failures of either launch vehicles or payloads into
account, the Aerospace Corporation had to increase the operating costs
of launch vehicles or payloads by a certain percentage or by a given amount
to some space programs. In general, with respect to launch vehicles,
the Space Shuttle System was regarded as more reliable than the Expendable
System, since the percentage cost increases were from 6. 5070to 9°70for the
Space Shuttle System as compared with 9% for the F_pendable System. The
treatments regarding the uncertainty of payloads were somewhat different.
For the Expendable System, additional costs due to possible payload failures
were allowed for all programs without backup payloads and all programs with
less than 3 payloads. For the Space Shuttle System, additional costs due
to possible payload failures were allowed for all planetary programs, but
not for others [2]. To the extent that the estimates of the reliability of
launch vehicles and payloads may be subject to errors, the resulting cost
data would also involve some considerable uncertainty.
All economic analysis has to be based on the fundamental fact
of economics that value does not derive from costs and expenditures embodied
in objects or services. Value derives solely from use within a system of
preferences. These have to be established and must fit into the overall system
of preferences of the nation. In other words, a rational NASA value system
must be assumed to exist or must be created. History serves as a useful
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Lguide. Contained within the system must be a part which requires and
justifies a new STS which when identified as far as its missions are con-
cerned, must then fulfill minimum cost requirements or maximum capability
levels for a given budget. This is the only correct way of approaching any
economic analysis of a proposal for a Space Shuttle System. There is no
way of justifying expenditure on anything, no matter what or where, merely
because it is technically possible or otherwise becomes achievable. The
system of preferences is not easy to establish and the process of building
one is usually subject to many influences. Even when established it may
have a complicate@ structure which may also be subject to change over
1
time.
When there is an open market for services, it is easier to deter-
mine the value of new government services. But only a few space applica-
tions have a market price, though one must hope that their domain
will increase [3]. Public investment for; say, water resources can more
easily be evaluated because the need for the water is clear and market prices
also exist for different uses.
In the absence of an appropriate measure of benefit, our '_enefit-
cost analysis" has to measure the '_enefit" solely by savings in the cost of
space programs. The results of the economic analysis show that the
cost levels are nearly proportional to the activity levels. In other words, the
return to space activity when comparing Space Shuttle operations to Expendable
(Rocket) operations can be characterized by constant returns to scale. By
restricting the measurement of '_enefit" solely to cost savings of activities
planned for (more expensive) Expendable_$ystems, we have implicitly
assumed in effect that no benefits can be attributed to the capabilities and
activities peculiar to the Space Shuttle. There are other possible limitations
of a benefit-cost analysis which are more technical in nature. A discussion
of some of these limitations has been provided in Chapter 3 of this report for
readers who may wish to pursue this matter further.
2.4 The Process of Bud_etin_ for Space Expenditures
Figure 2.2 describes the interrelationships among the different
phases through which the Space Shuttle System has to pass before receiving final
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Lapproval or rejection. There are both a time sequence with several feedback
loops as well as a logical structure. Inspection of this figure will show
where MATHEMATICA's final report does fit the analyses.
The figure shows that national goals must be set. They are,
or were, as a rule not very clearly and explicitly formulated, though the
National Goals Commission (since dissolved) was charged with this difficult
i
task. It would be absurd to expect NASA to have a clearer picture and
better interpretation of national goals than other government agencies.
Rather, as with all others, there will be an approximation leading to the
sharp formulation of specific NASA programs. In the present study, we
must assume that national goals are sufficiently definite to allow the estab-
lishment of a preliminary Federal budget. The real process of arriving at
a Federal budget is, of course, very complicated. The budget is not the
result of a simple direct translation of goals into money terms. Rather, it
is the result of a strategic game played among all those who believe they
have claims on the nation's resources. The final outcome of that game is
reflected in the Federal budget. It approximates what Congress thinks is
a fair representation of national preferences and thus a reasonable allocation
of national resources. We shall not enter here into the difficult analysis
of these processes, although understanding them would be of crucial
importance when the various departments and agencies of the government
wish to determine their optimal strategies in budget m_king.
Having stressed the game nature of budget formation one can
nevertheless attempt to reflect government policies to some extent by means
of an econometric model. Such models "allow some projections to be made of
government budgets and, also, of NASA budgets. We consider these matters
in the following section.
It is apparent that the better the preliminary analyses of alter-
native STS's, the better is the chance to anticipate and conform to the ideas
of the Office of Management and Budget in whose attitude should be seen the
financial reflection of national goals and preferences. The fact that prob-
r
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Labilities of mission success have to be included, as well as projections of
outside demand {other agencies, commercial and foreign} which also have
a high degree of uncertainty, makes it clear that stochastic elements
{other than those in the cost estimates) prevail throughout. The present
report merely points out their existence; however, the stochastic factors
in the internal NASA program, as far as the costing and the historical
demand for the STS is concerned, are considered numerically.
2.5 Potential Future Space Expenditures and Budget Requirements of
New Space Transportation Systems
We sketched out earlier how the Federal budgets are determined. In
spite of political factors, the effects of many government policies can be
explicitly evaluated by an econometric model. In an effort to arrive at
alternative forecasts of future NASA budgets, we have constructed such an
econometric model by substantially modifying the widely accepted Klein-
Goldberger model of the United States economy to incorporate the relation-
ships of both government receipts and expenditures. The new model consists
of a system of 28 simultaneous equations describing the development of
production, consumption, and investment activities, as well as the deter-
mination of profits, wages, and interest rates. Several important policy
variables, controllable by the government, have been included in the model.
These include not only monetary policies regarding the discount rate and
reserve requirements, but also fiscal policies relating to corporate and
individual income taxes as well as compensation to government employees,
2
etc.
In this section, we consider some implications of the overall budget
constraints which NASA must take into consideration when introducing a New
Space Transportation System such as the Space Shuttle. Specifically, it
covers-
(l) The future level of NASA budgets as a function only of
NASA's past budgets;
(2) The future level of NASA budgets as a function of
several economic variables in the context of the U. S.
economy in the 1970's; and
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L(3) The required budgets of the Expendable and Reusable
Space Transportation Systems as well as their feasibility
given in (1) and (2).
Were one simply to project the expected NASA or space budgets 3 of the
19701s based only on the trends of NASA and other space appropriations of
the 1960's and early 1970's (see Figure 1. 3 for the 1955 to 1971 Fiscal Year
budgets), the level of space expenditures can be projected to fall from
approximately $3.9 billion in 1971 to only $2.0 billion in 1980 (in 1971
constant dollars). Such projections, in fact, have been made by NASA.
• The projections of space expenditures were obtained simply by first
extrapolating the expenditures for manned space flight, science applications
and military purposes separately and then summing up these separate
extrapolations. These projections, failing to take into consideration the
national economic conditions and the level of government expenditures in
general, appear to be very unrealistic. Making a forecast based only on
trends in past space budgets of different agencies leads to very drastic extra-
polations over a 10-year period; e. g. , the decline of budgets for manned
space flight from approximately $1. 6 billion in 1971 to merely $0.1 billion
in 1980. It must also be noted that while our projections of potential
space expenditures (as all other dollar values in this analysis) are expressed
in billions of constant 1970 dollars, the particular NASA projection is expressed
in billions of constant 1971 dollars.
In Chapter 7 we shall demonstrate that the level of space expenditures
during the past decade has been influenced significantly by economic variables
other than NASA's past budgets. These variables include the level of govern-
meat expenditures in general and the condition of the national economy, such
as the rate of inflation or the rate of unemployment. In order to forecast
NASA budgets or space expenditures, we must therefore be able to forecast
each of these influencing factors which may be simultaneously determined
with many other factors in an econometric model of the national economy.
As an exploratory investigation, an econometric model has been
constructed which is capable of generating reasonable forecasts of the future
national economy, including government receipts and expenditures. The
resulting forecasts were then used to project the future level of expenditures
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ifor space research and technology. Several alternative projections of the
national economy representing expansionary, neutral and restrictive
policies respectively, were obtained for the period 1971-1980. The pro-
jected results of the levels of government expenditures and economic
conditions, such as the rate of inflation, were then used to project
potential future space budgets for the same period. One of these projected
levels of potential future space expenditures, reflecting the neutral
monetary and fiscal policies, is presented in Table 2. i. For comparison,
the funding levels of the three options recommended by the Space Task
Group l_eport (1969) are also provided in the same table. In general, the
levels of our projections are lower than those of all three options, but
are very close to those of the third option.
The projected space expenditures are based on the national
income account concept of "government expenditures for space research
and technology". This concept closely approximates the appropriations
of NASA budgets. For some purposes, however, a broader concept of
space expenditures which includes not only NASA expenditures for space
activities but also the expenditures of the Department of Defense and other
government agencies for space activities may be more meaningful. The
relative importance of NASA's and other government agencies' expenditures
for space activities are shown in Figure 2.3 for the period from 1955 to 1971.
A comparison can be made between the different forecasts of space
budgets for the 1970'S. A surprising result of the work done so far is the
close agreement of the Space Task Group Report projections of NASA's
budget and the independent forecast made by IVLATHEIVLATICA for the late
1970's. These contrast sharply with the budgets projected for NASA and
other space applications based on simple trend extrapolations. The a priori
positing of any arbitrary fixed budget level for space activities, say, $4
billion, would be dangerous for a rational economic choice of the best Space
Transportation System of the 1980's. For historical purposes, if nothing
else, the Space Shuttle and Tug funding requirements for nonrecurring costs
in the 1970's are compared to the activities of NASA in the 1960's in Table
2.2. Compared with an earlier estimate, the present estimate of nonrecurring
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Table 2. 1
Projected Levels of Potential Future Space Expenditures, 1971-80
(Billions of Current Dollars; i.e. , with expected inflation)
Year
(i)
Projected
Total
Re commended ......
Totals - STG
(2) Option I Option 2 Option 3
(3) (4) (5)
1971 3.40_ _ 4.25 3.95 3.95
1972 3.20_ 4.85 4.05 4.05
1973 3.47 5.85 4.25 4.25
1974 3.71 6.80 5.00 5.00
1975 3.94 7.70 5.45 5.45
1976 4.18 8.25 5.50 5.50
1977 4.47 8.75 5.50 5.50
1978 4.78 9.10 5.65 5.50
1979 5.15 9.35 6.60 5.50
1980 5.55 9.40 7.65 5.50
.i¢ ._
Projections based on the econometric model (calendar year),
except 1971, 1972.
The Post-Apollo Space Program: Direction for the Future.
Space Task Group Report to the President, September 1969, p.
Budget figures, January 1971.
22.
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Years
1959-1970
(I
Table 2.2
NASA Budgets: The 1960's Versus the Space Shuttle Non-Recurrin 8 Costs
(Billions of Current Dollars, except Budget Requirements for Space
Shuttle which are expressed in Constant 1970 Dollars)
TA OS-
Manned Space Shuttle
Space NASA Space and Tug *_**
Expenditure* Appropriation Flight_',-'* Apollo*** ( 1 970 Dollars)
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Years
1971-1980
po
!
Do
1959
1960
1961
196Z
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
19 70
0.26 0.33 0.05 0.01 --
0.57 0.52 0.1Z 0.04 --
0.89 0.97 0.30 0.19 --
1.80 1.83 0.54 0.45 0.0Z
3.37 3.67 1.50 1.19 0.23
4.63 5.10 Z.7Z Z. Z8 0.50
5.59 5. Z5 2.96 Z. 63 0.76
5.95 5.18 3_17 Z.97 0.98"
4.86 4.97 3.0Z 2.99 0.97
4.55 4.59 2.81 2.81 0.94
3.95 4.00 2.18 Z. 18 0.74
3.57 3.75 Z.03 Z.03 0.63
* National income account concept of "government expenditures for space research and
technology" (calendar year).
** Includes R&D funding only.
*** Includes R&D funding to Apollo Program and Apollo Applications
***eIncludes RDT&E and Initial Fleet Funding
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
cost_____sof the Space Shuttle program as represented by a typical TAOS is
substantially lower. According to the present estimate, the annual non-
recurring costs of the Space Shuttle System are at no time expected to
exceed $i billion (constant 1970 dollars).
Having compared our projections of space expenditures with
simple extrapolations and with alternative options recommended by the
Space Task Group Report, we may now consider how these projected
overall space expenditures compare with the required budgets for the three
major alternative Space Transportation Systems throughout the 1970's.
Since the ability to project the overall space expenditures beyond 1980 is
obviously very uncertain, we shall confine our comparison to the period
from 1971 to 1980. For the purpose of this comparison, we shall select
only the Reduced Baseline Model (Scenario 32) though many other mission
models have also been examined in the present report.
In order to avoid the uncertainty associated with the possible
inflation, the budget requirements of alternative Space Transportation
Systems are expressed in undiscounted 1970 dollars. Furthermore, the costs
associated with the military missions for the Department of Defense are
excluded. For comparison, the projected overall space expenditures were
also converted into 1970 dollars. Table 2. 3 shows such a comparison together
with the percentage of the overall budget that would be absorbed if one of
the three alternative Space Transportation Systems were selected.
The budget requirements of the Space Shuttle System reach their
peak in 1979 at $2. 36 billion, and the budget requirements of the Current
Expendable and New Expendable Systems reach their peaks in 1981 at $3.14
and $2.97 billion respectively. Furthermore, the Space Shuttle System would
4
absorb more than 50% of all space expenditures from 1978 on. The same is
also true for the Current Expendable and the New Expendable Systems.
Notice that the budget requirements of the Space Shuttle System for 1979 and
1980 are lower than those of the alternative Expendable Systems.
It must be pointed out that all of the foregoing conclusions have been
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Table Z. 3
NASA Budgets Requirements of Alternative Space
Transportation Systems, 1971-80
(Billions of 1970 Dollars)*
Year
(1)
Space Transportation Systems*_,
(DoD not included)
Potential
NASA Space Space Current New
Expenditures Shuttle Expendable Expendable
(Z) (3) (4) (5)
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
3.32 0 0 0
3.04 0.02 (1%)*** 0 0
3.19 0.23 (7%) 0 0
3.31 0.50 (15%) 0 0
3.40 0.78 (23%) 0.(}9 (3%)*** 0. 10 (3%)***
3.50 1.07 (31%) 0.29 (8%) 0. 32 (9%)
3.62 1.46 (41%)**** 1.00 (28%)**** 1.06 (29%)
3.75 2. 14 (58%) 1.96 (53%) 1.97 (53%)
3.91 2.36 (61%) 2.58 (66%) 2.46 (63%)
4.08 2.36 (59%) 2.99 (75%) 2.67 (67%)
In billions of (constant) 1970 dollars, i.e. , without inflation for all figures
shown in the table. Rates of inflation were predicted, based on a neutral
economic policy, by year from 1971 to 1980. These rates were used to
obtain "Potential NASA Space ExpenditureS" in Column (2).
** Including costs of payload, based on the Reduced Baseline Model (Scenario 32)
constructed by MATHEMATICA.
*** Column (3) as percent Of column (2)
Colurrm (4) as percent of column (2)
Column (5) as percent of column (2)
**** DoD funding no_.__tincluded.
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based on our projections of potential space expenditures and a particular
space mission model. While the reliability of the projected space expendi-
tures cannot be easily assessed, they are quite consistent with the alter-
native recommendations of the Space Task Group Report. As to budget
requirements, it was found that the budget requirements in the 1970's of
alternative Space Transportation Systems relative to one another would not
change significantly when the modified space mission model of 514 Space
Shuttle flights of the 1980's is taken as the basis for evaluation. For these
reasons, the conclusions regarding the peaks and scheduling of alternative
Space Transportation Systems should generally be true, even if the pre-
dictions of potential space expenditures and the particular set of budget
requirements for altermtive Space Transportation Systems are more ten-
tative in nature. The question of required Space Shuttle fundings in the
context of the overall NASA budget of the 1970's is discussed in more detail
in Chapter L.
Z. 6 The Impact of Space Expenditures
In the previous discussion of the goals and nature of space pro-
grams, we have stressed that the fulfillment of space goals cannot be con-
sidered separately from that of many other national goals. The reason
lying behind this argument is the intrinsic nature of joint supply and joint
demand associated with any space program. Therefore, the goals of space
programs must be carefully coordinated with other national goals, which may
either be economic, political, or military. Although it is extremely important
to consider all of these goals, this is beyond the scope of the present report.
which deals mainly with economic issues of Space Transportation Systems.
Frequently one may encounter an apparently reasonable argument to the
effect that space programs can greatly contribute to economic growth and
full employment. This assertion, however, is very difficult to support by
a careful analysis, once it is realized that the funds provided for space
exploration can have other alternative uses which are not necessarily less --
or more -- beneficial to economic growth and full employment. Until very
recently there have been few rigorous studies of the economic impact of
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space expenditures or of new Space Transportation Systems. To fill this
gap, we have undertaken a task of investigating the spending impact of
space expenditures on various industries or groups of industries by using
input-output analysis techniques. Specifically, we have attempted to
evaluate the impact of the reallocation (not simple elimination) of a $3
billion space expenditure to some alternative uses in terms of the effects
on production and employment. The results of this investigation have been
reported elsewhere. Since the study has provided useful information for
decision-making in space exploration, some of the significant findings are
summarized below.
The analysis of the spending impact of space expenditures on the
national economy has been based on the most recent (1963) input-output
tables. The relative impact was, however, computed by comparing the
estimated effect to an estimated 1970 level of production and employment.
We had conducted a similar analysis by using the earlier 1958 input-output
tables and found that most results were not significantly different from those
based on the 1963 tables. Therefore, no effort has been made to update the
1963 input-output tables to a 1970 basis. In fact, whether an updating can im-
prove the results of our analysis is somewhat doubtful.
Besides the spending impact of space expenditure on production
and employment, four other alternative expenditures have been considered.
These include new construction, cornnlunication and transportation equipment,
medical and educational services as well as research and development in
general. The impact of the reallocation of a $3 billion space expenditure into
each of the four alternative uses was evaluated first in terms of production
levels then in terms of employment level.
The spending impact of a reallocation of $3 billion from space ex-
penditures to each of the four alternative uses was found to be relatively
unimportant, except for those industries which are directly affected. This
is shown to be true both in terms of the production levels and the employment
levels of various industries. In fact, except for those industries which are
directly affected by the reallocation of $3 billion, almost no industry would
be affected either beneficially or adversely by more than I_0 of the 1970
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production or employment level.
As to the impact on the industries which are directly affected by
the reallocation of $3 billion in space expenditures, while it is true that
ordnance and aircraft industries together would decrease their production
by nearly $4 billion annually, it must also be recognized that the alter-
native industry would increase its production by more than $3 billion (though
it may not be as high as $4 billion). Similarly, in terms of employment,
while it is true that transportation equipment and ordnance industries would
lose about 170 thousand man years of employment, it must also be recog-
nized that the alternative industry would gain more or less the same level
of employment, depending on its labor intensity.
As an example of the foregoing conclusions, we may mention
only the major impact of the reallocation of $3 billion from space to
communication and transportation equipment. According to our analysis,
such a reallocation may be expected to decrease the annual production of
ordnance and accessories by $i. 2 billion (about 11% of 1970 level) and the
annual production of aircraft industries by $2.6 billion (also about 11°70of
1970 level). At the same time such a reallocation may be expected to
increase the annual production of communication equipment by $2.1
billion (about 10g0 of the 1970 level) and the annual production of transporta-
tion equipment by $i. 0 billion (about 12°70of 1970 level). The only other
industry which may be expected to he affected either beneficially or adversely
by more than 1% of its own 1970 level is manufacturers of machine shop
products. Its annual production may be expected to fall by about 3°70 of 1970
level, which is only $0.1 billion. In terms of employment, the group of trans-
portation equipment and ordnance industries may be expected to lose 125
thousand man years (about 10% of 1970 level). At the same time, the group
of electrical machinery industries may be expected to gain 118 thousand
man years (about 6°70 of 1970 level). Therefore, on balance the net long-
term effect on the whole economy, both in terms of production and employ-
ment is largely negligible. Therefore, the spending effect and employment
argument should be used neither for nor against the development of a Space
Shuttle System. It must be recognized, however, that some significant
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Leffects can be found for those industries and locations which are directly
affected by a reallocation of the fundings, both in terms of production and
employme nt.
Z. 7 Final Remarks
From our analysis there emerges an important lesson: the Space
Shuttle would have to be "drastically" better and cheaper in operation, and
would have to accomplish approved tasks that are out of reach of existing
and/or modified existing systems, in order to be considered. This applies
particularly if the new system requires large initial investments, long lead
times and is a long term commitment from which it would be very hard to
return. Only such "drastic" improvements make it at all likely that the new
system can stand the test of economic analysis, in particular with a relatively
high social rate of discount -- say, 10% -- measuring the social opportunity
cost of investment funds. The results of our analysis show that the new
Space Shuttle System does significantly improve NASA's operations, not by
orders of magnitude, but more than sufficiently when a 10% social rate of
discount is applied in the analysis. The report does clearly document the
substantial savings in payload costs due to reuse, refurbishment, updating
and on-orbit check-out of payloads. Whether the Space Shuttle System, and
which particular Space Shuttle configuration, is technically suited to best
achieve reuse, refurbishment, and updating of payloads, as well as check-
out on orbit, is strictly an engineering task, which again can be subject to
economic analysis, however, in a different context. We believe this tech-
nology to be feasible. MATHEMATICA did estimate the maximum P_DT&E
outlays that could be justified on econom}c grounds to develop such
capability. The typical Space Shuttle System currently under consideration
appears to lie well within that region.
The entire question of the size of the future NASA budget is sharply
illuminated in Figure 2. 3. Although one should always be wary in trying to
predict the future from the past, it is clear that it will take strong argu-
ments and a significant change in the environment in which decisions regard-
ing NASA's share in national resources -- small as it is, especially when
allowing for the expansion of the economy -- are made, in order to achieve
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a sudden turn-around in appropriations such that on top of the current expend-
iture pattern a new large investment is authorized, one which commits funds
in a rigorous manner into a rather distant future. That is, the Space Shuttle,
once started, takes a number of years to construct and then requires oper-
ation for a substantial period of time in order to be "amortized". However,
the TAOS System promises substantially reduced nonrecurring costs in the
1970's when compared to the Two-Stage Fully Reusable Shuttle System of
May 31, 1971. As shown in Chapter i, many of the "peak funding" constraints
have thereby been alleviated.
It is, unfortunately, not normally the policy of Congress to budget
important and complicated long- range programs for several years ahead of
tirr_. It will be particularly difficult to obtain firm funds of this nature at
present even though the new Space Shuttle System (TAOS) proves to be
strongly cost-effective. The fact that this type of funding -- and indeed funding
on a substantially larger scale -- was once obtained for Apollo was due to
a combination of circumstances which do not now hold. At that time,
President Kennedy had announced a goal that was nationally acceptable,
exciting, and in competition with expected Soviet efforts. We are now far
from this. Even under the most favorable circumstances the Space Shuttle --
startling as the concept is and with a much further ranging potential than
Apollo ever had -- cannot compete with the drama of placing men on the Moon
and doing this for the first time in human history. In addition, when that
goal was announced and the decision made, there was no war to cope with
(or to liquidate), and the awareness of grave problems now felt by the pub-
lic such as pollution, destruction of the "environment, population increase
(all with the additional factor of unrest, e.g., among the young), was insig-
nificant. Yet, in terms of economic analysis, and promise of future tech-
nological, scientific and economic opportunities, the development of the
Space Shuttle is by orders of magnitude more importanC
The Space Shuttle is a means of achieving lower space transporta-
tion and space payload costs. If, and only if, this is documented to the satis-
faction of NASA and Congress should this investment be made. Present eco-
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nomic data so far show the Space Shuttle -- and particularly TAOS -- to be
cost effective.
A few remarks have to be made regarding the STS investment
decision when compared, for example, to the development of the Supersonic
Transport (SST). It may appear that the proposal for a new STS is similar
to that for a supersonic transport plane for which Congress denied funds in
March 1971. However, the two are fundamentally different, both technologically
as well as economically. The SST would have used and developed well-known
technology further, since many supersonic planes -- mostly military -- have
been built by many nations. It would have been a private effort merely under-
written by the government. The SST would serve no scientific purpose in
its uses; the planes would merely transport persons able to pay the fare, at
any rate only a small fraction of the travelling public.
The Space Shuttle, on the other hand, can never be a private enter-
prise. Its construction and operation is a government matter, though its
services may be made available to domestic and foreign business. Its
dimensions are far larger, both in inves_nent as well as over time; indeed,
it would be the largest technological effort of the country, comparable only
to the Manhattan and the Apollo projects.
In concluding we list a number of problems which must be settled,
but which are beyond this assignment:,
(a) The expected demand for Space Shuttle services
has to be studied in detail, nationally and inter-
nationally, as a function of launch costs and pay-
load costs. This is a complicated undertaking
which will also involve a fair amount of field work.
(b) The cost analysis of payloads in orbit in our analysis
did include the costs of developing the payloads for
alternative STS (the Current Expendable System,
the New Expendable System and the Space Shuttle
System). The costs of satellite data handling and
distribution of the space program for the 1980's were
not included in the analysis in sufficient detail. These
L.
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(c)
costs should be similar for the three systems,
though the Space Shuttle System may lead to
important reduction of these costs in some
•areas. Information about these matters is
needed, but estimates will be hard to make
and to evaluate.
There is a need to quantify the benefits to the
nation of more and more space applications. As
in cases where numbers have to be obtained from
qualitative or mixed qualitative-quantitative
information, this is a difficult matter as anyone
who has ever attempted to do so will attest.
Yet, it is clear that rational decision making
would be aided if more meaningful numbers
could be arrived at to quantify the benefits and
the prospective uses of space. When a proposed
investment is very large, this effort is, indeed
worthwhile though there is no guarantee of success
in all respects.
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Preferences of values may be incomparable to each other (i.e.,
be only "partially" ordered), or they may be easily and clearly
"completely") ordered according to importance, yet some, so
ordered may lack the so-called "Archimedian property" of
continuity. The problem of optimal allocation of scarce resources
is in each of these cases a different one and sometimes is only
settled by complicated political processes. It would lead too far to
discuss these matters here, vital though they are. (For more
detail and illustrations cf.: O. Morgenstern, "The Economic Worth
of the Space Program," in Astronautics and Aeronautics, Vol. 6-
No. 2, (1968) pages 45-51).
For more detailed discussion see K. H. Young, "A Macro Econometric
Model for Projections of National Economy and Space Expenditure",
Working Paper, MATHEMATICA, October 1971, in part incorporated
in Chapter 7 below.
Space budgets include the Department of Defense space appropriations
as well as other non-NASA space activities.
At the peak of the Apollo Program, the comparable ratios were
approximately 50% and 60°f0 for 1966 and 1967 respectively.
During the preparation of this report, two technical papers prepared
by North Arrerican Rockwell have come to our attention. They are:
C. M. Merz, T. A. Gibson and Ward Seitz, "Impact of the Space Shuttle
Program on the National Economy", SD 71-478, March 1971 and T.A.
Gibson and C. M. Merz, "Impact of the Space Shuttle Program on the
Economy of Southern California", SD71-762, September 1971.
K. H. Young, "The Impacts of Space Expenditure on the National
Economy in ihe United States", Working Paper, MATHEMATICA,
October 1971. See also Section 7.2 of Chapter 7 which includes some
materials based on this paper.
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lCHAPTER 3.0
THE _THEORY OF BENEFIT-COST AND
COST-E FFE CTIVENESS ANALYSIS
3. 1 The Approach Used in This Analysis
In trying to apply economic principles when determining the most
economic Space Transportation System, the analysis is hampered by one major
drawback when compared to the economic evaluation of other transportation
systems: there does not at present exist in the United States economy any
"free" market where the demand for space transportation and supply of space
transportation services are determined by the interplay of many consumers
and many producers. Rather, we find a situation similar to that of Depart-
ment of Defense decisions where two major consumers are two government
agencies, the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. On the supply side, we find at most ten to twelve major com-
panies competent to compete for major aerospace hardware systems. Thus,
huge investment expenditures are decided on the basis of technical criteria,
political processes, national priorities, etc. Most important, instead of a
market value the costs of systems is frequently used as a substitute for the
measurement of economic value, a very questionable economic practice.
This does not mean that economic decisions made in such an environ-
ment have to be less rational than those made in the free market. The means
of arriving at economic decisions is different. The basic assumption of an
economic analysis in the absence of market indicators is, and has to be,
that the decisions on the actual budgets - " the budgets for the 1960's and the
1970's -- do reflect in effect national priorities. One has to assume further
that within each agency the programs outrank in priority projects not under-
t_aken by the agency. In other words, we have to make the assumption that
the resources allocated to space activities in the United States, both by NASA
and by the Department of Defense, are efficient in an economic sense: that
the needed resources of NASA and of the Department of Defense are minimized
to achieve a given capability demanded by Congress or the Administration --
i. e., cost minimization is achieved -- or, given the resources allocated to NASA
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and to the Department of Defense a maximum capability is developed with
these funds within NASA and DoD. Given that the agency funds, particularly
within the Department of Defense, compete with other programs within the
same agency, the assumption of economic efficiency within each agency is
not completely unreasonable. In this analysis we do not have to assume that
the budget level is optimal.
Given this basic assumption, cost-effectiveness analysis, in a
strict sense, is only concerned with identifying technically feasible systems
that assure either a maximum of space transportation capability at any given
budget level or a minimum cost for any given space transportation capability.
Although in economic theory this is a rather straightforward task, in practice
it proves very difficult to determine the cost-effective systems, either for
the present technology or for the projected new Space Transportation Systems.
Figure 3. i shows a hypothetical example of the cost efficiency frontier for
the space program in terms of space missions to low earth orbit for 1970
technology (i.e. , expendable rocket technology). The vertical axis in Figure
3. i represents the capability measured in terms of numbers of payload missions
flown to low earth orbit, and the horizontal axis measures the costs (the bud-
gets required) to deliver that payload to low earth orbit. The figure is basic
to an understanding of cost-effectiveness calculations for analyzing the econo-
mics of new Space Transportation Systems. The shaded area in Figure 3. i
shows the regioll of possible costs of payloads in low earth orbit. That is,
a given space program capability of, say, k I can be delivered to low earth
orbit certainly for a budgetof b I -- about 46 space missions -- can be lifted
to low earth orbit for $3.0 billion, including payload costs. The same capa-
bility, i.e., 43 payload missions, can also be lifted up and delivered to low
earth orbit for more than $3.0 billion, e. g. , for $3.5 billion or $4.0 billion.
Such a cost to capability combination would lie to the right of k I in the shaded
area shown in Figure 3. i below the efficiency frontier (cost curve). Similarly,
for the same budget of $3.0 billion, we could have a smaller space program,
for example, a capability k 0 (35 flights). Again, these combinations would
lie below the efficiency frontier within the shaded area of Figure 3. i. As
we move from one point within the shaded area -- the feasible region of
space project/cost combinations -- toward the left and upward, we improve
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the economics of systems choice. Cost-effectiveness analysis is concer _.ed
with finding space transportation programs where no increased capability
(more payloads in low earth orbit) is possible without a corresponding ill-
crease in budgetary funding. Also, for systems that are cost-effective, iao
further decrease in cost is possible without a corresponding decrease i_
capability. The set of cost-efficient points -- the cost curve -- is shown by
the boundary of the shaded area, F0F 0, in Figure 3. i. By inspection, we
see that P0 -- a point not on the frontier -- is not cost-effective. The syste_
P0 requires a budget of b 0 and promises a capability of k 0. We can find
other space transportation programs different from P0 that offer more capa-
bility in terms of payloads delivered to low earth orbit or less cost or both.
One of such programs is shown at PI' with a budget requirement of b 1
(smaller than b 0) and a capability of k I (larger than k0).
From the shape of the cost efficiency frontier, we also observe that
by increasing the budget of the space program we add -- along the cost curve --
capabilities. But as we move out to larger and larger funding levels, any
additional funding yields smaller and smaller increments in capability. Ire
other words, the shape of the efficiency frontier reflects increasing marginal
costs as the capability requirements of space transportation expand. In
Figure 3. i, two cases are shown to illustrate this point. The change in capa-
bility of Ak 2 is equal to the change in capability of Ak 3 -- at a higher funding
level. But the absolute increase in capability is bought at an increased in
cremental cost ( Ab 3 > Ab2). In many large-scale, advanced technologies,
this efficiency frontier may well be a straight line over a considerable ran____
of the cost efficiency frontier. The inter.cept of the efficiency frontier with
the horizontal axis does indicate the minimum (fixed) costs of buying an_:
amount of capability of space transportation. Thus, a straight line efficie1;<:y
frontier with a positive intercept at the cost (budget) line would indicate a
Space Transportation System with constant marginal (incremental) cost_ a_d
decreasing average costs. This is what we actually find to hold for Space
Transportation Systems, the Current Expendable and the new, fully reu_ab!e.
The case shown in Figure 3. 1 is more general and includes, in princi_,']_,
the more specific case of the new Space Transportation Systems as we v_.iil
see later on.
L-
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LThe task of benefit-cost analysis is more demanding. While cost-
effectiveness analysis tries to identify the systems (for space programs)
along the "efficiency frontier" (the cost curve), benefit-cost analysis attempts
to select a single space program from all possible cost-effective candidates.
To do this, however, we have to use a benefit (utility or value) measure of
all the conceivable space programs within the range of technology -- a task
we do not propose to solve and which may be an intractable task. Given in-
formation on the economic value of these programs, we can then, in theory,
select an optimum space program.
This choice process can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 3.2
which shows the cost curve and the benefit curve confronting 'the decision
maker and the actual capability and cost levels of several space programs.
It should be noted, first of all, that the cost curve in Figure 3.2 differs
from that shown in Figure 3. I. The latter denotes "recurring costs per
year" as a function of "capability per year. " The cost curve in Figure 3.2,
on the other hand, refers to "total program costs over the entire planning
horizon." Since "total program costs" are incurred over time, it must be
assumed that all costs are adjusted for the time value of economic resources.
The time stream of space program benefits, summed up in the benefit curve,
also is assumed to have been discounted appropriately.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the general relation between space program
costs and space program benefits. Observe that at higher and higher levels
of capability, an additional (marginal) space mission becomes increasingly
more costly in our example -- the same cost curve as in F_gure 3. 1 -- the
marginal cost of space mission increaseswhile, at the same time, the
marginal benefit derived becomes increasingly smaller. 1 The assumption of
progressively decreasing marginal benefits is based on the notion that
successive additions to space programs will perform successively less
valuable missions and, at some point, may well reach a saturation point,
which means that the benefit curve in Figure 3.2 will eventually become
vertical.
At a given level of capability, say k0, "net program benefit" is
measured by the horizontal distance between the benefit and cost curves.
L_
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LIn Figure 3.2, the net benefit at k 0 is given by the distance CD; at k I, it is
given byAB. Recall that the cost curve is really an efficiency frontier
associating a given level of capability with the least cost Space Transportation
System which, with given technology, will provide that capability. The
optimal space program therefore is the one corresponding to the scenario at
which the distance between the benefit and the cost curves, i.e., the net
benefit, is maximized. It is the capability level at which the cost curve and
the benefit curves have the same slope, i.e., at which marginal (incremental)
benefits are just equal to marginal (incremental) costs. In Figure 3.2 this
optim_n space program is k i"
Some cost analysts prefer to define the optimum capability level
(and the corresponding optimum space program) as that level at which the
ratio of program benefits to program costs is maximized. In Figure 3.2,
that level might be capability k 0 at which, however, the net program benefit
2
is seen to be suboptimal. It was shown in the earlier MATHEMATICA
report that the so-called benefit/cost ratio is not a reliable criterion of
program evaluation while the "net-program-benefit" criterion generally leads
to the economically correct choices. The economic implications of a full
benefit-cost analysis of the space program are illustrated in Figure
3.2.
Having established these fundamental points we notice that the
benefit (value) relationship of space programs within the range of technology
cannot be measured quantitatively at present -- if it can ever be. The next
section explains the economic analyses possible within the confines of cost-
effectiveness analysis.
3.1.1 Equal Capability and Equal Budget Analysis of the Space Transporta-
tion System
The above general definition of cost-effectiveness analysis has
to be applied to the analysis of a large breakthrough promised by a new
technological system -- the fully reusable Space Transportation System --
where all the space transportation programs of the past may become cost
inefficient once the new system is available. Technological innovation -- the
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new, fully reusable, two-stage Space Transportation System -- will change
the efficiency frontier (cost curve of space programs). In general, techno-
logical change will shift the efficiency frontier F0F 0 of Figure 3.1 upward
and towards the left -- i.e. , it will lower costs or increase capabilities.
Figure 3. 3 shows that shift from F0F 0 to FIF 1 and represents in our case
the change in expected recurring costs of the space program before the
fully reusable Space Transportation Systems becomes available. If techno-
logical change occurs throughout the range of interests (the likely space
transportation budgets in the 1980's or likely space program requirements
in the 1980' s) then the shift will take place along entire F0F 0 as shown in
Figure 3. 3. If the New Space Transportation System brings about in-
creased efficiency at larger scales of operation only, then the shift in F 0
F 0 will take place only at larger cost/budget levels and leave the lower
points of F0F 0 more or less unchanged.
If one evaluates an efficient space program for expendable space
transportation technology, for example, P0' one sees that the space program
P0 is not any more cost effective with regard to the new, fully reusable
technology FIF I. Given the new Space Transportation System, we can find
other space programs (low cost payloads, reusable Space Transportation
System vehicles) that provide the same capability at less cost (space
program PI) or a larger space program with more flights and a larger num-
ber of payloads at the same budget level (space program P2).
Therefore, within the confines of cost-effectiveness analysis
(strictly defined), one may ask the following two questions:
(a) Equal capability effic_iency for a given capability level:
What are the net cost savings that can be achieved by
adopting new technology and are these cost savings
(for example, the distance P0Pl ), large enough to
justify the initial (non-recurring) outlay on RDT&E
and new hardware over the uselife of the new system?
(Figure 3.4)
(b) Equal budget efficiency: What increases in the capability l_
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Lof payloads in low earth orbit are brought about by
technological change, the new Space Transpor_ati_
System, at the same budget level after the new sy_.e:_
has been introduced, and will the economic va!m.,_ _
this added capability through the re_,sable Spa,:.:
Transportation System justify ,+.here:J,_Tire_!_iui.l:!_"
outlays on RDT&:E and new hardware: over the u_:_: _
of the new system? (Figure 3. 5)
Question (a), illustrated in Figure 3.4 on t}:_ebasis o_ S,.:._:,_,'.,
3 and 23 by MATHEMATICA, is by far the easier one to an,3wer fret,, _:
empirical point of view in the context of the new Space Transportat.[o:_
System. In answering that question, one need only make the assurv_cqi. _:
-- prior to the development of the new Space Transportatior_ Syster_J -.
that societyis willing to spend $3.0 billion to place 43 pay].oa@ _'Ii.ght_}::._
low earth orbit per year. The reader should notice that the on].y_ a_:]
crucial, assumption is that the $3.0 billion allocated to space tr_.sp:.,t[n i_i-
by the Department of Defense and NASA jolnt].y _average ev_-:r ¢:he yc_:r _
from 1963 to 1970) are being spent in an efficient way, that _s, no si_z_',bli._
cost cutbacks could be achieved for the same progranl capabilities e!._-'__ '
in the Department of Defense or in the science and applica_ on_ _orc.g:_--_,_
of NASA -- that is, excluding for the moment any question of rnanu_z_J _[::: _
flight efficiency. We do not assume, and do not have to assume, for #__e
purposes of our analysis that the fll_ht level or the size of the space [_.
gram -- the particular space transportation capability -- is an opti.ms_
one. The only assumption is that the $3.0 billion capability/cost prog; ._,_:,
really lies on the cost efficiency frontier of space technology in ]970. _ _.
that assumption, a very conservative and objective estimate of the be_:_ ! ,_
from the new Space Transportation System is the annual cost savlng_
($2.0 billion in absolute dollars at the activity level of the present spa_: _
program, Scenario 23, of our overall economic analysis).
A whole set of equal capability analyzes has been made e i,__
a varying level of budget activities, for a variety of about twer_tT! .(,._:u_
different space programs for the 1980's.
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It is much more difficult, in practice, to ask question (b)
above and illustrated in Figure 3.5. The question really amounts to
asking:
(b') Given the fact that we could fly a total of 43 payload
flights per year to low earth orbit annually at a cost of
$2.0 billion, does the economic value of additional
payloads which could be placed in orbit by spending an
extra $2.0 billion annually -- that is, a total of $4.0
billion with an additional set of about 43 flights per
year -- justify the additional expenditure?
Clearly, this question cannot be answered unless one can, in fact, place a
value on the additional 22 payloads per year placed into orbit. In other
words, question (b) really requires one to know society's demand curve for
space missions. The assumptions necessary for such a cost-effectiveness
analysis of the new Space Transportation System are spelled out in the next
section.
3.1.2
The Measurement of Induced Benefits from Incremental Space
Activities
In measuring the economic benefits of additional flights for
"equal budget" analyses (beyond those already undertaken under the Current
]Expendable System), one has to take into account one basic axiom of econo-
mic theory: as additional missions are added to the existing space program,
they will increase the total utility received by society, bythe agency, or by
the scientific community; however, the increment in utility received by
society or the consumer will be decreasing as the number of missions
increases. This should hold for NASA, as well as other government agencies.
In earlier reports, we pointed out some of the reasoning that lies behind the
construction of such a relationship which ultimately leads to a negatively
sloped demand curve for transportation services.
For the Space Transportation System to be evaluated in this
report, the analogue to point P0 =(Q0' F0) is already known, it is the
baseline mission model (Scenario 3) (i.e., traffic level Q0) equivalent
to roughly 46 Shuttle flights per year (see also Figures 3. 1 through 3.5).
3-13
The cost per mission -- including payload cost -- under the
Current Expendable System is about $60 million. The corresponding
cost per mission for the fully reusable Space Transportation System is
two-thirds that amount, i.e., $40 million. These data are depicted in
Figure 3.6. One need not know the precise shape of the demand curve
above section F0P 0 in order to estimate the direct benefits from the intro-
duction of the Shuttle for "equal capability" analyses. These benefits are
defined to be the cost savings indicated by area FIFoPoP 1in Figure 3.6.
The points P0' PI' P2 correspond exactly to the same points in the earlier
figures of this section. If one were to treat the direct cost savings as the
only economic return from the new Space Transportation System, then one
assumes implicitly that the demand curve is a straight, vertical line going
through points Q0 and P0o This is a conservative assumption, indeed, as
it assumes that only a fixed capability is to be placed into space, irrespec-
tive of transportation and payload costs. With this assumption, one can
infer something closely akin to a demand curve. This inferred "demand
curve" is shown as the rectangular hyperbola labeled DD in Figure 3.6.
The product of any combination F and Q on this demand curve will be
equal to a constant budget outlay.
In Figure 3.6, Q0 represents the space program roughly re-
flecting the activity level of the 1960's for NASA and for the Department of
Defense. The new capability Q1 reflects the possible incremental capability
if NASA and DoD do operate under a constant budget approach. This incre-
ment is shown in Figure 3.6 -- going from 43 space missions to low earth
orbit (Q0) to 65 missions to low earth orbit (QI). The increment under the
equal budget hypothesis is given by the point where the costs per mission,
that is FIF 1 in Figure 3.6, intersect the "constant budget" demand curve,
DD. The increment in activities AQ shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 is about
22 space missions. The induced benefits to be added on to the direct benefits
is the area shown as B under the demand curve. This area was defined
earlier as the "induced benefits." Given the size of the cost savings im-
plied by the new Space Transportation System (roughly thirty-five percent
for the various agencies in launch costs, payload costs, and payload re-
search and development costs) the added activity under the constant budget
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ihypothesis adds up to, roughly, another 50 to 60 percent of Q0" However,
the measured benefits shown under the demand curve amount only to 25
to 30 percent of the estimate which would have been made based on a cost
savings approach for the total activity level, shown as area B and C in
Figure 3.6.
For the actual calculations presented in this report, we pro-
ceeded as follows: F l represents the cost per equivalent mission capability
in orbit for the new Space Transportation System. The expression
"equivalent mission capability" or "equivalent payload flight" requires
some explanation. One of the major sources of cost savings provided by
the fully reusable Space Transportation System is that it will permit heavier
and, therefore, cheaper payloads since the absence of the weight constraints
will allow the construction of less expensive payloads in a shorter time.
Also, a major cost savings in the payload costs, both for research and de-
velopment as well as per unit costs is derived from the reuse and refurbish-
ment capability of the new Space Transportation System, a capability not
existing for expendable systems for economic reasons. From the data that
were provided by Aerospace Corporation and LMSC it is shown that, for
equal capability, the Shuttle will put up payloads at a cost saving of nearly
30 percent in both OSSA and the DoD as well as application programs, with
different payload weights and different numbers of actual space flights.
In order to make the two systems comparable, the cost per pound
of payload in orbit or the numbers of space missions for the new Space
Transportation System are changed by a factor which varies from payload
to payload for our purposes, say a factor of 1.6 (for payload mass) and for
number of space flights, say a factor of 0.7. The area OFoPoQ 0 in Figure
3.6 represents the baseline activity costs of the Current Expendable System.
The c0st of the Shuttle for a traffic level Q0 is shown by the area OFIPIQ 0.
The shaded area FIFoPoP l represents the cost savings of the Shuttle over
the Current Expendable System. Then we calculate the induced benefits
from the increased activity level that would be stimulated by the lower costs
of the fully reusable Space Transportation System for space missions.
From the mission programs, and the cost data provided, is seen L
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Lfrom Figure 3.6 that the new, fully reusable Space Transportation System
could send up roughly double the payload capability at the same total pro-
gram costs. The demand curve defined in Figure 3.6 is shown for a total
budget of funding level for space transportation activities, including payload
costs of $3. 0 billion, not including manned space flight activities. With
the reduction of payload costs in orbit, the activity level would then increase
to Ql where the cost curve of the fully reusable Space Transportation System
intersects the demand curve. The added activity level in equivalent space
missions to low earth orbit is, in the example chosen, roughly 22 flights
a year. This amounts to a total of about 65 flights to low earth orbit for
the new Space Transportatio n System at a cost of roughly $40 million per
miss_on including payload costs. The induced benefits generated by the
Shuttle at the additional activity level is therefore represented by the area
labeled B under the demand curve in Figure 3.6. This represents the con-
sumer surplus or the benefit to society, of the new Space Transportation
System for the increased activity level AQ. The area B is easily computed.
B, the benefits due to induced activity, can be calculated as:
B = $3.0 billion (In Ol - In Q0) - A = $0.40 billion {per year}.
The total undiscounted benefits of the new Space Transportation
System per year would therefore equal the original cost savings of $i. 0
billion plus the incremental benefits of about $400 million, or together about
$1.40 billion per year. It is the sum of the areas shown by A and B in Figure
3.6. In the "Equal Budget" cost-effectiveness analysis, one factor is of
overriding importance: the cost per space flight under t}_e different
Space Transportation System -- the Current Expendable System and the
new, fully reusable Space Transportation System. As a matter of fact,
all of the RDT&E and initial investment costs of a new Space Transporta-
tion System aim at reducing the operating cost of space programs -- the
larger this decrease in costs per flight, the larger the expected cost
savings for NASA and DoD missions, and the greater the economic attraction
of space technology for commercial ventures. The greater the reductions
in the cost per space flight {including payload costs}, the more we will
move out along the "demand curve" for space transportation shown in
Figure 3.6.
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L3.2 Costs and Benefits: A Unified Concept
The purpose of this section is to examine in greater detail
the problem of the comparison and estimation of the benefits derived from
the new Space Shuttle System. The term, benefit-cost analysis, is mis-
leading insofar as it implies that the costs of undertaking an investment
project are conceptually distinct from the benefits derived from it, and
that the categories of costs and benefits must be estimated separately.
For example, suppose that one train costs the same as three
buses, and that one train carries i00 passengers between points A and B,
whereas one bus can carry only twenty passengers over the same route.
If there are i00 passengers to be transported and providing there are no
other costs to be considered, then presumably the train should be assigned
to carry the passengers. The use of buses to carry the passengers will
either increase the cost of carrying a given number of passengers or re-
duce the benefits achieved from a given expenditure in that few passengers
will be carried. A cost is simply a negative benefit. A cost saved is a
positive benefit. If, for purposes of estimation a distinction is made be-
tween costs and benefits, the line between the two will depend upon the
particular structure of the project being analyzed. In the case of the
cost-effectiveness approach discussed below, the line becomes blurred
and the conceptual identity of costs and benefits emerges.
3.2.1 Problems of Definition and Measurement
The framework developed by economists for the analysis of
costs involves a description of the relationship between cost and output
levels. Total cost curves measure the total cost of producing each
possible quantity of output, and total cost is related to fixed, variable,
marginal and average cost in the following way:
Let total cost = TC
fixed cost = FC
variable cost = VC
marginal cost = MC
average cost = AC
+
L_
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Loutput = Q
then TC = FC + VC
TC
_=AC
O
dTC
- MC
dQ
Each value of TC, AC, MC and VC depends of course on the level of output.
FC by definition does not change with the level of output. Figures 3.7 and
3.8 describe a conventional set of cost curves. The cost relationships used
in economic analysis are simple but important tools for the economist.
However, great problems are encountered when an attempt is made to esti-
mate these relationships using real-world data. Cost information recorded
by accountants may not conform to the definitions of economists. For
example, total and average costs are useful for computing profits and there-
fore may be easily obtained from existing accounts, but marginal cost,
which measures the additional cost which would be incurred if extra units
of output were produced is not usually estimated by accountants and may be
difficult to obtain. ImplFcit as well as explicit costs are included by econo-
mists in total costs, and these are often excluded from cost accounts.
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LAnother problem encountered in the estimation of cost curves
is the determination of the units in which the volume of output is measured.
For example, in connection with the estimation of costs in the transportation
industry, it has been suggested that "Different cost levels are associated
with different proportions of tons, miles and different velocities...Further-
more, an average length of haul may simply mask substantial diversity among
specific hauls thereby obviating (or hiding) considerations of relative
heterogeneity, which, of course, renders ten miles an inappropriate traffic
concept from the point of view of costs. ,,4
For the Shuttle project, the volume of output is variously
measured as the number of flights per year (capability), the total number
of flights produced by the system over its uselife, and the activity level,
or the number of flights produced over the years 1979 to 1990. The shape
of the total and marginal cost curves will of course depend on which output
measure is used.
The conclusions of any cost-benefit analysis will therefore be
sensitive to the way in which the economist chooses to define his terms.
Different answers may be reached using different definitions.
The identification and estlmat_on of benefits is subject to pre-
cisely the same kinds of complications and we begin with the simplest
approach -- cost-effectiveness.
3. 2.2 Cost-Effectiveness As A Measure of Benefits
The cost-effectiveness approach itself is straightforward. By
means of some decision-making proces_ it is stipulated that certain definite
tangible objectives are to be attained. For example, one objective might
be the attainment of a given number of space flights per year. Given the
objective, the costs of the various alternative programs for achieving it are
compared. The choice between programs is then based upon the criteria
of minimizing the cost of achieving the specific objectives.
Cost-effectiveness analysis was undertaken for the Shuttle pro-
ject in the following way. First it was assumed that for a Space Trans-
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portation System, the total cost curve could be represented by the straight
line TC = F + VM, where TC = total cost, F = fixed cost, VM = variable
cost and M = the total number Of flights produced by the system over its
entire uselife (see page 1-31 of Volume I of the May 31, 1971 Report). V is
•both the average variable cost per flight TC and also the marginal cost
(_OTC'_
of producing the extra flightk_--/_ .. The assumption is, therefore, that
marginai cost is constant over the relevant range of output. Figure 3.9
illustrates the total cost curve.
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Suppose there is a choice of three possible Space Transportation Systems.
System one is the current expendable system. System 2 is the proposed
Shuttle System and system 3 is the proposed New Expendable System. For
each Space Transportation a total cost curve can be drawn (see page 1-37,
Figure 1.5 in Volume I of the May 31, 1971 Report).
1
In Figure 3. i0, TC 1 is the total cost curve for the current system,
TC 2 and TC 3 are cost curves for a future new system. In order to compare
the three systems fixed costs (FI) must be deducted from TC II at every
level of output, since these would no longer be incurred if system 1 were
scrapped and systems 2 or 3 chosen instead (see page 1-24 of Volume 1 for
a more detailed explanation of this point). The total costs of each system are
now compared at different levels of output, the objective being to choose that
system which can be produced at least cost. Since at every output level TC 3
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Lis higher than TC I, system 3 would not be chosen. For any output level
below M 2, TC 1 is lower than TC Z and if the chosen objective is to produce
output M I, then system 1 is the cheapest. But if the chosen objective is to
product a greater number of flights than M Z, then system Z is the cheapest.
In other words, if the objective is a number of flights equal to say M 3, then
system 2 is said to be cost-effective; it is the cheapest (least cost) way of
producing more than M Z flights.
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Figure 3.10
Now the question can be rais.ed: what are the net benefits
derived from employing system 2? In other words, how much do we stand
to gain by employing system 2? The first part of the analysis has only indi-
cated that system 2 is the best way of achieving the objective (say M3) but
presumably it would also be interesting to discover the extent to which
system 2 is better than the other systems.
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The approach in cost-effectiveness analysis is to measure the
difference in total cost between system 2 and (say) system 1 at M 3. This
distance, B, measures the extent to which the use of system 2 to achieve
M 3 flights reduces cost below that incurred by system i. The extent of the
cost saving (negative cost) can be regarded as an estimate of benefits. The
cost-effectiveness approach therefore measures benefits as the amount of
cost saved in achieving the given objectives.
Some ambiguity arises, however, when, as for the NASA pro-
ject, more than two systems are being compared. If the Shuttle System
proves to be cost-effective at output level M3, the question is then whether
the benefits should be determined by comparing the Shuttle with the current
expendable system or with the new expendable system. The economist's
concept of opportunity cost is useful here. When resources are invested
in the Shuttle project, they must be diverted from other uses. The cost
of the diverted resources can therefore be measured in terms of what their
value would have been in other uses. More specifically, the opportunity
cost of the diverted resources is equal to the value which they would have
had in the most efficient alternative use. The net benefits of the Shuttle
System should therefore be measured as the cost saved by choosing the
Shuttle over the next most efficient alternative. At output level M, the
most efficient alternative was system i, and the distance B in Figure 3.10
is therefore a correct measure of benefits.
However, since the total cost curves for each project (TCI,
TC 2, TC3) are not parallel, the rel_tive cost rankings of each project will
change for different levels of output. For example, at output level M0,
system I is cost-effective and system 3-is the next most efficient alternative.
Between Mand M2, system 1 is still cost-effective but now system 2 is the
most efficient alternative. Above M 2 system 2 is cost-effective and system
1 is the most efficient alternative. To clarify the switches in cost ranking
it was decided to record the differences between TCI, TC 2 and TC 3 at
every level of output (see page 2_37 in Volume I).
In fact, the actual cost-effectiveness calculations were compli-
cated by the introduction of a discount rate and a more detailed specification
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Lof the output objective. A chosen discount rate was used to reduce the total
cost estimates of each different output level to their present value. Dis-
counted total cost was then plotted against M to yield three different dis-
counted cost curves. The shape of the cost curves was obviously dependent
on the discount rate chosen.
To compare the three projects, an objective (value of M) was
selected from a range of scenarios. Since M equals the number of flights
per year(Q) multiplied by N, the number of years in the system's uselife,
both Q and N could be altered to yield different values of the objective M.
For example, scenario I consisted of 736 flights over a period of 13 years.
Mwas 736, N was 13. _At the level of Mdetermined for scenario i, the
discounted total costs of each project were compared (see p. 2-20,
Figure 2.6 in Volume I) and the benefits of the cost-effective program
estimated from the differences between the total cost curves at that level
of M.
Before turning to an examination of the equal budget approach
as a way of estimating benefits, another way of expressing the cost-effec-
tiveness approach should be introduced. As we have stated above, the
total cost of producing any level of output is the sum of the fixed or non-recur-
ring cost and the variable or recurring cost of producing that level of output.
When the total cost curve is a straight line, the variable cost per unit of output
is unchanged regardless of the level of output. (See Figure 3.9)° The value
of the intercept of the total cost curve with the vertical axis is of course
equal to fixed cost. Now for the three different programs examined the
relative size of the contributions of fixed and variable cost to total cost
differed. The new expendable system involved a small initial fixed outlay
with high variable costs, whereas the Shuttle involved a large initial fixed out-
lay with rather low variable costs. It was recognized that a choice could
therefore be made between having high initial fixed and low recurring costs,
and low fixed and high recurring costs. Normally the researcher would only
be interested in comparing the total discounted costs of each program. But
if for political, budgetary, or other reasons it was expected that constraints
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might be placed upon the level, not just of the total cost which could be incurred,
but upon either the fixed cost or the yearly recurring cost, then an analysis
of the relationship between fixed and variable cost would be useful. This is
the rationale behind the trade-off analysis describ ed in the report.
Suppose the total cost of achieving objective M 1 is TCI; the objective
can be achieved either by incurring a large amount of fixed cost and a relatively
small amount of variable cost, or by sacrificing some fixed cost and correspond-
ingly raising the variable costs which must be incurred. The straight line T-0 1
in Figure 3. II represents the trade-off between fixed and variable costs when
the total cost of achieving output level M l is TC I.
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Figure 3. 11
If the total cost of achieving output leveLM l were less than TC l the trade-off
line would shift to the left -- T-02 in Figure 5. Each Space Transportation
System can be represented by a single point on the graph. For example, System
2, represented by point S 2 would incur fixed costs F 2 and variable costs V 2
in the production of M 1 units of out-put. System l, however, represented by
point S I, would incur fixed costs F 1 and variable costs V 1 in the production of
M 1 output. The cost-effectiveness system is that system which lies on the
lowest trade-off line. Since system 2 lies on a lower trade-off line than system
1, system 2 is cost-effective.
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L3.2. 3 The Equal Budget Approach as a Measure of Benefits
The cost-effectiveness approach does not provide a method for analyz-
ing changes in objectives. While there may be little difficulty in estimating the
costs of increasing the number of space flights produced per year, the question
of whether the extra flights produced are worth the extra cost needed to produce
them may not be so easily resolved. In other words, since cost-effectiveness
analysis assumes that each proposed program must achieve the same objective,
whatever the value attached to this objective, this value or benefit will be the
same for all programs. The criterion for choosing between programs is there-
fore to choose that program for which the total cost is least. However, when
the possibility arises that each program may achieve a different objective then
it is not sufficient to compare the costs of producing the different programs;
a comparison of the benefits gained from the different objectives must also
be made. This means that a technique must be introduced which will follow a
broader evaluation of benefits than that provided by cost-effectiveness analysis.
So far, the discussion has mostly been in terms of total costs, but in
economic theory the concept of marginal or incremental cost is also very
important. If the government means to operate a Space Transportation System
in such a way as to maximize the economic welfare of society as a whole, then
it should sell the services (flights) of the system at a rate which is equal to
the incremental cost per flight. For Space Transportation Systems characterized
by a linear total cost function, TC = F + VM, the marginal cost\-_--_ - will
be constant at every level of output. This means that the price per flight charged
by the government should be constant and equal to the marginal cost at every
output level. Using the proposition that p_ice should equal marginal cost it is
possible to describe the cost=effectiveness approach in terms of marginal rather
than total cost and then to extend the analysis to include a broader definition
of benefits.
As described above, the slope of the curves TC 1 and TC 2, i.e., the
marginal cost curves of the current expendable and the Shuttle differ. The
marginal cost for the Shuttle System is lower than that for the current expendable
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system. The two marginal cost curves are shown in Figure 3. 12 below.
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Figure 3. 12
If the price charged by the government is equal to marginal cost then the intro-
duction of the Shuttle System would mean a reduction in the price per flight
which the government could charge. Suppose the fixed objective is Q2 flights
per year, the rate per flight charged for system 1 will be P1 = MCI" The
rate per flight charged for system Z will be P2 = MC2" The net benefit from
the introduction of the Shuttle, system 2, is then equal to the price reduction
(P1 P2 ) multiplied by the total number of flights Q2" shown by the shaded
area A in Figure 3.12.
Using this framework it is possible to extend the analysis to calculate
the benefits of the Shuttle program when objectives are not fixed. The follow-
ing disclission centers around the determination of the value of space flights
when it is assumed that such flights can be sold to buyers. However, it should
be emphasized that not all, perhaps not even a large proportion, of the benefits
from Space Transportation are derived directly from the sale of space flights
to those willing to buy flights. If a meterological bureau buys space flights for
weather research it does so because it derives benefits from the flights. But
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many other people may benefit indirectly from the results of the weather research,
and these benefits may not be included in the price of the space flight. In other
words, non-marketable benefits from Space Transportation may be large and
should be estimated separately.
The rest of this section concentrates only on the problem of estimating
the value or benefits from Space Transportation which are re_lected in the market
price. This approach therefore yields an underestimate of benefits and shou]d
be weighted accordingly.
In order to deal with changes in objectives, it is now necessary to intro-
duce the idea of a market mechanism and demand and supply curves. The quantity
of a good demanded by a single consumer can be expressed as a function of the
price of the good. Normally, given the consumer's level of income and tastes,
if the price of the good falls the consumer will demand more of the good. The
quantity demanded is therefore negatively related to the price of a good and the
demand curve which represents this relationship graphically (DD in Figure 3o 13)
is downward sloping.
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Changes in income and factors other than price which affect the consumer's
demand will cause the demand curve to shift. The curve will shift outward
L_
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if circumstances are such that the consumer wants to buy more of the good at
every price (D1D1), and inwards towards the origin if the consumer wants to
buy less at every price (DzD2). The total market demand curve for the good
is simply the horizontal sum of all the individual demand curves.
For a competitive industry the upward-sloping market Supply curve
measures the amount of a good which producing firms are prepared to supply
at every price. The shape and position of the supply curve depends upon
current technology and the price of the inputs used in producing the good. The
market mechanism or competitive bidding process will then determine that
the actual price at which goods are bought and sold and also the quantity ex-
changed occurs at the intersection of the demand and supply curves. ( See
Figure 3. 14)
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Since, in a perfectly competitive world, the market supply curve is
simply the sum of all firms' marginal cost curves, the price which is determined
by supply and demand is also equal to each firm's marginal cost of producing
the good. Therefore the market price is said to be efficient and to maximize
social welfare.
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LThe market mechanism and the determination of price by supply and
demand dominates at least the private sector of the economy. However,
Space Transportation is produced by only one producer, the government, and
is sold to a few large buyers including the government, although there is no
doubt that a larger number of potential buyers exists. The market for Space
Transportation, therefore, differs from the competitive market structure
described above in certain important ways.
Looking first at the demand side, the demand for Space Transportation
can also be expressed as a function of the price of space flights, and the demand
curve for space flights can be drawn as a downward sloping curve. However,
another way of describing the demand curve for Space Transportation is to say
that it expresses the consumer's willingness to pay for space flights.
W
c.) PI
n,.
\
P2
QI Q2
QUANTITY
t=,..._
r
Figure 3.15
If the price charged is P1 per flight (In Figure 3.15) only those who are willing
to pay at least P1 per flight will demand flights at that price. In other words
only those to whom the value of the flight exceeds P1 per flight will demand
space flights. If the price were lowered to P2 then those willing to pay less
than P1 but more than P2 per flight would exhibit a demand for flights and the
total number of flights demanded would go up. The demand curve therefore
characterizes the value or willingness to pay of consumers for Space Transport-
ation.
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LHowever, the demand curve for Space Transportation may not be revealed.
In a competitive market situation, if producers mistakenly set a price above the
equilibrium price level they would find that the amount they were prepared to
supply at that price exceeded the amount demanded and bought. They would have
a surplus of goods and this would be the signal for them to reduce their price
towards the equilibrium level. At different price levels producers will perceive
the amount demanded and therefore have an idea of the shape of the demand curve.
But for Space Transportation there is only one producer, the government. More-
over, though there may be a large number of buyers who would benefit from be-
ing able to buy Space Transportation and would buy more the lower the price,
they are not able to buy the good yet since the good is only for sale to certain
government departments. Therefore, the total demand for Space Transportation
which would reflect the total valuation put on Space Transportation by society
may be said to exist but is not revealed. If the government were to quote a
lower pricer per flight, those departments (such as NASA and DoD) currently
buying Space Transportation might be willing and able to buy more flights
thereby revealing the value which they put on the flights. However, for all
those buyers who ar e not yet able to buy flights a value or benefit exists
which is not revealed. A demand curve which reflects the response of the quantity
demanded by current buyers to price changes, but does not include potential buy-
ers is therefore an inadequate tool for the estimation of benefits and will lead
to an underestimate of the social value of Space Transportation.
The equal budget approach which relies on the concept of a demand curve
is based on the following hypothesis. Suppose there is just one government agency
buying Space Transportation -- say DoD. - That agency has a budget allotted for
the purchase of space flights which is fixed for a given period -- say a year.
At the quoted price P1 (in Figure 3. 16), the DoD will be able to buy as many as
Ql flights if its budget is equal to PiQ1 , area 0PIXQ 1 in the figure. Now sup-
pose that the following year the DoD has been allotted the same budget but that
the quoted price has been reduced to P2" The equal budget hypothesis assumes
that the DoD will buy as many more space flights as its budget allows; i. e.,
at a price of P2 DoD will demand Q2 space flights where the product P2Q2 , area
OP2YQ 2 equals area OPIXQ I. In other words, while cost-effectiveness analysis
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assumes that the same quantity of flights is bought regardless of the price, the
equal budget approach assumes that the same quantity of money will be spent
on space flights regardless of the price.
Both approaches embody an implicit assumption about the shape of the
demand curve for space flights. The cost-effectiveness approach assumes
that demand is completely unresponsive to price and therefore that the demand
curve for flights is a vertical straight line at the level of the fixed quantity
demanded. (See Figure 3.17)
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LThe constant budget approach assumes that at each price that quantity will be
bought such that the square area under the demand curve which represents
the product lOQ (the total amount of money spent on flights) is always the same.
Such a demand curve has the shape of a rectangular hypobola. (See Figure 3. 18)
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In economic terms the shape of the demand curve is described by the concept
of elasticity; in the case of the constant-budget approach the demand curve
has unitary elasticity.
The elasticity of demand measures the extent to which the quantity de-
manded responds to a change in price. The fact that the demand curve slopes
downwards to the right indicates that when the price falls the quantity demanded
rises. However, the elasticity of the curve measures the extent to which de-
mand rises in response to the price fall. For example, suppose the price falls
by 3%, if there is a more than 3% rise in quantity demanded, then the demand
curve is said to be elastic at the point at which the measures were taken. If
a 3% fall in price is accompanied by a 2% rise in quantity, then the demand
curve is said to be inelastic. If a 3% price fall induces a 3% rise in quantity
then the demand curve is said to possess unitary elasticity, and this is the
assumption behind the c ¢mstant-budget approach.
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LWe examine below the plausibility of the unitary elasticity assumption
in terms of the likely behavior of those government agencies which buy Space
Transportation.
For now, the task is to show how these concepts can be used to measure
the comparative benefits of two systems using the equal budget approach. The
problem can be formulated as follows: suppose the government can produce
two possible Space Flight Systems. For each system, the marginal cost
per flight is constant, but for system 1 the marginal cost curve is higher
than for system 2. (See Figure 3.19)
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Assume that the price per flight for each system is always equal to the marginal
cost for the system. If the demand curve for flights is known we can see that
if system 1 is employed the price per flight will be Pl and the quantity demanded
at that price will be Q1; if system Z is employed the price per flight will be
1:>2 and the quantity demanded Q2" What are then the benefits of employing
system 2 rather than system I? Note that the cost-effectiveness approach
assumes that Ql is consumed for both systems and therefore that the net benefits
gained from choosing system 2 equals the cost (or price) reduction (Pl - PZ )
multiplied by the fixed quantity QI' area DFBC in Figure 3. 19.
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To explain the measurement of benefits for the constant budget approach,
the economic concept of consumers' surplus must be introduced. When price
equals P1 and quantity Ql is consumed, the value to the consumer of the last
unit of Q1 must be just equal to l° 1. However, all consumers except the last
were willing to pay more than Pl for the units which they consumed; these
consumers therefore experience a surplus value over and above the price P 1
which they paid for the good. This surplus value is called consumers' surplus.
At price P1 the consumer's surplus generated from the consumption of Ql is
shown by the area CS in Figure 3. 20 below. Now suppose the price falls to
P2 and the quantity demanded rises correspondingly to Q2"
w
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Figure 3.20
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Now the value to the consumer of the last unit of Q2 is exactly equal to P2" But
all the consumers of the intramarginal units were prepared to pay more than
P2 for the good and therefore experience a total consumers' surplus of
CS+A+B. The addition to consumers' surplus which results from the fall in
price is therefore equal to area A and area B. Area A represents the increase
in benefits to existing consumers from the price fall, and area B represents
the extra benefits which accrue to consumers from the consumption of a larger
quantity. For the Shuttle project area A is referred to as Direct Benefits and
equals those estimated for the cost-effectiveness approach; area B is called
Indirect Benefits.
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If the concept of consumers' surplus is recognized as a legitimate
measure of benefits then it can be seen that the cost-effectiveness approach
underestimates the net benefits of using sytem 2 where space flights are
priced lower for system Z than for system 1. The net benefits A+B gained
from system 2 are then compared with the fixed-cost expenditure associated
with the introduction of system 2 and that system chosen for which benefits --
costs is greatest.
Given that the use of a downward sloping demand schedule for the
estimation of benefits is a more realistic and inclusive method than the cost-
effectiveness approach, it is now appropriate to investigate the question of
whether the unitary elastic demand curve is a plausible representation of the
behavior of the current buyers of Space Transportation -- i. e., government
agencies. If it can be shown that government agencies do increase the quantity
of space flights they buy when the price falls, and that the percentage increase
in quantity is approximately the same as the percentage fall in price, then it
can be argued that the use of the constant budget hypothesis to estimate benefits
is a reasonably accurate method.
Let us assume that there is only one supplier of space flights, NASA,
and only one purchaser, DoD, both supplier and purchaser being government
agencies. As before it is assumed that the supplier agency sells its product
at a price eqllal to marginal cost. If the constant-budgeted approach is to be
used for an estimate of benefits, evidence must be found for the following
hypothesis; there is a choice between the production and sale of two systems,
the current expendable (CE} system and the Shuttle System. For the CE
system the marginal cost per flight is constant for all relevant ranges of
output and higher than the marginal cost per flight for the Shuttle System
which is also constant. Under these circumstances with the introduction of
the Shuttle System the price per flight which the DoD must pay will go down
and DoD will buy more flights such that its total expenditure on space flights
remains constant.
The sytem of allocating funds to the various federal government
agencies known as the PPB system has undergone sveral important changes
during recent years, but continues to sustain criticism. Among the papers
L_
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advanced as part of a Several Study of the PPB system undertaken in 1969
the following have important implications for the constant-budget hypothesis.
6
Weidenbaum discusses the extent to which agency budgets are control-
lable by congress. Weidenbaurn argues that because of the timing of appropriation,
rigidities resulting from the earmarking of funds for particular purposes,
statutory constraints and the limitations of planning resulting from authorization
made on a year-to-year basis, it is difficult for congress to control, and in
particular, to reduce yearly the budgets of some agencies. In other words,
it is only possible for congress to change some agency budgets year by year if
the change is in the upward direction; it is very difficult to reduce them. This
implies that it is difficult to switch funds between agencies and therefore that
an efficient interagency allocation of funds in which the marginal net benefits
of funds are equated between agencies is unlikely to occur. The absense of
efficiency in interagency allocation of funds necessarily reduces the benefits
from allocating funds efficiently within any one agency, and weakens the estimate
of benefits used here.
Weidenbaurn suggests, however, that a large percentage of DoD funds
are controllable and able to be reduced by congress on a yearly basis.
Assume that at any given budget level the DoD demand for flights is
a normal downward sloping schedule, DD in Figure 3.21.
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A rise in DoD's budget implies an upward shift in its demand curve
for flights to D1D1; a reduction in its budget implies a downward shift in the
demand curve to DzD 2. If the price "per flight remained constant at pX the
quantity of flights consumed would obviously be larger for the large budget
(Q1) than for the small budget (Q2). If the DoD budget is changed every year
then its demand curve will shift every year and the quantity demanded at any
given price will be different every year.
One of the ways of determining the shape of the demand curve of a govern-
ment agency might be to examine the quantity of flights bought and the price paid
each year.
For example, in Figure 3.22 the quantity of flights bought in 1963 was
Q63 and the price paid was P63" The quantity of flights bought in 1964 was
Q64 and the price paid was P64 and so on. The actual price-output combinations
observed each year could be plotted and a curve DD constructed through these
points as an estimate of the DoD demand curve.
_4
D
\
\
\
\
Q63
I
I
I
I
Q64
QUANTITY
Figure 3.22
However, this analysis assumes that the demand curve does not shift
from year to year. But suppose that the 1967 demand curve was D7D 7 in
Figure 3. Z3, and the 1968 demand curve was D8D 8, etc. Then the estimated
demand curve is a hybrid which resembles none of the true demand curves.
This identification problem would arise in the space flights' case if, as'we
have suggested the DoD budget does not remain constant from year to year.
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However, additional information is available in the Space Transportation
case which can help solve the identification problem. It was assumed above
that the supplier agency always charged a price per flight equal to marginal
cost. Suppose that each year technological changes take place causing the
marginal cost curve of the producing agency to shift downwards. Each year
the price charged to the buying agency is reduced. Suppose, moreover, that
the demand curve is relatively stable from year to year and not shifting very
much. Then the price quantity points which are observed trace out the shifting
of the marginal cost curve along the true demand curve. (See Figure 3. Z4)
\
Q67
P6..t= MC
P'68=MC
CURVE
.
Q68 Q69
QUANTITY
LIn other words, when there is information which suggests that the marginal
cost curve is shifting downwards year by year then it can be concluded that
the observed price quantity points trace out something close to a demand
curve.
Information gathered from DoD suggests that this is the case for Space
Transportation.
We can conclude from the evidence provided by the DoD that DoD
does in fact buy more flights when the price of flights is reduced, and
furthermore that the elasticity of its demand curve is close to l.
A further rationale for this behavior _night be found in the way budgets
are used within any given agency. Both Achinstein 7 and Weidenstein 8 suggest
that as is the case between agencies, within any given agency funds are
rigidly alloted for certain purposes. Once allocated these funds cannot be
shifted easily to another project. A reduction in the price of flights to the
DoD would both increase the real value of the budget allotted to the DoD for
the Shuttle project (income effect) and also make expenditures on space flights
cheaper relative to expenditure on other projects (substitution effect). Because
of the rigidity of fund allocation one would not expect the DoD to substitute
additional space flights for other projects since the funds could not be easily
shifted into the Shuttle project. However, one would expect the income
effect to work in that the DoD wouldnow buy more flights when the price of
flights fell because of an increase in the real value of _ts budget. In fact,
since it would presumably be equally difficult to shift funds out of the Shuttle
project if some were left over, one would expect the DoD simply to use up
its funds in buying extra flights. In othmr words, it would spend the same
amount in space flights at every price; its demand curve would exhibit constant
elasticity.
3. 3 Critical Parameters in the Evaluation of New Space Transportation
Systems
Up to this point our attention has been focussed exclusively on
the definition of the benefits and costs of new Space Transportation Systems
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and their use in cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analyses. We shall now
turn to an examination of the major parameters entering the evaluation of
new Space Transportation Systems, namely: the social rate of discount, the
investment horizon, and the gestation period and IOC-date.
3. 3. 1 The Social Rate of DiscQunt
3. 3. 1. 1 The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Concept
In the May 1971 Report, we had introduced the technique of discount-
ing and the concept of the social rate of discount by referring to society's
so-called rate of time preference. Briefly, society's rate of time pre-
ference may be defined as a rate of interest which reflects consumer's
subjective, relative evaluation of given quantities of consumables available
at different points of time. For example, if in year 0, consumers assign
the same value to 100 units of consumables available immediately as they
do to the certain prospect of receiving 105 units of consumabl_es one year
hence, then their rate of time preference is said tobe 0.05 =]_ l/ = 5
/
L_ J
percent. Alternatively the rate of time preference may be defined as the rate
of interest which consumers would have to be offered in order to persuade
them to sacrifice additional current consumption in favor of additional
future c onsumption.
Any investment project -- public or private -- involves the sacrifice
of consumables at some point in time for the sake of increased consumption
at one or more subsequent points in time. 9 From the very definition of
the rate of time preference, it is clear that this rate must some how be
reflected in the social rate of discount used in the evaluation of public
projects.
There is, however, still another side to the social discount rate.
We had noted in the May Report that the social opportunity costs of a public
project are the benefits foregone when the economic resources used by the
project are diverted from the private to the public sector. The social rate
of discount should reflect these opportunity costs as well.
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Let us assuzne, for example, that all of the resources devoted to a
public project would have been used in the private sector for investment out-
lays promising an annual rate of return of 10% before corporate income taxes
and after an allowance for the eventual replacement of worn out equipment.
Suppose $1-billion in resources were transferred to the public project. Then
the public project could be justified economically only if it also promised a
benefit stream (necessarily accruing to members of the private sector at
large) equivalent to an annual benefit stream of $100-million (10% of $1-billion).
An alternative way of expressing this is that the present value of the benefit
stream produced by the public project, discounted at r = I0%, must be at
least as high as $1-billion, or, that the net present value (NPV) of the project
must be greater than or at least equal to zero.
The interest-rate concept used in the preceding paragraph is some-
times referred to as the time productivity of economic resources. It is the
rate of return which society is able to earn in the private sector by sacrificing
current consumption in favor of future consumption, i.e. , by investing econ-
omic resources in productive investment projects. In contrast, society's
rate of time preference is the rate of return for which society's rate of
time preference is the rate of return for which society is willing to sacrifice
current consumption for the sake of increased future consumption. These
two interest-rate concepts should not be confused: the rate of time productivity
is an objective, technical concept; the rate of time preference, on the other
hand, is a purely subjective magnitude.
It can be shown that, in the imaginary world of classical economics,
the savings and investment behavior of society -- through the nation's capital
markets -- would always drive the economy to an equilibrium position in which
all individuals exhibit the same (social) rate of tin__e preference, all investors
face the same (social) rate of time productivity and in which, moreover, the
social rate of time preference would be just equal to the social rate of time
productivity. This overall equilibrium market rate of interest would then be
the appropriate discount rate to be used for public-project evaluation. I0
Unfortunately the real world differs significantly from the happy
state of affairs in the classical model. For one, individual investors face
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different degrees of risk and differ in their attitudes toward risk. The rate
of returns required by private investors therefore include risk premia which
differs over the spectrum of investors.
Secondly, the tax system does not treat all investors in the private
sector equally. Corporations, for example, force tax rates that differ from
those paid by unincorporated businesses, and there are also differences in
the rates paid by different unincorporated business firms. To earn the
same after-tax rate of return, different business firms must therefore
earn different pre-tax rates of returns on their marginal investments.
Finally, net savers in our economy typically obtain rates of return
on their savings that differ from the rates faced by net-borrowers. Different
consumers therefore are characterized by different rates of time preference.
In short, then, in the real world there exists no single market rate
of interest which can be viewed as the appropriate discount rate for public
project evaluation. The rate being used for that purpose must therefore
be a weighted average of the various rates prevailing in the market.
In the real world, a resource transfer from the private to the
public sector does not usually come solely from private investment pro-
jects: part of the resources will surely come from private consumption.
It follows that the opportunity costs of the resource transfer must reflect
not only the spectrum of rates of return on foregone private investments,
but also the spectrum of time preference rates of those who sacrificed
current consumption. This requirement confronts one with enormous dif-
ficulties in any attempt to estimate the appropriate level of the social discount
rate for practical applications of benefit-cost analyses. These difficulties
are discussed in detail in an earlier report, On the Principles of Public
11
Project Evaluation and will not be enumerated here. Suffice it to say
that the fundamental idea underlying this estimation process is always the
same: one seeks to estimate the magnitude of the sacrifice borne by the private
sector when resources are transferred from private consumption or invest-
ment to public-sector use, and to express this sacrifice in the form of an annual
rate of return, r.
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3.3. 1.2 Social Rates of Discount Used by Various Federal Agencies
in the United States
Table 3. 1 presents a sample of discount rates estimated with pain-
staking effort by various professional economists. It should be emphasized
that the economists' estimates were made at different points in time, i. e.,
under different capital-market conditions. But this circumstance alone can-
not explain the wide variation in these estimates; rather, the variation reflects
for the most part differences in the conceptual framework used by these
12
economists.
13
From the surveys presented in Table 3. 1 and earlier surveys
it is apparent that neither the various U.S. government agencies nor pro-
fessional economists have so far been able to agree on an appropriate social
rate of discount. The rates of discount implicity or explicitly adopted by
Federal agencies span a range from 0 percent to 15 percent. (In some
cases this rate actually may be less than zero when outright subsidies are
given in the financing of projects with a negative return in undiscounted dollars. )
The rates suggested by economists span the somewhat smaller range from 4
percent to roughly 14 percent.
In view of the prevailing uncertainty about the proper social rate of
discount, some economists would prefer not to select a unique discount rate
at all, but instead to evaluate public projects in terms of an entire set of
alternative rates. For want of a better term, we shall call this method the
flexible approach. Pushed to its logical limit, the flexible approach amounts
to the derivation of the net present value curves for all projects being evaluated
for a reasonable range of discount rates, say from zero to 20 percent. The
overall evaluation can then be presented simply in terms of a diagram such as
Figure 3.25, which depicts the discount-rate sensitivity of three hypothetical
investment projects.
The advantage of the flexible approach is immediately apparent
from Figure 3.25. For Project I, the approach clearly indicates acceptance
of the project for the example chosen, since the project has a positive net
present value over both the range of discount rates suggested by economists
v
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Table 3.1
Social Rates of Discount Recommended by Various Economists
_#_uthor
Z_rutiila and Eckstein [9 ]
i_iirs_thieifer,DeHaven, and Milliman [I0]
Hafscl_r_idt, Krutilla and Margolis [12]
?_'eisbrod [ir]
]_riedlaender [13]
Lain> Caves and Margolis [14]
Stockfish [ 4 ]
_umoi [15]
gcks rein [i6]
Ha_'berger [17]
Year
1958
1960
1961
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1968
1968
Rate
5 to 6 percent
10 percent
4 to 5 percent
l0 percent
1
5 percent
5 to 6 percent
13.5 percent
l0 percent
8 percent
10.68 percent
The author •adjusts for risk by assuming a relatively short use life
for the (highway) investment project'being evaluated.
,ootl_,ce: 5. Hirschleifer and D. L. Shapiro [ 2 ], Table 1, pp. 517,
for unstarred items and author's publication for starred
items.
..J
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(4 to 14 percent) and that suggested by federal agencies (0 to 15 percent). Simil-
arly, Project III would probably be rejected since it has a positive net present
value only at rates lower than those recommended by economists. The more
flexible approach thus provides one with information about the sensitivity
of the acceptance criterion to the analyst's assumptions concerning the
discount rate.
However, the flexible approach is not particularly helpful in one's
evaluation of Project II. Clearly, it is small comfort to know that there are
some rates, acceptable to som____eanalysts, at which Project II would be accept-
able, when there is also an entire range of recommended rates at which the
project would be deemed to be "uneconomic. " In other words, for projects
such as II the flexible approach begs the question entirely.
Facing the risk of being criticized for not having taken into account
any one of the particular interest rates suggested by economists, we analyzed,
as a first step, all alternative Space Transportation Systems being considered
in this Report for interest rates ranging from 1 to 20 percent. These discount
rates, it should be noted, are rea___.lrates, i.e. , they are free from any allow-
ance for inflation.
At some stage of the evaluation of new STS's, NASA (or the final
arbiter) must, of course, narrow the range of plausible social discount
rates sufficiently to help him overcome the ambiguities left by the flexible
approach. This narrowing of the range of plausible rates, however, cannot
proceed on a rational basis unless the arbiter has at least some understanding
of the conceptual issues involved in the estimation of the social rate of discount.
For only on the basis of such an understanding can a government agency decide
or argue that, say, 7.5 percent is likely to be a better approximation of the
true social rate of discount than, say, 12 percent.
3. 3. 1. 3 The Discount Rates Used by MATHEM_&TICA
For the purpose of this Report, MATHEMATICA proposes that the
representative values for the evaluation of the new Space Transportation
System be chosen at a rate of discount of 10 percent. For purposes of
comparison, MATHEMATICA will also summarize the economic results at
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L5 percent and 15 percent. In making this recommendation, the following
considerations are offered:
,
Z.
.
o
The 10 percent rate of discount is among the highest
rates used for the evaluation of public investment pro-
jects in large scale research and development programs.
It is larger than the discount rate used by the Bureau of
Public Roads which "does not use discounting techniques
in administering Federal aid and direct Federal highway
construction programs", and "in addition, does not plan
to use discounting techniques in the future. " [6 , p. 169. ]
The l0 percent rate is in direct agreement with the
recommendation of the Department of Defense which
recommended that "one way for the DoD to assure this
result [i. e. , to treat interest as a cost] is to adopt in public
investment evaluations an interest rate •which reflects the
private sector investment opportunities foregone. The
discount reflects the preference for current and future
money sacrifices and the public exhibits in non-govern_rnent
transactions. A i0 percent rate is considered to be the
most representative point within a range of plausible
rates at a present time." [7 , P. 60.]
The I0 percent rate exceeds the rate proposed by the
U.S. Water Resources Council [ 6 , p. 13] and that
recommended by the Subcdrnmittee on Economy and
Government and by the former Bureau of the Budget
which stipulated in Circular A-92 of June 26, 1969,
that "a discount rate used to evaluate programs and
projects should not be lower than the discount rate
established by the Water Resources Council... The
formula to be used to compute this rate is defined in
the December 24, 1968 issue of The Federal Register,
Volume 3, pp. 19, 170. "
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This rate was recommended as "the floor of the
acceptable range [of rates]. " [5 , p. 9. ]
The 10 percent rate exceeds or equals the social
rate of discount recommended by 8 out of 10 economists
listed in the previous survey, a representative cross-
section of the present recommendations by the economics
profession. The exceptions are Harberger _7] who recom-
mends 10.68 percent, and Stockfish [ 4 ] who recommends
13.5 percent.
The discount rate of 10 percent applied to real dollars
(1970) dollars were used throughout our analysis of the
new (STS) corresponds actually to a nominal financial
market rate of at least 15 percent in the present environ-
ment of the U.S. economy, with a rate of inflation well
in excess of 5 percent. This rate can be considered as
one of the most conservative rates used in an evaluation
of public projects.
3. 3. 2 The Investment Horizon
In the discussion above it has been assumed that the uselife of
our hypothetical, new Space Transportation System (System 2) is a finite
number of N years. That assumption is surely an oversimplification . In
reality, a transportation investment consists of a variety of distinct com-
ponents, each with its own physical uselife. Given this agglomeration of
different, individual uselives, the question arises what the overall project
horizon of a Space Transportation System should be? We shall now examine
this question, using as a concrete example the two-stage reusable Space
Shuttle currently being evaluated by NASA.
3.3.2. 1 The Determinants of the Uselife of an Investment Project
The assumed "economic uselife" of an investment project is normally
something shorter than infinite because of one or a combination of the following
factor s:
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Io Factors inherent in the project itself:
a. One of the physical inputs to the project depreciates over
time, collapses at a point in time (one hoss-shay deprecia-
tion) or becomes unavailable at a point in time (e. g. , a
rented piece of land, or an exhaustible supply of raw materials).
b. The demand for the product or service yielded by the project
may drop off or disappear altogether after some time.
2. Factors inherent in the decisionmaker:
a. The decisionmaker is risk averse and deliberately chooses
a finite and possibly short investment horizon as a risk
adjustment.
b. The decisionmaker limits the investment horizon to his
own life expectancy.
Since the present discussion is concerned exclusively with public
investments in transportation systems, item 2(b) above can be dismissed
from consideration altogether. Furthermore, it has been argued in an
14
earlier report by MATHEMATICA to NASA -- and in the pertinent economic
literature at large -- that the government should not be risk averse in evaluat-
ing alternative public projects. This means that a public agency should not,
because of risk averseness, shorten the investment horizon (N) of a public
project arbitrarily. On the basis of this argument, item 2(a) above can be
eliminated from consideration as well.
With respect to item 1 (b) above, it can probably be assumed that there
will continue to be a steady -- or even increasing -- demand for transporting
"things" and men into low earth orbit, at least, for the next four to five decades.
But at discount rates greater than, say, 5 percent, the present value of a steady
stream of annual benefits increases only at a sharply diminishing rate with
increases in the investment horizon, as is indicated in Figure 3.26.
In Figure 3.26, the symbol PV(_, N) denotes the present value of a
steady stream of annual benefits obtained for N consecutive years and discounted
at some discount rate F>5 percent. As may be inferred from Figure 3.26,
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ithe assumption of a 40 to 50 year project horizon is almost tantamount to
assuming an infinite horizon. Thus, in asserting that the demand for
Space Transportation will continue into the indefinite future, one really
needs to be certain only that it will continue for at least the next four to
five decades.
This leaves us with point l(a) above, i.e. , with the question of
whether a physical input into the Shuttle program will become unavailable at
some future point in time, and if so, when.
The first - and second - stage vehicles and the launch site facilities
acquired for the Shuttle do, of course, wear out, but they can be rebuilt.
Engineers and astronauts wear out, but they also can be replaced. However,
from society's point of view, the knowledge (blueprints) produced by RDT&E
expenditures -- by far the most important component of the initial cost of the
16.
Shuttle -- does not depreciate, I.e. , such knowledge does not simply
evaporate or become over tinae. One is led to wonder then, whether these
17.
RDT&E expenditures need to be recovered in any finite period of time and,
if so, what should determine the length of this period?
3. 3.2.2 The Uselife of RDT&E Costs
One approach to the problem of determining the uselife of RDT&E
costs might bc to estimate the average number of years in which technologically
advanced systems become obsolete and to use that estimate as the project
horizon (N) for the Space Shuttle. The currently proposed horizon dated 1990
is probably based on such an approach. That approach, however, implies that
the technical know-how gained during the RDT&E phase of the Shuttle project
will have no further economic value after 1990! In other words, one acts as
if such knowledge will, in fact, have fully depreciated by 1990.
Actually, there is a crucial difference between the concept of deprec-
iation and that of obsolescence. Depreciation refers to the physical deterior-
ation of an asset; obsolescence to a situation in which it is no longer expedient,
on economic grounds, to use an asset further. This distinction bears directly
_r
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on the problem under discussion here.
Let us suppose that, if the Shuttle were ready for operation in 1978,
the initial set of vehicles (and the associated ground facilities) would have to
be replaced in 1990. Let us further suppose that, by 1 990, it will be found
that the Shuttle is obsolete, {a circumstance which can not really be predicted
in 1970). This means, presumably, that an economically superior design is
available in 1 990. It does not mean that the blueprints for the original Shuttle
have evaporated or have been mislaid. In other words, in 1990 NASA still
has the option of building replicas of the Shuttle (Model 1978), although NASA
may, for economic reasons, decide not to do so.
What are these economic reasons? Consider the investment decision
NASA faces in 1990. NASA has the option of spending $1- or $2-billion, or
so, on replacing the old Shuttle equipment with identical new equipment, or
it can go over to an entirely new Space Transportation System, presumably
one involving heavy RDT&E outlays, initial investment outlays and a different
future benefit stream. However, the decision whether or not to adopt any
new Space Transportation System in 1990 will have to be made against the base-
line furnished by the 1978 Shuttle System. This means, presumably, that
NASA will go over to a new Space Transportation System only if the net present
valu_______e(in 1990) of the extra costs and extra benefits associated with it will be
higher than that associated with the 1978 Shuttle System. If that condition
is not met, then the 1978 Shuttle System will still be the economically superior
system in 1990 and should, therefore, be maintained in operation.
The gist of the preceding discussion is that the assumption of an infinite
uselife for the Shuttle-related RDT&E e_penditures is not as reckless as it
might appear at first glance. For as we have suggested above, to limit the
uselife of these expenditures to the year 1990 is tantamount to assuming that all
scientific and technical knowledge produced as part of the Shuttle development
will be useless by 1990, and that the development of whatever new system might
be built in 1990 will not draw on such knowledge. That assumption, however,
is not only unrealistic, but it is also unnecessarily restrictive. It is restrictive
in that it leads to an understatement of the true economic value of RDT&E
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Lactivities and hence tends to discourage investment in such activities.
It must be emphasized at this point that, in positing an infinite use-
life for RDT&E outlays on public investment projects, one presupposes that
all conceivable and technically feasible alternatives are being evaluated at
tl_e time the project selection is made. Let us suppose, for the sake of
argument, that in addition to the two stage reusable Space Shuttle potentially
available in 1978, NASA were fully aware of a still more advanced system --
(i.e. , a system offering even more substantial operating economies than the
Shuttle) available for operation in, say, 1985 only. Suppose further that the
net present value of the 1978 Shuttle, evaluated against the current expendable
system, is positive. Suppose, next that the net present value of the still
more advanced system is even larger than that of the Shuttle, if the current
expendable system of Space Transportation were used as a baseline system,
but that the net present value of the advanced system would turn out to be
18
negative, if the Shuttle were used as the baseline system. Finally, suppose
that the Shuttle could not be justified on economic grounds if its uselife (includ-
ing the uselife of the Shuttle-related RDT&E expenditures) extended only to 1985.
In the (hypothetical) situation outlined above, NASA clearly ought to
decide against developing the 1978 Shuttle and chose instead the more advanced
system available in 1985, since the latter has a larger net present value (in
1971) than does the Shuttle, and since the 1985 concept is in no way technically
19
dependent on the prior development of the 1978 Shuttle. It is to be noted,
however, that in deriving the net present values for the 1978 and the 1985 systems,
an infinite horizon should be posited for the RDT&E outlays of either system.
To summarize at this point: if _ reasonable effort has been made to
identify all conceivable alternatives in a benefit-cost analysis, and if the
economically most attractive alternative is actually chosen from the roster
of conceivable projects, then one can make a strong case for an infinite use-
life for RDT&E costs. This argument will be especially strong if the knowledge
produced in the RDT&E phase will carry over into whatever future system will
eventually cause the obsolescence of the project now chosen, i. e., if the latter
is a technical stepping stone for the future replacement.
L_
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L3. 3. 3 The ProGram Start, the Gestation Period, and the IOC-Date
It is sometimes supposed that, if at the time a project is being eval-
uated, the net present value (NPV) of that project is negative, then the project
should be postponed for all times. Actually, a negative net present value simply
means that, for a given IOC-date (denoted by b in Figure 3.27) and for a given
gestation period (G), the project being evaluated is not economically attractive.
The project may appear much more favorable if the IOC-date and/or the
gestation period were altered. It is a possibility which should not be over-
looked in the development and evaluation of the proposed Space Shuttle. We shall
rfow briefly examine the principles underlying this argument.
3.3.3. 1 Changes in the Gestation Period
In Figure 3.27, it was simply assumed that the RDT&E and Investment
Phase (i. e., the gestation period, G, in Figure 3.27) of the project being con-
sidered spanned a total of nine years• Actually the length of that period is
rarely a technical datum; within limits, it can presumably be shortened or
lengthened. Any lengthening or shortening of the gestation period, however,
would tend to alter also the total non-recurring costs associated with the
development of the project. The manner in which the present value of non-
recurring costs might vary with the length of the gestation period is sketched
in Figure 3.28.
In Figure 3.28, the curve labelled C represents the present value
m
of the costs of managing an RDT&E program. The curve is based on the
assumption that a minimum management capability must be maintained just
to keep the development phase of any ma_or transportation improvement alive.
If the annual cost of this minimum management capability is a constant amount,
then the present value of these costs will increase with G as is indicated by line
C
m
One would assume that the longer the gestation period allowed for a
new project is, the less costly it will be to procure the new technology, if
any, required for the project. This is so because the longer the gestation
period, the more technical know-how will be available to the project in the
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iform of "spill-overs" from other, unrelated research in the economy. Frorrl
the point of view of the particular project being evaluated, such "spill-over"
information is costless. Curve C in Figure 3.28 reflects this relationship
P
between the cost of new transportation technology and thd time within which "Lt
is produced. The curve becomes vertical to the left, because a minilnurn of
time will always be required to produce new technical know-how, regardless
of how much is spent on that activity.
In addition to making more and more technical know-how available,
virtually without cost to the project being evaluated, a lengthening of the
gestation period also has the effect of shifting some RDT&E outlays from
earlier to later years. Other things being equal, this postponement of
RDT&E costs will, of course, reduce the present value of these costs. It
is sometimes supposed that such reductions in the present value of costs (i. e. ,
reductions obtained by reallocating a constant total of funds over time) do not
represent real savings at all, but are simply the mathematical consequences
of discounting.
A moment's thought makes it clear, however, that something concrete
can be gained by a postponement of RDT&E costs, for that postponement does
free funds, temporarily, foruse in competing projects. It is the earnings yielded
by the competing projects during the period of postponement which constitute
20
the real savings.
It is seen from Figure 3.28 that the selection of an optimal RDT&E
and Investment (gestation) period involves the balancing of the extra manage-
ment costs associated with a lengthening of the period against the savings one
achieves by a more deliberate pace of technology production. In Figure 3.28
the optimum gestation period is shown as Gopt; it is the point at which the
extra (incremental) savings from cheaper technology production is just offset
by the extra (incremental) management costs associated with a slightly longer
gestation period. Alternatively, it is the cost at which the present value of
total RDT&E and Investment costs (represented by the curve labelled Cf) is
minimized.
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Consider again Figure 3.27 above. Suppose it is discovered that,
on the basis of the assumptions underlying this diagram, the net present vlaue
(NPV) of the project is calculated (by way of equation (I. 2)) to be slightly
less than zero. This may mean that the project should never be accepted.
But it may also mean that the gestation period chosen for the development of
the project is too short, i.e., that the non-recurring costs associated with
the project are unnecessarily high. Indeed, after optimization with respect
to the gestation period, it might well turn out that the net present value of the
project will be positive, i.e. , that the project becomes economically attractive.
3. 3. 3.2 The Optimal IOC-Date
Even if the gestationperiod (G) were somehow given and fixed, the
net present value of a proposed project can change from negative to positive,
or vice versa, by a change in the IOC-date. Let us examine this proposition
in the context of the choice between STS 1 and STS 2, an example already
described in Section 3.2 above.
Suppose, for example that the govenrnent expects the demand for
launches to increase at a steady rate over time. This means that the demand
curve is expected to drift towards the upper right-hand corner. As a result
of this drift, the annual direct and inducedbenefits of STS 2 will therefore
increase over time.
The time profile of benefits and costs associated with the proposed
STS 2 before the shift in the IOC-date will appear as the solid line in Figure
3.29 below. The corresponding time profile after the shift in the IOC-date
is indicated by the broken line. It will be noted that we have assumed a constant
gestation period, regardless of the IOC-date, so that postponement of the later
implies a corresponding postponement of the starting date.
Suppose now that, for an assumed IOC-date of I0 years (see Figure
3.29) the net present value (NPV) of STS 2 is found to be negative. It follows
that the development of system 2 as it had been originally planned must be
rejected on economic grounds. It does not follow, however, that system 2
should be omitted from consideration for all times. For example, consider
the possibility of starting the RDT&E and Investment Phase of system 2 not
in year I, but instead in year 6. With a constant gestation period (G), this
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Lmeans that the system's IOC-date is moved frm_n year 10 to year 15. The post-
ponement in the IOC-date, in turn, will have the following, opposite effects on
the net present value of system 2 (as the NPV is calculated at time = 0):
1. The NPV of STS 2 will be reduced by the present
(discounted) value of the benefits lost due to the post-
ponement. In Figure 3.28, the undiscounted total
of such cost benefits is represented by the shaded
area A B C D.
2. The NPV of STS 2 will be increased by the present
value of the earnings which can be earned by post-
poning some RDT&E and Investment outlays. Those
RDT&E and Initial Investment outlays for STS 2
which are postponed to a later date are identified
by shaded area labelled X in Figure 3.29. The
eventual incurrence of these outlays is indicated by
the area labelIed Y.
It is impossible to predict, a priori, whether the postponement of
the project's IOC-date (and the starting date of its RDT&E phase) will
increase or decrease its net present value at time t = 0; that depends on
the relative magnitude of the two effects described above. In practical
applications, Lhe delay in the starting date of the RDT&E phase itself may
yield some extra savings in the RDT&E costs, since more and more of
the required new technology will be available, free of cost, from research
undertaken elsewhere in the economy. (We have already discussed that
possibility in Section 3.3. 1 above).
This discussion on the timing of Space Transportation investments
has been included in the present chapter mainly to draw attention to the fact
that the starting date of a project's RDT&E phase and the length of that
phase (hence, implicitly, also the project's IOC-date) are economic and not
merely technical decision variables. The history of technological develop-
ment during the post-war period suggests that all too frequently in the past,
technological advancements have been advocated and pushed for their own
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sake, without due regard to the relative magnitude of the costs and benefits
associated with such advancements. This effort to introduce ever more
advanced tehcnological "improvements" in rapid succession is sometimes
buttressed by the statement: "Technical progress is inevitable,
therefore, we might as well push it along. " That statement is, of course,
21
a perfect non-sequitur.
The remarks contained in the previous paragraph should not be
construed as an argun%ent against basic research. Nor should they be taken
as a criticism of NASA. Indeed, the emphasis currently placed by NASA
on the role of economic analysis in the selection of alternative Space Trans-
portation Systems is a clear-cut departure from the practices criticized
above and therefore much to be commended.
3.3.4 Summary and Conclusions
As was mentioned at the outset of this section, its intent has been
mainly to expose certain principles underlying the economic evaluation of
alternative Space Transportation Systems. No attempt has been made to
cover the entire range of problems encountered in practical applications of
benefit-cost analysis; nor was the discussion always directed at the fully
reusable Space Shuttle as such.
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i3.4 Considerations of Risk Aversion in the Evaluation of
Alternative Space Shuttle Configurations
The benefit-cost analysis performed and presented in the May 1971
P_eport was mainly concerned with the economic evaluation of whether or
not the Space Shuttle investment could achieve reduced space transportation
costs in the 1980's as well as an overall reduction of the costs of space
programs; the question asked was whether these expected benefits did
justify the expected non-recurring cost outlay in the 1970's for the develop-
ment of the Space Shuttle System. Although relatively early in the project
we did raise the issue of whether or not the government should be risk
averse when engaging in large scale projects such as the Space Shuttle
System, we followed the accepted line in benefit-cost and cost effectiveness
analysis of government projects by assuming that the government itself is
risk neutral in the choice amcmg its projects.
The notion of government risk neutrality is, in essence, based
on the insurance effect when the government engages in many alternative
investment projects. For the size of most investment projects under-
taken by government agencies, for example, the building of a particular
highway link, or the building of a hydroelectric dam, as well as many
other investment projects, the assumption of risk neutrality due to the
insurance effect is correct. It is based on the effect of repetitively incur-
ring the same risk which leads to a canceling out of the possible variances
in the evaluation of the benefits and the costs of such projects and leads to
a convergence of the rate of return on government investment to expected
value s.
However, as with individual behavior, also the government and
its agencies should be increasingly adverse as a particular project either
uses a substantial amount of the funds of an individual agency or a consid-
erable amount of the total resources available to the nation or to the govern-
ment. Under the complete list of alternative investment projects either in
research and development, as well as other investment projects, the govern-
ment under the hypothesis of risk neutrality would be indifferent to both the
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scale of the investment project as well as the variance of the expected
rate of return. If either of these assumptions is not correct, a substan-
tially different portfolio of investment, research, and development pro-
jects will be chosen by the government than under the assumption of risk
neutrality. In the case of the Space Shuttle System there are important
considerations that affect the choice of system if NASA as well as the
government are risk averse for a project of this size. In the following
we will sketch a theory of rational behavior under uncertainty and risk in
terms of expected utility. The point will be stressed of the possible justi-
fication of risk aversion by the government in the case of the Space Shuttle
as against the assumed risk neutrality of the present analysis and of
benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness analyses in general. The following
figures may lead to a better understanding of the size of the proposed Two-
Stage Fully Reusable Space Shuttle System versus the TAOS Systems (I) In
years where the funding of the RDT&E costs of the original Two-State
Fully Reusable Space Shuttle would have required the expenditure of
$2 billion per year in the 1970's the economy could afford at the projected
levels of the gross national product (GNP) only 500 such projects as a
nation, assuming every single dollar be invested with no consumption and
no depreciation in the economic system as well as no other services ren-
dered. (2) On another basis, the total investment funds of a national
economy and of the United States vary usually between 15 and 20 percent
of Gross National Product. On that basis--since the Space Shuttle invest-
ment has to be built with such funds, the United States could, theoretically,
afford at most one hundred such national projects with no other investment
activity in the 1970's. (3) if the funds are more closely defined as per-
taining to the research and development activities of the nation (a funding
of $16 billion by the federal government in Fiscal Yar 1972), then the
U.S. _overnment could have engaged in_ at most_ seven other projects of
similar type per year throughout the peak funding period. (4) Similarly,
in terms of the NASA budget and its present funding level of about $3.2
billion or even the long term projected level of between $3.5 and $4.0_:_billion
See Chapters #2 and 7.
T
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Two-Stage Fully Reusable Space Shuttle investment in several years
would have constituted two-thirds or one-half of the total agency bud_.
The analogy of the Apollo project and its expenditure of, say,
$24 billion in the 1960's is not quite correct. The reason for this is
that the Apollo project itself consisted of several discrete, single steps,
i. e. , the Mercury program, the Gemini program, the Apollo program,
as well as the subsequent step-by-step development of the hardware.
Each of the components could be developed separately with each advance
adding to thecapabilities ultimately required of the Apollo pro ject_ but
also usable by themselves for other space capabilities. For one, the
initially stated need for the Nova rocket proved, through some ingenuity,
never to be needed in terms of the requirement of landing a man on the
Moon in the 1960's.
On the other side, as proposed, the Two-Stage Shuttle System,
but less so other configurations of a Fully Reusable Space Transportation
System, development would have associated with it the direct outlay of
between $14 billion to $15 billion over the next ten years, and both the
development of the orbiter and the booster as well as all other compon
ents have to be successful to assure the economic success of the system.
Obviously, the usual notion--with or without adequate justi-
fication--for other government investment projects of risk neutrality
cannot hold when such a discrete portion of funds is allocated to a
single project; the notion of risk aversion ought to play an important
part in determining the best portfolio of R & D investments in the nation
as well as when determining the best'choice of alternative Space Shuttle
configurations. Here we propose one quantitative set of analyses that
should take risk aversion into account in determining the best choice
among the vast set of different Space Shuttle configurations, which in the
end, lead up to confirm very strongly the choice of a TAOS system.
3.4. 1 Expected Utility -- The Theory of Rational Behavior
Work in the 1960's has further clarified the role of risk and
uncertainty in economic decisions, one of the more exciting aportions
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L0f economic theory throughout the past centuries. A good summary of
the recent state of the art can be found in Portfolio Selection_ Efficient
Diversification of Investments by Harry M. Markowitz [Cowles Founda-
tion for Research in Economics, John Wiley / Sons, New York, 19597.
As Markowitz explains, portfolio analysis is characterized by:
I. The information concerning the projects upon which
it is based; in the case of Markowitz, securities.
2. The criteria for better and woi_se portfolios which set
the objectives of the analysis.
3. Computing procedures by which portfolios using the
information in i, are derived from the criterion in 2 from the inputs.
A portfolio analysis approach to the decision both, on the best
Space Shuttle configuration as well as to the best mix of government
research and development projects, in general is only a logical conse-
quence of the information that is put into the evaluation of the research
and development project. The inputs for the May 1971 economic analysis
have been provided by Lockheed LMSC and Aerospace Corporation. There
is a large ongoing effort within NASA and in industry and reported on in
this report to evaluate alternative Space Shuttle configurations and their
expected life cycle costs. Another important part of the evaluation and the
information put into our evaluation were payload effects and their expected
life cycle costs for different Space Transportation Systems. The present
economic analysis as performed and presented in the May Report assumes
risk neutrality by the government and NASA with regard to the size of the
project and the expected variance in tl_e rate of return of alternative Space
Shuttle configurations. A unique social discount rate was posited and the
summary was given at 5%, 10% and 15%. The analysis was performed
from 0% to 20% for all projects and mission models based on the Two-
Stage Fully Reusable Space Shuttle configuration. The question of best
system choice among the alternative Space Shuttle configurations was not
raised; when analyzing that problem, however, the analogies with portfolio
analysis in security market operations become increasingly important.
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LThe criteria determine how the information is used and transformed to
yield conclusions regarding alternative investment projects, in our case
Space Shuttle configurations and the overall worth of this project as com-
pared to the opportunity costs of these funds within the nation.
The computing procedures are outlined in detail for the analysis
done in our case under the assumption of risk neutrality of the government.
A quantification of the level of uncertainty and risk was made in Section 6.3.3
of the May 1971 economic analysis in order to quantify the expected variance,
for example in the operating phase of the Space Shuttle System in the 1980's.
'However, that information was not used to discriminate between alternative
Space Shuttle configurations. The computing procedures for risk averse
government investment decisions, particularly in the case of the Space
Shuttle System, are the topic of this section.
3.4.2 Expected Utility vs. Expected Money Return.
The way that the additional information of risk aversion by the
government is included is by defining a utility measure of the expected
return as against mathematical money expectations. The problem can
best be explained along the line of the St. Petersburg paradox. The
St. Petersburg paradox is a classical example dating back to the 18th Cen-
tury when for the first time a paradox was described which arises with an
expected money return theory of rational behavior by Daniel Bernoulli in
"Exposition of a New Theory of Risk Evaluation. "
The paper by Daniel Bernoulli contains numerous new ideas,
among them the notion that a gamble should be evaluated not in terms of
actuarial value of its alternative money payoffs but rather in terms of
actuarial value of its utilities of the expected payoffs. Bernoulli then
shows that the diminishing marginal utility of income implies t_at a
mathematically "fair" bet, that is, one who's expected "actuarial" money
value is zero is necessarily disadvantageous to anyone who undertakes it.
The reason is easily illustrated by one example--an equal chance of gaining
and losing $I, 000 is disadvantageous because, with diminishing marginal
utility of income, a loss of $I, 000 in terms of utility is greater than the
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Lutility offered by a gain of $I, 000, so that the expected utility of the gamble
(one-half utility of gaining $I, 000 plus one-half this utility of losing $I, 000)
is negative. We will present subsequently utility functions that imply
exactly this principle. This classical example led to a revision over the
past centuries of utility and investment theory. A similar utility function
really can also be derived by the principle of risk aversion. Under risk
neutrality one would work with the hypothesis that an expected return of,
say, 30% on an investment is evaluated "indifferent" from the variance
attached with the expected return. Under such behavior an investor,
given his resources, would try to identify the projects that have associated
with them the highest expected return irrespective of the expected variance,
skewness, etc; most likely he will put all his funds into just one single pro-
ject if that project promises him the highest return with such a decision
rule. An investor who thought only to maximize the expected return would
never prefer a diversified portfolio either. If one security had greater
expected return than any other on the stock market, the investor would
place all his funds into that security. If several securities had the same
(greatest) expected return, the investor would be indifferent among port-
folios, diversified or not, which contain only these securities. Thus, if
we consider diversification a sound principle of investment, we must reject
the objective of simply maximizing expected return. Or, put better, we
must find the underlying rational on why in actual behavior a diversified
portfolio is preferred to a non-diversified portfolio even with the expecta-
tion of identical return on investment among securities. The obvious
parallel here with regard to government projects is that given the govern-
ment funds for R & D money, the government can invest every year only a
limited amount of funds (roughly $16 billlion government financed in Fiscal
Year 1972) and the government has to make a choice on where to put this
money among the many diverse R & D projects, hopefully maximizing with
that also the expected return to society (the nation, national secu/-ity and
general welfare of the people) from these activities in the long run. With
the assumption of risk neutrality the government would try to identify
among the research and development projects those with the highest total
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£expected return irrespective of the scale and possible variance (uncertainty)
associated with these projects. If now the government engages in many,
say, I00 or more (possibly thousands) of research and development projects,
each of them requiring a relatively small portion of funding out of the total
R & D funds, or the total government funds available, then through the
insurance effect among different research and development projects the
government effectively can claim and defend the position of risk neutrality
by maximizing only the expected return for each research and development
project and realizing actually this rate among projects of the same yield
22
across the hundreds or thousands of projects undertaken.
On the other side, the principle of insurance which ultimately
would lead to the claimed attitude of risk neutrality in government decisions
does not hold any more. When the funds needed for a single research and
development project do make up a large portion of either the total funds of
research and development financed by the federal government in any one
year or the funds make up a sizable sum of the total funding of the govern-
ment agency, insurance effects are not applicable since the government
could engage in at most seven to eight projects of similar size per year
in the 1970's. Thus, by looking only at the expected money return of
investment without considering the possibility of a large variance in that
expected return (in part already quantified in our May 1971 Report), the
government would really not make a rational choice among alternative
Space Shuttle Systems. It is our contention that with i_egard to the choice
of research and development projects as they become relatively large, the
principles of portfolio selection equally apply, by analogy, to investment
project selection in R & D for government financed activities, particularly
with regard to the Space Shuttle Systelu choice.
The expected utility rule was proposed as a substitute, therefore,
for the expected money return rule. (By applying a social interest rate
uniformly across government projects irrespective of the scale and
uncertainty of these, one adheres to the expected n_oney return rule.) A
money return of 200/o, it was argued, is not necessarily twice as good as
a 10% return; a loss of 20% is not necessarily only twice as bad as a loss
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Lof I0%. Perhaps there is a curve such as that in Figure 3.29, relating
to various levels of return on total resources invested. According to the
curve in Figure 3.29, for example, the utility of a zero return is zero
a utility of a 10%0 gain is I, the utility of a 10%0 loss is minus i. 3. Perhaps,
instead of maximizing expected money return, the rational man would
maximize the expected "value of the utility" return. 23 The expected utility
of a bet with a 50-50 chance of a I0%0 loss and a 50-50 chance of a 10%0 gain
equals :
U = (½) (1) + (½) (-1.8) = -.40
This is less than the utility of having zero return with certainty. Thus
the individual or agency maximizing the expected value of utility, as
represented by the curve in Figure 3.29, would prefer the certainty of
no return rather than a 50-50 chance of a 10%0 loss or gain. Expected
utility return is lower in the second case even though expected money
return is the same in both cases.
3.4.3 The Principle of Risk Aversion Applied to NASA Decisions
In the case, for example, of the Space Shuttle investment with
an underlying utility curve or risk aversion expressed in the form of a
utility curve as shown in Figure 3.29, it would imply that two separate
investment chunks of $7 billion, each with a return of 20% would be pre-
ferable to a single investment of $14 billion with an expected return of
20%, total assets being in each case, say, $14 billion (each $7 billion
project would yield i0% on $14 billion). The application of the social
discount rate across mission models of, say 5%, 10% or 20% and as
constantly done at present in cost effectiveness and benefit cost analysis
of government investment projects does assume risk neutrality, i.e.,
indifferent (i.e., "equally good") between the first two separate investment
projects and the second single investment projects. The introduction of
the criterion of risk aversion in government projects has profound, deep
and immediate applicability to the Space Shuttle investment decision on the
best choice of shuttle configuration.
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LThe modern notion of utility avoids any hedonistic interpretation
of the curve in Figure 3.29. We are not to think of the vertical axis as
representing pleasure and pain. It simply represents the degree to which
the individual or the government agency is willing to take risks for out-
comes presented along the horizontal axis (return on "total available
assets"). As to the philosophic, introspective and psychological inter-
pretation of this varying willingness to take risks, this brings us from
firm ground to conjectural areas of controversy.
The expected utility maxim stripped of any hedonistic interpre-
tation says that the individual or agency should act as if:
I. He attaches numbers, called their utility, to each possible
outcome, which may be higher, lower or the same as the "money" numbers;
and
2. When faced with chance alternatives, he selects the one
with the greatest expected value of utility.
We shall refer to this formulation as the "expected utility"
maxim or the "expected utility return" maxim. The expected utility
maxim avoids the difficulties which condemned the expected money return
maxim. If his utility curve is shaped like that in Figure 3.29, with increase-
ingly great money returns adding less to utility return, the investor will
generally prefer diversified portfolios. If, over the range of possible
returns, his utility (U) depends on return (r), according to a formula of
the form
U = r - Ar 2
the investor will select the efficient portfolios through an analysis based
on an expected return and variance principle. The particular portfolio
preferred depends on the value of the positive number A 24, where r is
the rate of return on total assets. In terms of the Space Shuttle invest-
ment we actually can find a more suitable way of incorporating risk
aversion into the analysis by making the risk rate an increasing function
of the portion of funds risked or invested by the agency or the government.
T
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lThis principle actually corresponds to the principle expressed in Figure 3.29,
now quantified for the purposes of the Space Shuttle investment as shown in
Figures 3.30, 3.31 and 3.32. On the horizontal axis in Figure 3. 30, we
show in the case of the Space Shuttle investment the average (or peak)
annual funding required for the development phase and investment phase of
the Space Shuttle varying from zero to $. 5 billion, $i billion, $1.5 billion,
$2 billion and $2.5 billion upwards. Also, one could plot on the horizontal
axis the funds risked in the form of a fraction of the total agency funds, in
this case NASA, and corresponding to the average annual funding level the
values would now read 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 5/6, and 1 etc. Again one could
plot the total funds required by the alternative projects in order to get towards
a fully reusable Space Transportation System and the values would here
increase from $5 billion to $I0 billion, $15 billion, and $20 billion. On the
vertical axis we have the rate of risk added to the social discount rate in
order to evaluate now projects of different size expressed either on an
annual peak funding level basis, an annual average funding level, the total
project funding level or the fraction of agency funds risked by the investment
project. In terms of the levels of funds risked by the agency, we think the
curve (in Figures 3.30, 3.31 and 3.32) is even of general value, not only
NASA but also the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission,
and other government agencies engaged in investments into research and
development projects. The particular slope of the line shown now in
Figures 3.30 and 3.32 is, of course, very, very arbitrary, but nevertheless
we think it represents, at least to us, an intuitively rational and plausible
progression of risk rate added to the social discount rate for the evaluation
purposes of alternative projects. 25 The'risk rate (see Figure 3.32) pro-
gresses from zero for projects of up to $500 million for NASA of annual
funding to 5% for projects requiring funding of $1 billion for the research
and development phase, 10% for projects of $1.5 billion and progresses
linearly from there on. As to the intercept between the horizontal axis and
the risk aversion function, one either could assume that the government is
risk neutral in the case of NASA of projects requiring annual funding levels
of less than $500 million, or one could make the line proceed below the axis
to intercept at the 5% level and a zero funding requirement with the actual
level of the social discount rate then at 5%.
,
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In order to evaluate different Space Shuttle configurations pro-
posed, and reported in this report, the very important message here is
that different Space Shuttle configurations do require different levels of
funds to become operational and capture the payload effects effectively on
an economic basis. Basically what it says is that the investment, if
possible, should be split up between the fully reusable components. If any
one part can be developed first and the second part developed later on, if
and when require, that is if the research and development are truly
separable components and each step as a cost effective project in itself
than the evaluation of the joint project can be made at a relatively lower
risk rate than the combined evaluation of a single project requiring for
example $15 billion. The idea as quantified in Figure 3.30 is of great
and immediate importance when deciding about the particular Space
Shuttle investment in addition to the promise of reducing Space Trans-
portation costs in the 1980's.
This analysis, allowing for risk, has to be integrated with two
to three important, economic considerations when evaluating alternative
Space Shuttle configurations and the choice then becomes much more
clearer and narrower. When therefore, the principle of risk aversion
were to be integrated into the full economic analysis of alternative Space
Shuttle configurations, it would strongly reinforce and confirm the choice
of the TAOS-System and, therein, the choice of the TSRM-TAOS System.
i.
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3.5 Determining the Most Economic Space Shuttle Configuration
All of the economic criteria stated in the previous sections do enter
into determining the most economic Space Transportation System in a com-
plex system of interdependent economic-evaluation procedures. These
range from different types of cost-effectiveness analysis and benefit-cost
analysis to, finally, the most important issue of the adjustment of benefit-
cost streams for the time value of economic resources. Nevertheless,
it is possible to single out the two most important parameters, namely, the
expected nonrecurring cost for the alternate Space Transportation Systems
in the 1970rs and the expected recurring costs per launch of a space flight
in the 1980's and illustrate on the basis of these two economic parameters
the selection of the most economic Space Transportation System among the
alternate way s of doing space transportation. The main alternatives are (i)
expendable space transportation and (2) reusable space transportation.
Within the reusable space transportation systems, many alternatives are
available. This section describes how with all the previous economic criteria
and principles in mind, the cost-effective systems as well as the most economic
systems among these can, nevertheless, be determined rather easily as a
function of these two economic variables only.
3.5. 1 The Economic Location of Alternate Space Transportation Systems
In Flgure 3.33, alternate Space Transportation Systems are shown
in relation to each other as a function of two economic variables: the non-
recurring costs expected in the 1970's, shown on the vertical axis, and the
expected costs per launch of these alternate systems, shown on the horizontal
axis. In positioning alternate Space Transportation Systems, for example, the
Two-Stage Fully Reusable Shuttle System or the New Expendable Space Trans-
poration System, they are each shown as point estimates in regard to both the
expected nonrecurring costs of the 1970's as well as the costs per launch in
the 1980's. Of course, the costs per launch, for example, of a New Expendable
System vary widely, depending on the payload mass to be transported to widely
differing earth orbits and earth escape missions. Similarly, for some of the
hybrid systems, for example, the Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttles, equally
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idifferent costs per launch might be arrived at, again depending on the mass
of payloads to be delivered and the particular earth orbit to which they are to be
delivered. Therefore, on the horizontal axis the point estimates of the
average cost per launch are shown; these average launch costs are deter-
mined across the space-activity models expected for the 1980's and represented
in the alternative scenarios used in the evaluation of the Space Transportation
Systems. In Figure 3. 33, many possible Space Transportation Systems or
combination of Space Transportation Systems are shown for illustrative pur-
poses with regard to their economic location in terms of nonrecurring and
recurring costs. Any system has, of course, uncertainties attached to the
expected cost per launch in the 1980's as well as to the expected nonrecurring
cost in the 1970's. Thus, instead of actual point estimates as shown in Figure
3.33, the analysis of the risks and uncertainties in the nonrecurring costs as
well as recurring costs does reveal that each of the points actually is a
major area extending both horizontally and vertically. Figure 3.34 shows
the position of the alternate Space Transportation Systems, now, however,
reflecting some of the uncertainties as given by industry or NASA, with regard
to the expected variation in the nonrecurring as well as recurring cost of
alternate SPace Transportation Systems. Of these systems, for example, the
New Expendable System, and in particular, the Current Expendable System,
have a much reduced uncertainty in present expected launch costs per flight
of the system ms well as the outlays for the systems in terms of nonrecurring
costs in the 1970's. Yet, even these systems have substantial economic cost
uncertainties attached to them, which are minor, however, when compared
to uncertainties reflected in completely new systems yet to be developed by
research and development. The horizofital extension of the areas shown for
each system in Figure 3. 34 points out the uncertainty in the expected cost per
launch for each of the family of systems identified for illustrative purposes.
The vertical extent of the area reflects the expected uncertainty in the non-
recurring costs of the systems in the 1970's.
The more advanced a system is when compared to the present state
of the art, and the more ambitious with regard to complete reusability, the
larger the vertical extent of the area is expected to be in the 1970's. This
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is due to the plain fact that we cannot estimate these costs with as much
accuracy as for systems which already have been built in the past. The
vertical extent of the area reflects in a quantitative way the qualitative
feeling that for systems that represent a larger advance over the present
state of the art, the uncertainties and variability in costs in the nonrecurring
cost part of the !970's will be larger than for systems which are closer to
the present state of the art.
Similarly, the variation in the cost per launch reflects uncertain-
"ties, for instance, as to the expected possible turn-around time of Reusable
Space Transportation Systems as well as the possibility and feasibility of
integrating these systems more or less effectively with existing expendable
hardware. In order to determine the actual shape of these areas for each
of the family of systems a considerable effort has to be spent and each of
the systems have to be evaluated on a comparable and consistent basis.
This is not the case for the present cost estimates as well as the uncertainty
estimates that we have been able to gather from various sources. Neverthe-
less, they are roughly indicative of the expected variation t at least on the
nonrecurring cost side, on a consistent and comparable basis. Economic
analyses were made by us within the expected range of uncertainties as given
and reflected in estimates by industry and government agencies as well as
our own judgment as to the uncertainty of some of these costing efforts in
separate analyses.
The most important thing, however, with regard to Figure 3. 3 3 as
well as Figure 3.34 is that each of thesystems as shown in these figures
have a full equivalent space transportation capability to deliver payloads across
the mission model for NASA, and the DoD, as well as commercial applications in
the 1980's to all orbits, including earth escape missions. Therefore, in our
analysis these systems include whatever expendable hardware has to go with
partially reusable systems, as well as the inclusion of the Space Tug for
the Fully Reusable Space Transportation System in the 1980's. The system
costs also include the needed launch sites, both the ETR and WTI_. All
of the reusable systems do include for that matter the capability of using
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scout rockets for very small payload launches in the 1980's.
Analagous to the determination of cost effectiveness as explained
in the first section of this chapter, we now can determine cost effectiveness in
the context of the recurring versus nonrecurring cost tradeoff as shown in
Figure 3. 35. In Figure 3.35, the same Space Transportation Systems are
shown for illustrative purposes, as in Figure 3.33. Obviously, not all
systems are equally desirable from an economic standpoint. For example,
as illustrated in Figure 3.35, System 5 when compared to Systems I, 6
and 3, is obviously a better choice in economic terms. Each of these three
systems (I, 3, and 6) has both higher recurring costs as well as nonrecurring
costs when compared to System 5. Therefore, there exists no economic
reason -- if the cost estimates also reflect technological risk and cost uncer-
tainties as shown and exemplified in Figure 3. 34 -- to choose any of these
systems when compared to System 5. Without any further economic analysis,
System 5 is obviously better than either of the three systems enclosed by the
shaded area with its vertex at $5. In economic terms, Systems i, 3 and 6
are inefficient systems.
On the other side, when System 5 is compared either to System 2
or System 7, as shown in Figure 3. 35, we cannot state with equal assurance,
or for that matter with any assurance as of now, that System 5 is better or
worse than either System 7 or System 2 as long as no other additional econo-
mic criteria are introduced. When System 7 is compared to System 5, System
7 promises a further reduction in the cost per launch _n the 1980's when
successfully developed. This additional reduction in the recurring costs,
however, has to be acquired by a substantial additional outlay of cost in the
1970's. As long as we do not know to what extent the recurring costs can
be traded off economically into nonrecurring costs and vice versa, we have
no way of choosing between Systems 5 and 7. Similarly, if System 5 is
compared to System 2, we find that System 2 does promise a lower non-
recurring cost in the 1970's, while on the other side there is a substantial
increase in the cost per launch for System 2 when compared to those expected
from System 5. Again, the savings in nonrecurring costs can only be made
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up by a corresponding increase in the expected cost per launch in the 1980's.
System 5 does not and cannot be preferred uneconomically to System 2 witho_,t
the introduction of additional economic criteria that again allows one to tradeoff
recurring versus nonrecurring costs.
Among all the systems shown that are technologically feasible,
and represented in Figures 3. 33 and 3. 34, there is a very small set of
systems among these that is cost effective in the sense that these systems
clearly and unequivocally dominate other technologically feasible systems;
systems that arecost effective have associated with them either a lower non-
•recurring cost than any of the other systems considered or a lower recurring
cost than any of the other systems or a combination of recurring or non-
recurring costs that is lower than that of other technologically feasible and/or
cost effective systems.
The cost-effective systems are shown in Figure 3.35 as the lower
boundary to the technically feasible systems and for purposes of illustration
are connected by straight lines between them. The lines as sho_n actually
signify that, for instance, Systems 7, 5, 2, and 4 (that is, each of the cost-
effective systems) have been studied in detail by industry. However, other
systems possibly and probably can be found between, for example, systems
5 and 2, that would lie somewhere within the cost-effectiveness line connecting
Systems 5 and 2, which for reasons of economy and time have not been studied
in detail. It is also possible that systems between 5 and 2 are not actually
possible, but in that case, at least during the operating period of these systems,
a combination of Systems 5 and 2 would allow the achievement of recurring
costs between points $5 and $2. However, it is unrealistic to assume that such
a combined system could be achieved at the nonrecurring cost shown in these
figures.
Thus, among all the technically feasible systems, a frontier of
technological alternatives can be defined that economically dominates any of
the other feasible systems. Systems along this boundary are cost-effective
Space Transportation Systems, each of them having some advantages either
singularly or by a combination of economic attributes that are not met by other
L-
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systems capable of meeting the space transportation needs of the 1980's.
The determination of cost-effective systems is one major task of economic
analysis.
The second task of the full economic analysis is to determine among°
all the cost-effective systems the one single system or combination of systems
that is most adequate, in economic terms, to meet the space transportation
needs of the 1980's. The subsequent section shows howSpace Transportation
Systems are chosen as a function of all the different economic criteria and
parameters that enter the economic evaluation.
3.5.2
The Determination of the Most Economic Space Transportation Systerll:
the Nonrecurring Versus l_ecurring Cost Tradeoff Line
As shown in Figure 3. 35, one can move from System 5 to System 7
along the cost-effectiveness line only by trading off a given amount of cost per
launch, the A recurring costs, at corresponding increase in the nonrecurring
cost, shown again in Figure 3.35 by the A nonrecurring costs. For example,
we can move from a cost per launch of $8 million for some of the Thrust
Assisted Orbiter Shuttles to a cost of, say, $4.6 million per launch by incurring
the development cost for a fully reusable flyback booster in the 1970's. Ob-
viously, if there is only one launch, then eyen at usually high discount rates
it is uneconomic under any criterion to trade off a savings of $5 million in the
1980's versus a nonrecurring cost outlay in the neighborhood of, say, between
$I or $2 billion in the 1970's. On the other side, the same cost reduction
expected in the 1980's would be more than justified if in the 1980's there were
an unusually high rate of launches per year, for example, i000 launches. In
this case, even applying the most strict _conomic criteria in the evaluation
of such projects, it would be economic to incur the additional outlay irl nor_-
recurring costs in the 1970's in orderto bring about a very substantial savings
per year in the 1980's. The actual level of activity in the 1980's as well as
the value of other economic parameters will lie somewhere in between these tw_
extremes.
The basic principle is that there exists some economic tradeoff,
yet to be defined, between cost outlays in terms of research and development
expenditures as well as investment expenditures in the 1970's for a promised
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reduction in costs and operations in the 1980's. In terms of the two economic
variables shown in the diagram -- that is, the recurring and nonrecurring
costs -- one can draw this economic tradeoff line as a straight line from soln_:
point along the horizontal to some point along the vertical axis. This
line shows, with all due allowance for the different economic critf:ria t},at
enter into the economic evaluation (the overall level of the social rate (_f
discount applied in the analysis; the activity level in the 1980's to be e_rpecte'_
for space transportation; the external effects expected for the Space T!"ans-
portation System, in this case, the effects on payload costs and the costs
of space missions over an extended period of time; as well as the type of
economic analysis applied to evaluate the systems, foremost, th_ equal-
capability versus the equal-budget analysis as described in the earlier
sections of this analysis), the combination of recurring and nonrecurrir_g
cost systems f_hat are economically equally desirable as the development of
a New Expendable System for the 1970's.. All of the economic variables
mentioned will influence the exact slope of the tradeoff line to be drawn when
trading off recurring versus nonrecurring costs in the evaluation of alter-
nate Space Transportation Systems in the determination of the most econon1_c
system. We will first give a general exposition of the theory and assumption_"
underlying the concept of Economic Tradeoff Functions; then we will show
how changes in the major economic variables do influence the location and tl_e
slope of the Economic Tradeoff Function. In Chapter 2, the actual resalts a_'e
shown as they affect the choice among alternative Space' Shuttle configurations
and in Chapter 8 the computational routines and flow diagrams are presented.
Since the development of any new Space Shuttle System must be
tailored to fit NASA's budget projection, it is useful to characterize alt_rna_ir_ _
system candidates in terms of the following financial parameters:
(a) the nonrecurring costs associated with the RDT&E pl-Ja,se;
(b) the recurring costs per flight or per year.
One can develop so called equal-net-present-value lines (also called equal-
economic-benefit lines) depicting the theoretically possible tradeoff between
levels of nonrecurring and recurring costs.
L_
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3. 5. 2. 1 The Economic Tradeoff Function
Since both the recurring costs and the nonrecurring costs of a
typical new Space Shuttle System are incurred over time, the problem of
developing the tradeoff curves is tractable only if we are willing to make
certain simplifying assumptions, the most important of which are stated
below:
As sumptions :
(i) The capability to be placed into low earth orbit is the same
regardless of the particular Space Shuttle being analyzed. This assumption
allows us to measure benefits strictly in terms of cost savings.
(ii) It is assumed that, for any given Space Shuttle, the number of
flights to be flown per year is the same from year to year. This number
may, of course, vary from system to system. This assumption simplifies
our presentations greatly without detracting much from their realism.
(iii) The benefits per unit of time of any candidate system are measured
solely by the reduction in recurring costs, per unit of time, achieved when
the new system is used and the baseline capability is maintained. In other
words, we do not include in benefits any increment in capability attainable
with the new system. The reduction in recurring costs may, however,
include certain payload effects, i.e., cost savings in payload construction.
Notation:
We shall adopt the following notation:
B = the recurring costs, per fligl_t, under the baseline system (i. e. ,
m
3
Z°
3
X.
3
NRjt
the Current Expendable System).
= the number of flights, per year, flown under the baseline system.
= the recurring costs, per flight, under candidate system "j"
(e. g. , under the Shuttle or the hybrid system).
= the number of flights, per year, flown under STS "j".
= Z.R. the recurring costs, per year, under candidate system "j".
J J'
= the nonrecurring costs incurred in period t for the RDT&E phase
of STS "j'%
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L = the last year in which nonrecurring costs occur (RDT&E and
Initial Fleet investment).
N = IOC date for the Space Shuttle System (i. e. , the first year in
which recurring-cost savings accrue).
r = the social discount rate.
H = the economic uselife of the entire project.
NPVj(r)= the net present value of Space Shuttle System "j" evaluated at
a discount rate of r.
Other symbols vv/ll be explained as we proceed with our discussion.
Definition of Recurring and Nonrecurring Costs:
The term-nonrecurring costs refers to any type of cost which is
incurred only once during the economic uselife of the Space Shuttle System.
All other costs are regarded as recurring costs.
Example: Consider a new Space Shuttle System requiring $5 billion for the
RDT&E phase, $i. 5 billion for an initial fleet of vehicles assumed
to wear out in I0 years, and certain variable costs arising solely
out of the execution of flights.
We shall consider the I_DT&E costs as unambiguously nonrecurring.
Similarly, the mission-related costs are unambiguously recurring.
A question arises, however, in connection with the initial fleet
costs.
Our rule v411 be as follows:
I. If the project life is assumed to come to an end
when the first set of vehicles wears out, then
the initial fleet costs are a nonrecurring co st, as
they occur only onceduring the project life.
2. If the project life extends beyond the uselife of
the initial set of vehicles (i. e., if the first set
of vehicles will be replaced with a second set, and so
oa then the initial fleet cost will be regarded
as recurring.
L_
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r"
In a situation where the initial fleet costs are considered recurring
costs, we must, of course, include their amortization in the definition of
recurring costs per year (X. above). Assume now that the initial fleet for
3
system "j" costs $C. and has a uselife of M years. Then the annual
3
equivalent fleet cost (A_) is defined as
I C. • r "]'_
(1) A. : J /
l 1 -  l+r -Mi
% J .m_
Variable A. is something akin to straight-line depreciation of the initial
3
fleet costs, except that A. includes an interest component, while straight
J
line depreciation (in the above case equal to C./N) does not. In sum, then,
J
for cases where the project life extends beyond the life of the first set of
vehicles, the annual recurring cost X. includes an allowance for amortization.
3
The allowance will have a value of Aj/Zj, when recurring costs are expressed
on a per mission basis, i.e., as P_..
J
The other items assumed to be included in K. or X are the launch
3 m
costs, payload costs, the costs of ground facilities and, in the case of hybrids,
the cost of expendable components.
The Net Present Value of Space Shuttle System "j"
We shall think of a new Space Shuttle System as a time stream of
costs and benefits, the latter being thought of as cash equivalents. This
stream can be depicted along a time axis as follows:
] **time: 0 i 2 ... L L+I L+Z... H------ I I l _ ' '• . , , . _ _ time$: NRj 0 NRjl NRj2"'" NSN Yj Yj "" Y"J
.,..,.
[
It should be noted that the expression [i - (l+r)-*'_J/r is the present
value of an M-year annuity of $i per year, discounted at an
annual interest rate r.
Note that for illustrative purposes, the time stream above
assumes recurring costs to begin one year after the last non-
recurring costs have been incurred. In fact, however, the
nonrecurring and recurring cost streams may overlap; i. e.,
N may be smaller than L.
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£where Y. is defined as the net reduction in recurring costs per year associatedJ
with Space Shuttle "j". It is calculated as
where' as will be recalled, R. may include the amortization of depreciable
J
vehicl e s.
The net present value of the stream of benefits and costs,
at a discount rate r, is then givenby
t= L
(3) NPVj(r) = - (i+r)t
t=0
e valuate d
+ [mB-Z [I1÷ 1
• J L r (l+r) H
It should be noted that if the i-nit_al set of vehicles wears out pre-
cisely at the end of period H (and, since H is the assumed end of the project
life, it is not replaced with a second set of vehicles) then the initial fleet
costs are assumed to be included in thenonrecurring costs NR_t , and Rj
is exclusive of amortization of vehicle costs. If H extends beyond the uselife
of the first set of vehicles, then the NR_t do not include vehicle costs and Rj
includes an amortization allowance.
In equation (3), it is assumed that the project horizon is a finite
number of H years. Actually, society does have the option of retaining
system j indefinitely. Presumably, society will do so until a better system
comes along. There is, then, no compelling reason to use a project horizon
of less than infinity for the benefit stream Y..
J
If one uses an infinite horizon, tl_n equation (3) becomes
(3a) NPVj(r)= _ L(,+r,,j + _ . 1
.. t=O
where R. now definitely includes amortization of depreciable vehicles andJ
NR.tJ excludes initial fleet costs.
The Desired Economic Tradeoff Functions
We can use equations (3) and (3a) to derive the Economic Tradeoff
Functions between nonrecurring and recurring costs. These functions can
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then be depicted on a two-dimensional graph with recurring and nonrecurring
costs as the abscissa and ordinate, respectively. But before we can derive
these functions, we must first of all decide precisely how we wish to
represent the nonrecurring and recurring costs.
The Nonrecurring Costs
Since we wish to depict the tradeoff functions in only two dimensions,
the vector of nonrecurring costs (NRj0 , NRj2,... , NRjL)must somehow
be collapsed into a scalar. Here we have three options:
Alternative i:
We can assume that the relative amounts to be spent, per year, on non-
recurring costs over the period 0 to L will remain constant, and that a "given
"percentage change in nonrecurring costs" is interpreted to mean that each
year's nonrecurring expenditures change by that percentage.
On this approach, we can normalize all nonrecurring expenditures NKit
on those of some given year, e.g., on NRi0 , and write the vector of non-
recurring costs as
NRj0 (1, nil , nj2 , nj3 , ...,n.L }J
where n. = NRjt/NR jjt 0" The trade-off curve between non-recurring and
recurring costs will then be
(4) NRj 0
1
t=L
t=0 (l+r)t
mB-Z. R.)[i+i ] H-N
_ -i
r(l+r)H NPVj (r)
and
(4a) NRj0 EtL1]['mBnjt r (l+r) N
t-0 (l+r)t
- NPVj (r I
for the finite-and infinite-horizon cases, respectively.
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Alternative 2:
We can develop the tradeoff simply between the nonrecurring costs in a
particular year (e. g. , Nl_is), and the recurring costs (i_), holding
the nonrecurring costs in any other year t#s constant. The tradeoff
curves will then become
(5) NR. = (l+r) s
js
H-N
(roB-zj5) ( [l+r] -1) _Npv.Or)
J
r(l+r) H
t=L
7
t=0 (l+r) t
and
t=L
J J - NPVj(r) - __
(5a) NRjs = (l+r) s l+r) N (l+r) t
t=O
Alternative 3:
We can develop the tradeoff curve in terms of the present value of all
nonrecurring costs and the recurring, costs. On this alternative, we obtain
the tradeoff curves
(6) NRj(r) -
(mB - Z. R.)( [I+r]
J
r (l+r) H
H-N
-i)
- NPVj(r)
and
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(rob - Z. R.)
(6a) NRj(r) = J J NPV.(r)
r(1+r) N J
t--L
_, NRjt= This definition of the non- recurring-cost
where NRj (r) (l+r) t .
t=0
parameter is, of course, dependent upon the discount rate (r). It follows
that a diagrammatic representation of equations (6) and (6a) can be given
only for a single, assumed interest rate (r). Aside from this restriction,
however, Alternative 3 is probably the preferred definition of the non-
recurring-cost parameter.
Equation (6a) has been plotted in Figure 3.36 below for the case
NPVj(r)=0 and NPV. (r)>0. It will be recalled that equation (6a) is basedJ
on an infinite project horizon.
Each of the tradeoff curves in Figure 3.36 depicts a continuum of
alternative combinations of nonrecurring costs and _ecurring costs per
each combination representing a distinct hypothetical Space Transportation
System differing, however, from any other system only with respect to the
nonrecurring and recurring costs. In particular, in this simplified case we
assume that the number of flights flown per year is the same number (Z)
for any Space Transportation System plotted in Figure 3.36 except for the
baseline system for which the number of flights per year is assumed to be
m. All such systems (with the same Z) located on the same tradeoff curve
have the same net present value (NlmM(r)) if their distinct cost-benefit
streams are discounted at r.
We assume that the Current Expendable System, denoted by j=CE,
is located on the horizontal axis with nonrecurring costs (NKcE(r)) for
that system being zero and recurring costs per mission being I_CE. Let us
now examine a possible new Space Transportation System "X J' with positive,
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£nonrecurring costs equal to NRx(r) and recurring costs per flight equal
to i_X and flights per year equal to Z. This system, if evaluated at a discount
rate of r is just equivalent to our assumed baseline system CE. In other
words, any new system located on the line Qis no better and no worse than
the current baseline system.
Consider now a system Q characterized by the nonrecurring costs
NRQ(r) and the recurring costs per flight RQ and flights per year equal to
the same Z we assumed for system X. If evaluated at r, this system would
be equivalent (in terms of net present value, NPV(r) ) to another hypothetical
system characterized by zero nonrecurring costs, hypothetical recurring
^
costs per mission of RQ, and the same number of flights per year (Z) as
systems Q and X. It is clear that system Q is superior to both system X
and the (current-expendable) baseline system CE. For at a discount rate of
r, system Q must have a net present value greater than zero as otherwise
RQ could not be smaller than P_CE" Similar reasoning will convince the
reader that syste_n P is inferior to both system X and the baseline system,
since P must have a negative net present value (NlZrVp(r)_:0.
We may therefore draw the conclusion that, for all conceivable Space
Transportation Systems characterized by the same number of flights
p_eK_year, those systems located below line _ are preferred to the baseline
system CE, those located on line _) are no better and no worse than the
baseline syste:n and those located above line O are inferior to the baseline
system. This is the precise meaning-o_ graphs Such as Figure 3.3 6.
A Closer Look at the Recurring-C6st Dimension:
Fig_ re 3. 3 6 has one major %;¢eakness: it is the requirement that,
_4th the exception of the baseline system, all Space Transportation Systems
plotted in the figure are characterized by the same number of flights per
year.
':_Note that _Q = RCE NPVQ(r)/r(l+r) N.
is possibly only for NPVQ(r) >0, if r>0.
It follows that _Q<RcE
u_
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Actually there is no reason to suppose that tile number of flights
to be flown per year will be a constant over all alternative systenls being
considered. In view of the variability of Z_, it is therefore best to expreRs
the recurring-expense pararneter not on a per-flight basis (i.e. , as Rj),
but rather on a per-year basis (i.e., as X. = Z.R.). The graphic presentation
J 3 3
of the tradeoff curves vvill then appear as in Figure 3. 3"7.
In outward appearance Figure 3. 37 differs from Figure I only
in that the abscissa now represents X., the recurring costs erp_9/_y__r
J
associated with Space Shuttle Systenl ':j'% (Moreover, as Figure 3. 38 is
drawn, the scales of the axes are obviously not the same as those in Figure
3. 36; but this change has been made only for expository convenience.)
The great advantage of Figure 3.38 over Figure 3. 36 is that we can
represent in it any conceivable Space Shuttle System_ regardless of the number
of flights the system requires per year. Moreover, part of the exercise is
surely to see how alternative systems are likely to affect NASA's annual budgete_
and that is possible only if recurring costs are on a per annum basis.
Figure 3.3 7 still has the property that any Space Shuttle Syste:_n
located above line O is inferior to the (current expendable) baseline
system, any system located on line Q is equivalent to the baseline system1
and any system located below lineO is superior to the base]ine system.
Figure 3.37 can be made more informative still if it is acconnpanied
by a net present value scale as in Figure 3. 38 below. The reader will have
noticed that to every point (X i >_ 0, NP, i(r ) = 0) corresponds a unique net
present value NPV.(r). Consider, for example, system P_ in Figure 3o3_ with
J
nonrecurring costs of Nl_l{(r) and recurring costs per year equal to X R. We
know that this system is equivalent to another hypothetical system with zero
A
nonrecurring costs and annual recurring costs equal to X R > Xpc
The reader should note, however, that the trade-off curves in Figure 3, 37
all have the slope 1/r(l+r) N, io e. , al] systems eva]uated with reference
to these curves are assumed to have the same IOC date. We shall con
sider the treatment of variable IOC dates in Figure 3o 39. T
- :L
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Now this _R has the value of
(7) XR : mB - r(l+r) N. NPV a (r),
which can be solved for
^
InB - XR
(8) NPVR (r) = 7-7],----_.-:j_-:1 _.:/ r(l+r) _
^
The values of NPV.(r) correspor_ding to any other X. (where, to repeat,
3 3
the t signifies that we are talking about a hypothetical system _;ith zero
non-recurring costs) can be obtained via equation 8,
Figure 3. 38 enables one to rank the project plotted in the DonrecurJ._ ,g-..
recurring cost space with relative ease. Consider, for example, preje<:t 7"
To find its net present value, simply move along the tradeoff cu, ve (]J,_e Ill)
on which T is located up to the point where the tradeoff curve cuts the hori-
^
zontal axis at X. = X T. From there, drop a perpendicular to the r:et-pr_,sent
value scale and read off the net present value, NPVT(r), of system T. If
all systems under consideration have been properly located in the NR-X space,
the system with the left-most position on the net present value scale is the
most desirable one. (Recall, again, that all systems considered are assumed
to satisfy a given capability. )
While the X.-axis in Figure 3. 38 increases from left to right, theJ
net present value scale increases from right to left,and its zero-point is
located just where the X.-axis has the value of roB. Finally, in temxts of
J
absolute dollar values, one unit of distance on the X.-axhs corresponds to
J
1/r(l+r)N- units of distance on the net present value scale.
It is well to keep in mind, however, that the net present values
shown in Figure 3. 3.8 do not make any allowance for incremental benefits.
Any system on that graph with a positive net present va]ue is therefore
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definitely superior to the baseline system (assuming costs to have been
predicted accurately). On the other hand, even a system such as T in
Figure 3. 3 8 might be better than the baseline sFs tern if al___lpotential
future benefits associated with the system are accounted for.
Economic Tradeoff Functions when the IOC Date varies among Systems
It will have been noted that the slopes of the tradeoff functions
in Figure 3.36 are
(9}
BNR. - Z.
: .____L
r(l+r) N
and those of the trade-off curves in Figures 3.37 and 3. 38
_NR.(lO) ____2 = -1
BX.
...... J r(l+r} N "
In other words, all of the functions shown in these diagrams are
based on the assumption that the systems to be evaluated have the same
IOC dkte N years hence.
Suppose now that we wish to evaluate two alternative systems, U
and V, against the baseline system CE. Assume further that for U,
nonrecurring costs are incurred for L years while for system V nonrecurring
costs occur for K # L years. Finally, assume that system U has an IOC
date of N, while system V has an IOC date of M_N.
It is clear from the slope equations (9) and (I0) above, that the
location and possibly the slope of the Economic Tradeoff Function will be
different for each of the IOC dates. This is shown in Figure 3.39. Since
"U" has an IOC date of N, its position must be evaluated with reference to
lineQ . And, as may be seen from the net present value scale, system
U is clearly better than the current baseline system CE. If system V were
r
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evaluated with reference to line Q as well, it _ould appear to be better than
both the baseline system CE and candidate U. However, it will be recalled
that the IOC date for system V was M _N. This means that V must be evaluated
in terms of its position vi____s___-vi___sline @ (having a slope of Ivf )" And
it is apparent from Figure 3. 39 that system V, far frombein_(l+r)better than
the baseline system, is clearly inferior to it, because the net present value
(NPVcE(r)) of the baseline system is zero, while that of system V (NPVv(r))
is negative.
It is seen, then, that Economic Tradeoff Functions, such as Figure
3.38 can easilybe adapted to the case in which the IOC date varies among
the alternative Space Transportation Systems being evaluated. Any other
changes in the major economic variables can be incorporated equally well
and represented easily in the Economic Tradeoff Function (ETF), each sig-
nificantly influencing the exact location or slope of the ETF. But it is
equally clear from our discussion that one must be careful in making explicit
one's assumptions implicit in the use of the Economic Tradeoff Function. For,
as was illustrated with Figures 3. 36 and 3.39, failure to be conscious
about the assumptions underlying particular tradeoff functions can easily lead
one to make erroneous choices.
The actual Economic Tradeoff Functions are arrived at in Chapter
8 and the major empirical results are summarized in Chapter 2. However,
the impact on Space Shuttle System choice of changes in the major economic
variables identified in the economic analysis are brought out in the next four
figures. In Figures 3.40, 3.4 I, 3.42, and 3.43 it is shown how the actual
slope of the tradeoff line does influence the choice of the Space Transportation
System in the case of new space transportation alternatives.
In Figure 3.40, three alternate tradeoff lines are shown which
reflect the influence of the level of different economic variables on the tradeoff
line. Tradeoff line A shows how the cost per launch expected for a New
Expendable System in the 1980's can be traded off -- at increased research
and development expenditures -- by moving toward a reusable Space Trans-
Remember, however, that we have not accounted for any possible
incremental benefits under system V. Once these benefits have been
taken into account, system V might still be better than the baseline
system:.
t
!_
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lower activity level, lower payload effects or less than equal cal_bility.
Figure 3.40
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£portation System along the cost-effective line developed in Figure 3. 35.
Tradeoff line A indicates that for the levels of activities chosen for the
economic variables -- for a 10% social rate of interest, the NASA and the
DoDbaseline mission models for the period of 1979 to 1990, the payload
effects as documented by studies used for the purposes of this analysis
(due to volume, mass, refurbishment, and reuse), as well as the equal-
capability-cost-effectiveness analysis described in Section 3.1 -- the
expected New Expendable costs can be traded off at most against $15
billion of nonrecurring costs in the 1970's even assuming a recurring cost
per launch of zero. This goes to show that given the present state of
technology the most advanced system -- those of a minimal or possibly
negligible recurring cost -- also have associated with them a maximum amount
of economic resources that could be allocated to their development in the
light of the activities that the U. S. expects to carry on in the 1980's and
1990's.
If a different set of economicparameters had been selected as
representative of the economic environment in the 1970's and 1980's, then
a different tradeoff would have resulted of the expected reduction of
recurring costs versus the justifiable nonrecurring costs in the 1970's
when compared to New Expendable Systems. Tradeoff line C as shown in
Figure 3.40 reflects a substantially higher discount rate (in this case 15%)
as well as lower activity levels in the 1980's, a substantial reduction of the
expected payload effects, and again, an equal-capability-cost-effectiveness
analysis of alternate Space Transportation Systems. It shows that under
these constraints and economic conditions the most that an economic analysis
could show as justified in nonrecurring costs for the 1970's would be $i0
billion, even assuming inordinate reductions in the cost per flight %o be
expected in the 1980's and beyond.
On the other side, if some of the economic conditions prevailing
in the 1970's and the activity levels expected in the 1980's were more favorable
to the development of the Space Shuttle System, then Tradeoff line B
reflects such conditions: a lower social rate of discount of 5%, a higher
activity level in the 1980's than that represented by the NASA and the DoD
1979-1990 baseline mission model, as well as larger payload effects than
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those posed and given for purposes of our analysis. A similar effect on the
slope of the tradeoff line could also be shown if instead of the equal-capability
analysis, the equal-budget analyses were taken as the basis for the economic
evaluation of alternate Space Transportation Systems. With a substantial
variation in the economic parameters used for the economic analysis, alternate
Space Transportation Systems will prove to be the most economic among the
cost-effective systems as shown in Figure 3.35. In the case of Tradeoff line
A, the most economic system is shown (S*) in Figure 3.41 -- it is the system
where the distance between the Tradeoff line A and the cost-effectiveness
line of alternate Space Transportation Systems is maximized, as shown by
System $5. The most economic system among the cost-effective systems
is selected on the basis where Tradeoff line Ais tangent to the cost-efficiency
line represented by Systems $7, $5, $4 and $2. The point of tangency is
given at $5. With the tradeoff as represented by the slope of A between
recurring and nonrecurring costs, System 5 is bounded by the technical
possibilities offered by System 7 and System 2 in terms of recurring versus
nonrecurring costs and is closest to the tradeoff that is desirable for economic
reasons, represnted by Tradeoffline A. For example, to move from System
5 to System 4 one could save an additional portion of nonrecurring costs. One
would do so at an increase of recurring costs that is larger than the economi
analysis shows to be desirable, i. e., the slope of Tradeoff line A. On the
other side, by going from System 5 to System 7 we could further reduce the
recurring costs in the 1980's; however, the increase in nonrecurring costs
is larger than the one that can be justified on the basis of economic analysis,
again shown by Tradeoff line A. In the absence of other technical choices
between Systems 7, 5 and 2, System 5 is" economically the preferred system
to meet the space transportation needs of the 1980's.
If other economic conditions had held for the analysis, the tradeoff
between the recurring cost and the nonrecurring cost would have been in
favor of incurring higher nonrecurring costs in the 1970's with the promise
of a further reduction of recurring costs in the 1970's. As discussed earlier,
if the social rate of discount had been substantially lower than the one used
for the economic analysis, and/or the activity level in the 1980's had been
3-105
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substantially higher than that used again in the economic analysis and/or
the external effects of the Space Transportation System (mainly, the
decrease or increase in the payload costs in meeting various alternate
_-nissions of space transportation in the 1980's as well as the expected
reliability and operating time of the systms) and the type of cost-effectiveness
analysis applied in this case by moving from an equal capability to an equal-
budget analysis, then Tradeoff line B would apply. This case is represented
in ]5_'igure 3.42 by the Tradeoff line B, also shown in Figure 3.40. In this
case, t_e most economic system, that is, where the slope of line B is tangent
t_ the cost-effectivness function, is System $7. Under these favorable eco-
_on_ic conditions, the most advanced technological system would be developed
s_nce, when compared to the next best System, $5, the reduction in the
recurring costs promised by moving from System $5 to System $7 are
larger than those needed in order to justify the additional nonrecurring
cost outlay as shown by the slope of line B.
Conversely, if economic conditions had been more stringent than
_hose used by us and deemed representative of the economic environment
,_fthe 1970's and 1980's in our economic analysis, then a lower tradeoff line
would have resulted for purposes of this analysis. The Tradeoff line C
as shown in Figure 3.43 does reflect such an adverse combination of econo-
_nic factors. Tradeoff line C reflects a higher social rate of discount at 15% ,
a substantially lower activity level, as well as the exclusion of significant
payload effects than can be and may be achieved in the 1980's, but for purposes
of a conservative economic analysis were excluded to a large extent in this
case from the evaluation. Similarly, if the capabilities of this system to
be developed in the 1970's would only partially meet the mission models of the
]980's, the rest having to be carried by expendable systems, then again
the tradeoff line for the development of that system would be lowered to a slope
as shown by Figure 3.43 and Tradeoff line C.
As a matter of fact, in the analysis of this report, Tradeoff line C
_s more representative with respect to at least two of the three or four
key economic variables of the environment to be expected in the 1970's and
]980's, than tradeoff line A. This is reflected in the quantitative results of
3-I07
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our economic analysis. Using Tradeoff line C as shown in Figure 3.43 to
determine the most economic Space Shuttle System among the cost-effective
systems, System $2 is now preferred over any of the other systems including
Systems $5 and on the other side, $4.
The actual level of the various economic variables used in our
economic analysis -- mostly the discount rate, the activity level_ the pay-
load effect, as well as equal-capability and equal-budget analyses -- are
discussed in the _uantitative section of this report as well as in the surnn%ary
of results.
In addition to these economic variables, there are other factors
that also influence the economic tradeoff line and that are reflected in our
calculations. Among these are the expected initial operating capability
for the alternate Space Transportation Systems, the expected risk and
uncertainty of the systems, as well as the availability, or unavailability,
of a Fully Reusable Space Tug in the 1980's.
L_.
3-110
REFERENCES IN CHAPTER 3.0
i,i
Ii
J
.4j
5]
ETJ
i8]
Arrow, K. J. and Lind, B. C., "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of
Public Investment Decisions, 7' American Economic Review, Vol. 61
(June, 1970), pp. 364-78.
Hirshleifer, J., and Shapiro, D. L., "The Treatment of Risk and
Uncertainty" in Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on
Economy Government. The Analysis and Evaluation of Public
Expenditures: The PPB System. 91st Congress, Is,. Session,
Vol. I, Part III, pp. 505-30.
MATHEMATICA, Inc. , "On the Principles of Public Project
Evaluation", Vol. 1 of Cost-Benefit Analysis of New Launch Systems.
Report prepared by MATHEMATICA for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, July, 1970.
Stockfish, J.A. , Prepared Statement before Joint Economic Committee
Subcommittee on Economy in Government. Hearings on the Planning-
Programming Budget System: Progress and Potentials. 90th Congress,
Is, Session, 1968.
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on
Economy in Government. Economic Analysis of Public Investment
Decisions: Interest Rate Policy and Discounting Analysis. Report
of the Subcommittee, 1968.
U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on
Economy in Government. Hearings on Economic Analysis and the
Effioiency of Government. 91st Congress, Ist Session, 1969.
U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Cornrnittee. Subcommittee on
Economy in Government. Hearings on Guidelines for Estimating
the Benefits of Public Expenditures. 91st Congress, is, Session,
1969.
U. S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget.
Circular No. A-94 on Discount Rates and Procedures to be Used i_
[.9_]
[i0]
Evaluating Deferred Costs and Benefits. June 26, 1969.
Krutilla, J.V. and Eckstein, O., Multiple Purpose River Develop-
ment. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.
Hirshleifer, J., De Haven, J.C. and Milliman, J.W., Water Supply-
Economics, Technology, and Policy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960.
3-111
i.[111
[IZ]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Weisbrod, B.A. , Economics of Public Health: Measuring the
Economic Impact of Diseases. Philadelphia, University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1960.
Hufschmidt, M.M., Krutilla J., and Margolis, J., "Standards and
Criteria for Formulating and Evaluating Federal Water Resources
Developments, " Appendix I in Joint Economic Committee. Sub-
committee on Economy in Government. Hearings on Guidelines for
Estimating the Benefits of Public Expenditures. 91st Congress,
ist Session, 1969.
Friedlaender, A. F. , The Interstate Highway System. Amsterdam:
North Holland Publishing Company, 1965.
Bain, J.S., Caves, R.E. and Margolis, J., Northern California's
Water Industry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.
Baumol, W.J., "On the Social Rate of Discount, " American Econon_ic
Review. Vol. 58 (Sept., 1968), pp. 788-802.
Eckstein, O., Water Resource Development: The Economics of
Project Evaluation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ]958.
Harberger, A. , "Statement" submitted to the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee. Hearings on
the Economic Analysis of Public Investment Decisions: Interest Rate
Policy and Discount Analysis. 90th Congress, Znd Session, 1968.
3-112
FOOTNOTES IN CHAPTER 3.0
I.
2.
.
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.
.
7.
8.
9.
In our economic analysis, it is assumed that the incremental
cost of the new STS (Shuttle) missions is constant. The basic
arguments presented here are more general than what would be
needed in subsequent economic analysis.
These two criteria will not usually lead to the same choice. Let
B(Q) denote the benefit function, C(Q) be the cost function and
B'(Q) and C'(Q) be the first derivatives, with respect to Q,
of these two functions, respectively• Let Q denote capability
levels. Then "net benefits" are maximized at that level Q at
which B'(Q) = C'(Q), i.e. , where "marginal benefits" equal
"marginal costs". The cost benefit ratio, on the other hand,
is maximized (subject to second order conditions) at a level
Q such that
_)B/C = 0 which implies
_Q
B'(Q) C'(Q)
B(Q) C(Q)
It is clear that, in general, these two first order conditions are
not satisfied at the same level of Q, i.e. , the "net benefit" and
"benefit/cost ratio" will not lead one to choose the same capability
-- budget point.
Scenarios denote, roughly, different space programs for the 1980's
for NASA, the Department of Defense and commercial users.
George Wilson, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions in the Economics
of Transportation, Foundation for Economic & Business Studies,
Indiana University, 1962, p. 55.
"The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB
System", Joint Economic Comfnittee, the Congress of the United
States, Washington, D. C., 1969.
Op. cir. , Volume I, p. 357.
Op. cir., Volume I, p. 369.
Op. cit., Volume I, p. 357.
The readers may find it strange to see the output from a Space
Transportation System defined as a consumable. The point is
that the output from an STS becomes input into production pro-
cesses which ultimately do yield consumables.
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I0.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Klaus P. Heiss, Uwe Reinhardt, On the Principles of Public
Project Evaluation, prepared for NASA, July, 1970, Chapter 5.
Ibid.
For an exposition of these conceptual differences, see Ibid.,
Chapter 5.
Ibid.
MATHEMATICA, Inc. [3], Section 5. Z.Z, pp. 88=96.
See, for example, K. J. Arrow and B. C. Lind ill.
The blueprints may become obsolete (i. e. , Superior knowledge
may be produced in the future), but obsolescence is by no means
the same as depreciation, as will be argued shortly in this section.
By "recovered" in this context is meant "covered by benefits"
and not ',covered by user charges levied by NASA".
This assumption means, of course, that the Shuttle would be in
existence by 1985. In comparing the more advanced system to
the Shuttle, one would therefore disregard the fixed RDT_E outlays
for the Shuttle (they would be sunk costs), and compare the total
RDT&E and operating cost of the advanced system to only the
operating cost of the Shuttle.
Obviously we are abstracting here from a host of other managerial
and technical factors which ought to be considered in such a decision.
Let the reader be reminded that in this chapter, our aim is to explore
basic principles, one by one. Such an analysis inevitably forces
one to oversimplify and to abstract from the complexities of the
real world.
In the context of the proposed Space Shuttle development, for
example, the competing projects might consist of more scientific
applications using the current expendable transportation system.
The competing projects might include also programs proposed by
competing federal agencies, such as the expansion of medical-
school capacity or the support of basic research at institutes of
higher education.
It may not be unfair to suggest that the arguments for the early
developments of Supersonic Air Transport are predicated
precisely that type of non-sequitur. That the time for an early IOC-
date of the STS is not ripe may be inferred from the fact that private
capital shies away from the project. Indeed, aside from the proper
measurement of the social costs of the STS, a diligent search for an
appropriate IOC-date is probably the single most important factor
neglected by the advocates of that transportation system.
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22.
23.
24.
25.
As a matter of fact, for such projects one could make the case
of the government "risk happiness", as the low risk projects
would be undertaken by the private sector.
"Value of expected utility of return" is used here synonymously
with "expected utility return", as opposed to the "expected money
return. "
With A = i, this implies "variance" neutrality, A < i implies
risk (variance) aversion and A > 1 implies risk happiness. In
Figure 3. 29 we have 0 <A < i.
At present we are trying to empirically measure this rate for stock
market operations.
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iAppendix 3A: Benefit-Cost Analysis of Space Transportation Systems
Theory and Practice in Mathematical Economics
This Appendix reviews the theoretical foundation of our work on the
economic analysis of new Space Transportation Systems. This Appendix is
strictly intended for mathematical economists concerned with the rigor of
cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analysis. No effort is made to make it
intelligible in more general, non-mathematical form. This Appendix and
its implementation in our work represents in our opinion the first complete
theoretic foundation of benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness analyses of alter-
native technologies. Some effort has been made to fill what appears to be a
gap between the abstract discussion of the theory (such as recent contributions
of R. W. Shephard [2Jand [4J) and the concrete evaluation of the practice (such
as this and earlier reports _l] ).
General Framework and Specific Issues
The terms "cost-effectiveness analysis" and "cost-benefit analysis"
have been distinguished explicitly by us. They are treated as one by R. W.
Shephard [4]. In reality, the distinction between '_enefit" and "effectiveness"
is unnecessary when one is dealing exclusively with cost-benefit (effectiveness)
relationships of a single technology. This technology is described by a
correspondence x----_P(x), or its inverse correspondence u----_L(u), where
n
u_Er_ denote input and output vectors, respectively. 1 It is con-xEE and+
venient to reserve the term cost-effectiveness analysis for the situation in
which the cost-benefit relationships of more than one technology are involved
and one technology is selected as the basis from which cost savings or addi-
tional benefits of an alternative technology are derived. In our reports, the
alternative technologies of Space Transportation Systems are broadly classi-
fied into the Current,Expendable System, the New Expendable System, and
the New Reusable Space Shuttle System.
The cost-effectiveness analysis has been pursued in two alternative
approaches, referred to as the equal-capability approach and the equal-budget
approach, respectively (see Section 3.1). These two approaches correspond
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precisely to the two alternative cost-benefit relationships based on what
Shephard called the return-afforded-input correspondence and the cost-
limited-output correspondence. 2 His discussions of the analogous global
cost-benefit (preference) relationships rely on the concepts of the social-
preference-afforded-input correspondence and the social-preference function.
They are particularly difficult to apply in practice, despite their considerable
theoretical impiications. 3 In fact, the equal-capability approach of our cost-
benefit analysis involves merely a comparison of the cost-benefit relation-
ships obtained for alternative Space Transportation Systems based on the
return-afforded-input correspondences. Similarly, the equal-budget
approach of our cost-effectiveness analysis involves merely a comparison
of the cost-benefit relationships obtained for alternative Space Transportation
Systems based on the cost-limited-output correspondences. More specifi-
cally, the equal-capability approach attempts to compare the minimum
costs of alternative Transportation Systems for attaining any given level
of revenue (which is represented by the capability or the number of space
flights in our report). Similarly, the equal-budget approach attempts to
compare the maximum benefit of alternative Space Transportation Systems
obtainable from any given amount of cost (which is the budget for space
transportation).
In what follows, we discuss how these principles were implemented
in our report. It must be noted that the elegance of the theoretical frame-
work suggested by Shephard lies largely in its flexibility to deal with the
joint production of multiple outputs uEE+ and the externality of production
r_R m, where u and r are the output vector and the associated price vector,
respectively, for outputs. Note the fact that negative prices are allowed for
non-desirable outputs. These aspects received very little discussion in our
report. The discussion of scaling laws under the assumptions of homothetic
4
or semi-homogeneous output and input structure is of considerable interest.
It has, perhaps, some important implications for practical applications of
benefit- cost analysis.
Although Shephard's discussion was limited in static framework, his
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discussion of scaling laws offers significant insight into the problems related
to the social rate of discount and the changing levels of input prices as well
as output prices. Since the degree of scarcity of capital may vary for
different time periods, it may not be unreasonable to apply varying social
rates of discount for different time periods. In fact, one can treat the issue
of the social rate of discount as a special case of changing levels of input
prices where the relevant input is the service provided by the capital.
Furthermore, since the levels of input prices and output prices may change
at different rates, it may be argued that it is more appropriate to apply
different price deflators for the evaluation of cost and benefit, respectively.
Perhaps the issue of whether different price deflators should be applied to
evaluating cost and benefit, respectively, does not have a significant con-
sequence in our cost-effective analysis, since in this analysis the evaluation
of benefit plays a relatively minor role compared with the evaluation of cost.
In fact, the issue is somewhat relevant only in the equal-budget approach,
and is not relevant at all in the equal-capability approach.
The Equal Capability Approach of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
As pointed out in Section 3. 1, the equal-capability approach involves
a comparison of the minimum costs of two alternative Space Transportation
Systems. Let us consider how the equal-capability approach has been em-
ployed to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the Space Shuttle System as com-
pared with the Current Expendable System.
Following Shephard's notation, for any positive re_:urn rate, lZ, and
a price vector r_R m for outputs, a return correspondence (-_-)-----@S(-_)
for the Current Expendable System may be defined by
Ix I x,R:lr,Rm
where
(2) R(x'r) = Max I r" u[uCP(x)lu ' rCRm xCRn' +
is the maximum return obtainable from an input vector x at prices r for
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£outputs. The minimum cost of obtaining the return rate I_ at prices rERm
n for outputs may then be defined byfor outputs and prices peR+
(3) K(--_-,p) = Inf p. x xeS(--_-) ,
x
Similarly, for the Space Shuttle System, the corresponding relation-
ships of (1) to (3) may be written as
"S' ( ) = x R'(x,r).= R, xc + ,(4)
where
 'xr':  Xlruuiu' ,x,1 r, m
and
(6) K'(_, p)= Inf p. x x(S' ( ) rcR m, peR n
x
The primes in (4) to (6) merely indicate that these equations are defined by
alternative correspondences ('--_)----_S' (-_-) and x---.-_P' (x).
To estimate (3) and (6) directly and then to proceed to compare them
is an extremely difficult task to accomplish. It appears that an assumption
is in order. That assumption is that prior to the development of the new
Space Transportation System, society is willing to spend annually, say,
$3 billion to place forty-six payloads into orbit, and that the projected joint
space budget for NASA and the Department of Defense isbeing spent
5
in an efficient way. As a consequence of this assumption, we are, in
reality, assuming (3) to be
r K
(7) K(-_-, p) = p. x = r. u = (-j-)u = R .
where u is the output (capability) in terms of the number of space flights,
• K
and r = (-u--) is the average cost. The assumption leading to (7) is both
drastic and crucial. In effect, we were forced to measure the benefit 1_
in terms of cost K.
Once the assumption of (7) is adopted, the equal capability approach
can be carried out relatively easily by constructing (6) from
r-
L_
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(s) K'(R , p)
where p
I( )-S (N)
s,
represents cost saving and S'(R ) and S(R ) in turn
denote the input requirements of the Space Shuttle System and the Current
Expendable System, respectively. While the cost-benefit relationship of the
Current Expendable System (7) may be an expedience, the derivation of the
cost-benefit relationship of the Space Shuttle System (8) is entirely justifiable
had K(-_ , p) been correctly estimated.
A diagram may be helpful in illustrating the nature of the equal-
capability approach. In Figure i, the straight lines labeled CE and SH represent
the cost-benefit relationships of the Current ]_pendable System and the Space
Shuttle System, respectively. At the capacity level of u 0 represented by a
benefit of 1%0 = r0 "u0' we find K'0< K 0. Therefore, the Space Shuttle
System is shown to be cost effective because selecting the Space Shuttle
System in place of the Current Expendable System yields a saving of K0-K0'.
This by itself, however, cannot justify the Space Shuttle System. Suppose
the true cost-benefit relationship of the Current Expendable System is the
dotted-curved line CE*. The cost-benefit relationship of the Space Shuttle
System cannot be justified at the capacity level of u 0 ,with a benefit of 1%0,
_¢ I .-4'¢
since even though the same savings K 0 - K 0 --K 0 - K 0 can be realized, the
true cost of the Space Shuttle will be greater than the benefit K 0 > K 0 = 1%0"
In fact, assuming CE* and SH* are the correct curves, at any level of capacity
beyond 1% , the Space Shuttle System cannot be justified. On the other hand,
the minimum capacity level which can justify favoring the Space Shuttle System
over the Current Expendable System will be ___ (corresponding to the inter-
section of CE* and SH*).
The Equal-Budget Approach of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Turning now to a discussion of the equal-budget approach, we may
recall that such an approach involves a comparison of the maximum benefits
3A-5
R, benefit
R 1 '
SH/
CE
/
R o
R
Kf
Note s: CE:
SH:
. SH_
s_ p
K, cost
K 0 K' * K *
0 0 0
I
Figure 1: Equal Capability Approach
The assumed cost-benefit relationship of the current
expendable system, defined by
(a) R:K.
The assumed cost-benefit relationship of the space
shuttle system, defined by
R=K' +p_S'(-_-)-S (_r---)_,assuming(a)(b)
(continued)
L.
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CE_:
SH_:-':
I<0,a nd
K 0:
' andK o
Kf:
R and
R :
R 0 and
R 1 :
An alternative cost=benefit relationship of the current
expendable system, defined by
(c) R = eK B with _ >0, R _,0.
An alternative cost-benefit relationship of the space shuttle
system, defined by
(d) R = K' +p S'(_---) - S( ) , assuming (c).
Costs of the current expendable system at the benefit level
of R0, according to (a) and (c) respectively.
Cost of the space shuttle system at the benefit level of 1_0,
according to (b) and (d) respectively.
Fixed cost of the space shuttle system.
The lower and upper limits of the benefit level which justifies
the space shuttle system
The benefit levels of the space shuttle system corresponding
to the cost levels of K s and K 0 respectively.
3A-7
(9}
whe re
of alternative Space Transportation Systems obtainable for any given amount
of cost.
Again, following Shephard, for any positive cost rate C, and price
n for inputs, a cost correspondence (C_--)----_G(_ C) for the Current
vector pER+
Expendable System may be defined by
L(10) O(u,p) = p • x x_L (u) u_ + , p_ +
is the minimum cost of producing the output vector u at prices p for inputs.
The maximum return of output u at prices p for inputs is defined by
(11) B(_C, r)= SuPu }r. u I u_G (_C)I" p_E:, rcE m C>0.
Similarly, for the space shuttle system, the corresponding relation-
ships of (9) to (11) may be written as
(12} G'( ) = u Q' (u,p) <_C C >0, pl + ,
whe re
(13) Q' (u, p) = Min p .
X
x x {L' (u) 1
, E n
u{E+ m p{ ÷
and
(14) B'(_C, r)= SuPu I r " u[ u{G'(_C) l' p{E:,
r{E m, C>0.
The primes in (12) to (14) merely indicate that these equations are defined
by alternative correspondences (C_-)----) G_C_) and u----_L'(u).
Shephard demonstrated that the two alternative cost-benefit relation-
ships K( r
-_-, p) and B( , r) are in general not the same. This is, of course,
also true for K' (_-,p) and B' (C-_--, r). He showed that the relationships
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(15) B ( , B(---7)) =F ( ))
and
(15a)
and
(16a)
the n k=
r __p__ = F-1 R
(16) t( (-_, rr !p) (B(r)
where rr(p) andS(r) are homogenous functions of degree one, suitable as
price indexes of input (for the cost rate C) and output (for the return rate R),
respectively, hold if and only if both the input structure and the output
structure are homothetic. In a special case where no price of any input or
output varies, rr(p) and/3(r) can be any constant. There is no apparent reason,
however, why_r(p) = B(r) should hold for any time period, much less _or all
time periods.
P.arlier it was indicated that one possible approach to resolve the
problem of ttie social rate of discount is to consider it as the price of the
service of capital, which is really a specialkind of input. In this context,
the social rate of discount is merely a component of it(p). There is perhaps
another approach to the same problem which may be worth examining.
Suppose (15) and (16) refer to all economic activities of a society. Then it
appears reasonable to define the social rate of discount as k= (dB/dC)-i =
(dR/dK)-l. In an extremely simplified situation where the function F is the
identity function (and hence, so is F-I), (15) and (16) become
r CB( ' fl(r)) =F( )= _(p)
r p _F-I _ RK (_--, _(p) - ( ) = _ (-----_)
I
-i =_(r) - i>_0, where 7r(p)_<I and _(r) >_ 1 hold. In the real
= (p)
world, It(p) is reflected in the gradual decline of the interest rate, and _(r)
in the gradual increase in the consumer price index. To the extent that =(p)
and B(r) vary at different rates in different time intervals, there appears to
be sonle reason to favor the argument for varying discount rates for different
tinm periods, To the extent that _(p) and B(r) may differ for the same time
period, there also appears to be some reason to favor the argument for different
discount rates for the cost stream and benefit stream, respectively. There is
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more on this in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
In our reports, including the present one, the problem of the social
discount rate and of inflation were treated somewhat differently. Circum-
vention of the problem of inflation was brought about by using 1970 constant
dollars throughout. The problem of a social discount rate was then treated
separately by examining the impact of alternative rates ranging from 5%
to 15g0. In effect, using the concept of net present value it was assumed that
(15) and (16) may be written simply as
(15b) B = C
and
(16b) K = i_.
The alternative cost-benefit relationship of the Current Expendable System
(ii) is then derived by setting C = K and thus B = R. That is
(_)(17) B (_, r) = r • u = p • x = x = C.
The derivation of the alternative cost-benefit relationship of the Space
Shuttle System (14) was based on a more complicated procedure which can be
expressed as
' , [ -/-r S(--_-r )]+ C[ln (P_1/1_0)] - KfB (_ rl-- R +p.s'(_l-(18)
where p [S'(--_)-S(-_)] is cost saving (direct benefit), C [ln(l_l/l_0)] is the
induced benefit (indirect benefit) calculated on the assumption of unitary
elasticity of demand, and Kf, is the nonrecurring cost.
l_eferring to Figure 2, we see that the straight line labeled CE is
exactly the same as in Figure 1, but SH was shifted downward and to the right
according to formula (18). The shift reflects the d_fference between total
(direct and indirect) cost saving and the nonrecurring cost of the Space Shuttle
System, and is measured vertically. The line s CE and SH indicate that at
;k .u
a budget level C0, there will be B _ - B <=B'0 - B0) additional benefit attain-
able by selecting the Space Shuttle in place of the Current Expendable System.
However, such an additional benefit, regardless of how substantial it may be,
cannot justify the Space Shuttle by itself. In fact, if the true cost-benefit
relationship of the Current Expendable System is not CE, but CE*, then the
3A- I0
!B 0
! :¢.
B o
B o
B o
B=R, benefits
I SH*
-GE_
Kf
Notes: CE:
SH:
CE*:
budget
Figure Z: Equal Budget Approach
The assumed cost-benefit relationship of the current
expendable system, defined by
(_) B = C (or K= K).
The assumed cost-benefit relationship of the space
shuttle system, constructed according to formula (18)
in the text, using (a) for 1%.
An alternative cost-benefit relationship of the current
expendable system, defined by
(c) B = ¢_C 8 (or R = ¢_K8), ¢_ 0, 8 >0-
(continued)
C=K
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LC _',_and
C _'," :
CO:
B 0 and
B$:
!
B 0 and
B I(_ :
An alternative cost-benefit relationship of the space
shuttle system, constructed according to formula
(18) in the text, using (c) for P_.
The lower and upper limits of the budget level which
justifies the space shuttle system over the current
expendable system according to the alternative cost-
benefit relationships CE* and SH;',-'.
A given level of space budget.
The benefits of the current expendable system attainable
by the given budget C O•
The benefits of the space shuttle system attainable by the
given budget C O.
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LSpace Shuttle System is not justifiable at any budget beyond _:', despite the
possibility of achieving even greater additional benefits over the Current
Expendable System. The minimum budget which may justify favoring the
Space Shuttle System over the Current Expendable System is C__ (break-
even point).
Before concluding this section, it is perhaps worth mentioning that
the cost-benefit relationship of the return-afforded-input correspondence
and the equal-capability approach treats output prices r and benefit level 1_
as exogenous and deals only with the partial equilibrium of the input market.
How the output prices r and benefit level R are determined is left unanswered.
It is obviously clear that the same output prices r cannot be applied for a
wide range of output levels u. Similarly, the alternative cost-benefit
relationship of the cost-limited-output-correspondence and the equal-budget
approach regards input prices p and cost levelC as exogenous and deals only
with the partial equilibrium of the output market. How the input prices p and
the cost level C are determined remains an open question. Obviously, the
same input price p cannot be applied for a wide range of input levels x. It
is therefore desirable to integrate these two analyses.
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FOOTNOTES IN APPENDIX 3A
.
3.
4.
.
The subscript "+" is used to denote the non-negative domain
of the Euclidean space to which it is attached.
See Sections 6 and 3 of [2] respectively.
See Sections 7, 4 and 5 of [2] .
See _, sec. 9.3] for definition of homothetic output and input
structure, and [3] for definition of semi-homogeneous output and input
structure.
The consequences of this assumption do not depend on the actual
dollar amount and number of payloads.
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Appendix 3B: More on the Proper Rate of Discount for
Government Proj ects
This Appendix is intended to be read in conjunction with other papers
prepared by us on the same subject. It was our intention that they be coordinated,
but it was not possible to do this within the time constraints.
The work by Feldstein to which Baumol refers in a separate work-
ing paper is the most recent in a sequence of papers, notably by Arrow, Marglin
and Eckstein, which have considerably advanced our Understanding of the special
nature of discounting in public investment choices. The argument may be broad-
ly sketched as follows: the government's objective is to obtain the "best" flow
of consumption benefits possible with the instruments available to it. Under quite
general assumptions, we can translate '%est" into familiar financial arithmetic:
one stream of benefits is better than another if it has a higher present value
when discounted at the social rate of time preference. It is assumed that we
can associate with an increment to capita ! stock in any sector (however broadly
or narrowly defined} a definite stream of consumption benefits which will be
induced by that increment, and we can calculate the present value of that stream
using the social rate of time preference. Feldstein explicitly labels the values
of unit increases in the various capital stocks "shadow prices. " If we use cur-
rent benefits (consumption} as a numeraire, the cost of funds to the public
sector is, then the sum of current consumption reduction plus the present value
of future consumption reduction, i.e., the sum of current consumption decre-
ment and decrements in capital stocks multiplied by their associated shadow
prices. The value of the public investment is simply the discounted value of
the stream benefits, using the social rate of time preference as discount rate.
Baumol expressed this principal in a form which nets out benefit losses due to
withdrawal of resources from the private sectors and benefit gains from the
project in each period. This net benefit stream is then discounted at the social
rate of time preference.
There is one point in this procedure which is deceptively simple,
and that is the step requiring us to associate with an action (be it changing
a private capital stock or adding a government project} the entire stream of
benefits. To make the points he wished to establish, Baumol assumed this
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information was available. But, it must be emphasized that the benefits
in question may be distributed through time in complicated ways. Many in-
vestment projects, public or private, provide the wherewithal in the future
for further investments. Those investments, in turn, provide consumption
benefits and induce further investments, etc. Strictly speaking, all of the
extra consumption, produced directly by the initial investment and indirectly
via induced investment, constitutes the stream of benefits associated with
the initial act. This is the so-called "throw-off" problem, and it is to this
problem that we turn next.
A Simple Model of Evaluatin 8 Investment
These issues should be clarified by a close analysis of the fol-
lowing simple model. Let us assume that the objective of the government is
simply to obtain the best time stream of consumption:
• " ct' ct + l' " "
Assume that investment in private sector capital has a marginal
one-period rate of return rt in period t. That is, $I invested in period t
increases the total number of dollars available in period t + i by $(I + rt).
Generally, rt will be a decreasing function of the amount invested at time t.
The evaluation of time streams of consumption by the govern-
ment leads quite naturally to a calculated rate of time preference, it, in
period t. To find this we ask the question by how much must consumption
be increased in period t + i to compensate for a $I reduction in period t
consumption. The former amount is defined to be I + it. The more valuable,
relatively, is the earlier consumption, the higher is the social rate of time
preference. Strictly speaking, the value of it at any point may depend upon
the whole stream of consumption involved.
An increase in the private capital stock at any time may have
an impact on the entire future consumption stream, in the manner already
outlined. Let s t be the fraction of an increment in resources available to
the private sector ("income") in period t which is allocated to investment.
In conventional language, st is the marginal propensity to save in period t.
Since we are dealing with entirely with one-period investments, we need
not here distinguish capital stock and investment• Each period the whole
capital stock is up for grabs and may be consumed or invested.
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Evaluating the Throw-Off
We are now in a position to calculate the stream of consumption
increments following from a $i increase in investment at time t. To save
on notation let us suppose that the investment change takes place at time 0.
Then in period i, income is larger than it would otherwise have been by an
amount (I + r0). This leads to an increment (I - Sl) (I + r0) in consumption
in period i, and an increase sI (1 + r0) in period i investment. The period 2
income increase is thus sI (i + r0) {i + rl), of Which (I - s2) sI (i + r0)
(I + rl) is consumed and s2s I (i +r0) (i + rl) invested. In general, the increase
A Yr in period t income resulting directly and indirectly from the $I invest-
ment increase at time 0 is given by
(I) A y I = I + r 0
Ay_ = (I + r0)T-IsjIl (i + rj), T_ 2,
n j'=l
where the notation 1-I x. represents the product of x m,J
X j--rrl
n
x
m+l'
The consumption increase Ac generated in period 1" by the $1
T
time 0 investment increase is then simply (1 - s ) Ay . To evaluate the
T T
throw-off at each date, taking period 0 consumption as numeraire, we need
only multipIy the consumption change at that date by the discount factor g'r
derived from the social time preference rates in the familiar manner:
r-1 1
_ D(z) II (l+i) T I.
j= J - ,
=1
0
So,
dollars in period 0 consumption.
value of the increment is
1
for example, a $1 increase in period 1 consumption is worth _1 - 1 + i 0
= (1 - ST) A the presentSince AcT YT'
(3) PV (ACT)= PV ((I- ST) AyT)
PV (1 - s_ (1 + ro) II s k (1 ÷ rk) , T __ 2
k=l
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T -I (l+
(l- sr) (l + r o) I] Sk rk)
1 +i 0 k=l 1 +i k
PV(Ac l)= (l- Sz)(l+r 0)
l+i 0
We are now in a position to write down the present value of the
whole stream of consumption increments generated by a $i increase in period
0 investment. Let us call this quantity v 0. Then
QO
E PV (Ac .)(4) v0 = T = i T
(1+ T - i (i+
(i + r0) + E (I - st) r0) lq sk •rk)
v0 = (i - sI) 1 +i 0 T = 2 (i +i 0) k=l 1 +i k
The reader will not need to be told that to calculate v 0 in practice is likely
to be a formidable task if the problem is treated in full generality. A num-
ber of reasonable simplifications will, however, bring the job within the
realm of the possible.
The Case of Equal Time Preference and Rate of Return
Before we turn to this however, it should be useful to point out
how things simplify when the marginal rate of return equals the social rate
of time preference in every time period. As the reader will quickly verify,
in this case we have
(5) v 0 = (I - Sl) + E (I - s )
T = 2 T I-[ Sk
k=l
Writing out the first few terms,
th
The n
v 0 = (i - Sl) + (i - s2) sI + (i - s3) sI s2 + (i - s4) SlS2S 3
= i - sI +s I -SlS 2 +SlS 2 - SlS2S 3 +SlS2S 2 - SlS2S3S 4 + .
partial sum of this series is thus given by
I- sis2s 3 . . sn
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£We are interested in the limit of this sequence of partial sums, which is clearly
exactly I, provided all but a finite number of the s's are strictly less than i.
In this special case, then, the shadow price of a unit of invest-
ment at time zero is exactly i, and this is, of course, exactly as it should
be. For when the rate of time preference exactly equals the marginal rate
of return in every period we should be indifferent between an extra dollar
of consumption and an extra dollar of investment in every period, including
period zero. Our calculations tell us that giving up $I of consumption at
time zero would generate a stream of future consumption increments just
equal in value to that which is given up.
The Case of Investment Coefficient, Rate of Time Preference
and Rate of Return All Constant
assume st
have
In order to reduce the problem to manageable dimensions,
= s, it = [, r t = r, where s, [, and r are constants. Then we
O0
(l+ r) Z
(6) v0 =(l-s) (I+i) + T = Z
/" \
l+i \l+i -'
T -l
(7)
(8)
Defining _,
1 + r _ y , (6) can be rewritten as
I +i
o_ )T - lv0 = (I- s)y _ (sY , or
r= 1
= (i - s)y , assuming s Y < I.
v0 l-s Y
Since in most cases of interest, r>i, and hence Y>l, we findY>l; an extra
dollar invested at time zero generates a stream of consumption changes worth
more than one dollar. Note, further, that generally v0>Y = 1 + r/l +i.. For
the special case i = r, we conclude v 0 = [ directly from expression (8).
We can, if we wish, come at the same problem from another
angle. Let v t be the value of an increment to investment at time t, ex-
pressed [n time t consumption units. Now an increment of investment at
time t generates extra consumption at t + I equal to (l +rt) (I - st +l) , and
extra investment equal to (I + rt) st ÷I" The latter is equivalent to
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(I +rt) st +I vt + I' units of period t + I consumption, by definition of vt.
units of t +I consumption is equivalent in social valueFinally, since ct+ 1
to ct + I/(i +it) units of time t.consumptlon, by definition of it, we conclude
that $I extra invested at time t has a value
(9) v
t
= (I+ rt) (l- st +i ) +(i + rt) st + i vt +l
where Yt
constants, we must have v t = v,
(i0) v = (l - s +sv ) ¥ ,
l+i t
= (1 - St+l+ s t + 1 vt + 1 ) Yt'
is defined to be (1 + rt)/(l + it). If we assume Y
a constant.
to yield
If- s s) Y(n) v = I v
t =Y and s t
This is found by solving
-- Sj
Illustrative Numerical Value of the Shadow Price of Capital
The simple formulation which results from assuming the various
coefficients constant makes it easy to get more feel for the magnitudes which
might be involved in application. A sensible number for the before tax marginal
rate of return in the corporate sector is 10%, or r = . 10; a not wild level for the
social rate of time preference might be 5%, i = .05. Assuming all invest-
ment to be in the corporate sector, a very large value of s would be .2. In
this case v = 1.06, a dollar of private capital is worth about $1.06.
A Complete but Simple Model of Government Investment Choice
The discussion so far has been devoted to establishing (a) that
in making public investment choice it is in principle necessary to take into
account both the direct and indirect effects on the consumption stream
caused by changes in current capital stocks, public or private, and (b)
that under simplifying assumptions it is possible to make a reasonable
approximation to the correct shadow price of a unit of private capital.
The model thus far used is simple in a number of respects, but we shall
in this section be concerned with just one, namely the absence of a govern- r
L:
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ment making investment choices. Let us add, then, a government invest-
ment opportunity with rate of return Pt' i.e. , $I invested in period t in the
government sector makes available an increase of (I +Pt) dollars in period
t+l.
We now have three uses for income in any period: consumption,
private investment and government investment. The question now is under
what conditions Should the incremental government investment be undertaken.
To answer that question we need to consider another throw-off calculation.
If we assume, however, that the private investment throw-off calculation
has been taken care of, so that we are equipped with a series of shadow
prices, vt, telling us the value in period t consumption units of a $I increase
in period t private investment, we need consider only a one-period throw-
off for the government.
Specifically, let at be the fraction of a sum raised by the govern-
ment in period t which comes out of private capital formation. For some
forms of finance we would expect to find at = st, the marginal propensity
to save out of disposable income, although clearly we shall wish to associate
different at's with different techniques of financing government investment.
Denote by a t the amount by which private capital in period t is increased as
a consequence of an increase of $I in the output of the government sector.
For the case in which revenue is raised by direct taxation of consumer
citizens and in which the implicit income from the government project is
treated exactly like ordinary, after-tax income, at = at = st • However, we
must admit the possibility that these parameters differ.
It is now a simple matter to tote up the various effects of raising
an additional dollar in period t to finance government investment. Table I
shows the impact on consumption and capital formation in periods t and t + I.
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change in
con s umption
change in private
capital formation
PERIOD
( 1 - a t)
-a t
t+l.
(i +pt ) (1 - (xt + 1)
(I +Pt)(xt + I
Table 1 : The Effect of Undertaking an Additional $1 of Govern-
ment Investment at Time t
We know that the value in period t consumption units of $1 of private in-
vestment is v t. Hence the effective loss in period t consumption as a result
of the government investment is 1 - a t + atv t dollars. Similarly, the value
of the increase in consumption and private investment in period t + 1, ex-
pressed in periodt + 1 consumptionunit¢, is (1 +pt ) (1 - a t + 1 + at + 1
v t + 1). To compare these two sums, we must introduce the social
rate of time preference, i t. Discounting the effective t + 1 consumption in-
crease to period t, we obtain an expression for the net gain from the whole
trans action:
(lZ) -(1 - a t + atv t) + + it (1 - at + 1 + at + 1 vt + 1 )"
By definition of i t, we shall attain a more valued consumption stream if we
undertake government investment so long as expression (1Z) is positive, a
condition expressed by inequality (13).
1 + 1+ ( -i)P t > at'vt
(13) 1 + i t 1 + a t + l(Vt + 1 - 1)
which determines by how much, if at all, the rate of return, p, on the govern-
ment investment must exceed the social time preference rate, i, in order to
make the investment worthwhile.
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Some Important Special Cases
It is useful to consider the implications of condition (13) as a
government investment criterion in special cases corresponding to various
assumptions about the coefficients at, a t and vt:
A1. vt = vt + 1 = v. This assumption says, in effect, that the
degree of capital market imperfection is not changing over the period con-
sidered.
A2. a t = 0. This amounts to assuming that all of the resources
invested in the government project come out of current consumption.
A3. a t = 1. All the resources for the project come out of current
private investment.
A4. a
t+l
A5. a
t+l
the private capital stock.
A6. at = _t + 1" An additional dollar's worth of output from a
government project causes the same increment in private capital formation
as does a reduction of $1 in the amount raised through the financing instru-
ment corresponding to which a t is defined.
The effect of a rising or falling shadow price of private capital
works in the same direction under all meaningful assumptions about the
other coefficients. A glance at condition (13) will show that increasing
vt + 1' holding v t constant, tends to raise the denominator on the right hand
side and hence to reduce the critical rate at which pt becomes an acceptable
rate of return on the government project. The effect of decreasing
vt + 1' holding v t constant, is in the opposite direction. We shall interpret
this result below. For the moment we simply note that to consider the
consequences of varying the other parameters it is sufficient to look at the
cases for which A1 holds, i.e. v t = v, a constant.
There are three extreme cases of special interest.
C.ase 1. at = at + 1" This case (which includes a t = a t + 1 = 0
and a t = a t + 1 = 1) is a rather remarkable one. Substituting into condition
(13) we see that the acceptance condition for the public investment becomes
= 0. All of the output from the project is consumed.
= 1. All of the output from the project goes to increase
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i + Pt 1 + a t (v - I)
i +i t - i +at (v- I)
This says that government investments should be accepted as long as the
marginal rate of return exceeds the time preference rate. The surprising
aspect of this case is that the rate of return in the private sector, sometimes
called th..__e.eopportuDity cost of funds, does not enter the calculation at all.
The reason is not far to seek. By our assumption that a t + 1 = at' we have
assured that for every dollar of reduced investment in period t, the govern-
ment project •puts back (1 + pt ) dollars of increased investment in period
t + 1. The issue then is, how much must we increase investment in period
t + 1 to compensate for a loss of one unit in periodt. Since v t = v t + 1' the
answer is, clearly, at least (1 + it ) dollars.
This case has not received much attention before, which is
somewhat puzzling, since the assumptions involved seem, upon reflection,
to be rather plausible. However, the assumptions of Case 2 are much more
frequently encountered. - '
Case 2. a t = 1, a t + 1 : 0. Under these assumptions al_._!_lof the
resources for the project come from investment and the output induces no
increase in private investment. Condition (13) becomes _
l+P t
v t •1 +i t
This case is usually interpreted to require a rate of return on the government
project at least equal to the rate of return in the private sector. Note,
however, that this is actually not strong enough in general. Under the con-
ditions in which v t, i t and s t (which we have called the marginal propensity
to save) are all Constant, we concluded that v t > 7 = 1 + ri , _indicating that
the government project must have a return rate in excess ofr to pass
muster under the assumptions of Case 2. The reason for this is simply
that the government project does not generate the favorable repercussions
on future capital formation which the private investment does.
Case 3. a t = 0, a t + 1 = 1. In this case allresources for the
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project come from consumption and all yield is converted into private
capital. Condition (13) becomes
i +a t 21
I + it vt
For obvious reasons this case would allow as desirable projects for which
rate of return is actually below the time preference rate, and afortiori
below the rate of return in the private sector.
Summing Up the Analysis of the Simple Complete Model
The essential conclusions to be drawn from the simple model
are obtained from an examination of condition (13) for accepting a govern-
ment investment project with rate of return Pt" Assuming that all the
parameters of (13) are constant through time, we can write it as
(14) 1 + Pt > 1 + a (v- I) .
1 +i - 1 +a (v - i)
From (14) we conclude that the required yield on the government project
should exceed the rate of time preference if the dollar reduction in current
private investment per dollar withdrawn to finance the government project
exceeds the dollar increase in private investment per dollar of value of the
project's output (a >a). (We assume v > I). The required yield on the
government project falls below the time preference rate if the inequality
is reversed. The extent of the divergence in each case depends upon v;
the larger is v, the larger the divergence.
As we have pointed out, a tendency for v to grow with time
favors government investment, ceteris paribus. The reason for this is that
the government investment serves in part to shift private investment toward
the future. The more rapidly v is rising, the less future private invest-
ment do we need to offset the loss of any given amount of current invest-
ment. By the same line of reasoning, a tendency for v to fall with time
raises the minimum acceptable rate of return on government projects.
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Generalizing to Many Private Investment Sectors
There are a number of ways in which the foregoing analysis can
be generalized, and it would probably be of little use at this point to produce
a catalogue of possibilities. However, in view of the previous treatment
of this topic, by Baumol and others, we should consider explicitly the
possibility of more than one private sector.
It is customary by now to think of private investment as being of
two types, corporate and non-corporate, where decisions in the former
sector are influenced by the corporation income tax. Hence, we start by
• considering a two-private-sector model.
1
Let a t' then, represent the fraction of an incremental dollar
raised to finance government activities which comes out of non-corporate
capital formation• Let aZ t be the corresponding value for corporate capital.
1 2
Define a t and a t in the analogous manner , indicating the amounts of
capital formation in sectors 1 and Z induced by a $1 increase in government
1 vZtoutput in period t. Let v t and be the appropriate shadow price of
1
capital in the two sectors, given their respective rates of return, r and
2 t
r t" Table 2 shows the effect of undertaking an additional $i of
government investment at time t in this model world.
Change in
Consumption
Change in Non-
Corporate Capital
Formation
Change in Corporate
Capital Formation
PERIOD
1 2
(1-at-a t )
1
- a
t
t .+ 1
- a
t
(1 +pt ) (1 -a 1 -a zt+l t+l )
1(1 +pt p' a t + 1
Z(1 +pt j' a t + 1
Table Z :. The Effect of an Additional $1 of Government Investment
When There Are Two Private Investment Sectors
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tExpressed in period t consumption units, the resources taken out of the
aZt) 1 1 2 2private sector in period t are valued at (I - alt - + a tv t.+ a tv t'
while the value yield from the government project, expressed in period
t + i consumption units, is
(i +pt) [(.1 - _ 1 Z 1 1 Z Z i_t + 1 - _ t + i) +_ t + 1 v t + 1 +(l t + 1 v t + •
This can be discounted to period t by social rate of time preference, so
that we have all of the consequences of the decision expressed in period t
consumption units. The criterion for acceptance of the government invest-
ment is, then
1 2 1 1 Z vZt)(15) -(i - a t - a t + a t v t + a t +
l+Pt [ i 2 al t I a2 Z ii
1 +i t 1 -a t + 1 - _ t + 1 + + 1 v t + 1 + t + 1 v t + _a
A little algebraic manipulation allows us to express this condition in the
equivalent form,
.
1 (vI a2t (v2t(16) 1 +Pt 1 + a t t- 1) + - I)
>
1 + it - 1 + a I Z l(V zt + l (vt + 1 - I) + a t + t + 1 - l)
The interpretation of condition (16) runs along the same lines as
our previous interpretation of condition (14), and presents no special diffi-
culties. Of particular interest is the case alt = alt + i' aZt = aZt + I' in
which dollars taken out of the private sector by the financing methods and
implicit dollars put into the private sector in the form of yield on the govern-
ment investment, are divided among consumption and investment in the two
sectors in the same proportions. In this case condition (16) becomes simply
1 +Pt
l+it __ 1;
the government project's yield rate need be only as high as the social rate
of time preference.
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Calculating the Two Shadow Prices
If we assume constant propensities to save/invest, constant
rates of return and constant social rate of time preference, we can calculate
1 v2the values of the two shadow prices, v and without particular difficulty.
By a line of reasoning exactly analogous to that leading to equations (9) to
I 2
(Ii), we conclude that v and v must satisfy simultaneous equations (17):
1 l+r I [(17) v - 1 + i 1 + s 1 (v 1 _ 1) + s 2 (v 2 - 1)]
2 l+r2[ 1 s2 ]v - 1 +i 1 + s (v 1 - 1) + (v 2 - i) .
1 Z
Define _/ and W , analogous to _ in the one-sector analysis, and the new
1 2
variables x and x :
1
1 l+r
(18) Y = 1 +'---T-
Then (17) implies
22 l+r 1 1 2 Z
' _ - 1 +i ' x = v - 1, x = v - 1.
1 yl_l 1 1 ZxZ ]x = +S x +S
2 ,2[ 1 1 sZx 2]x = l+s x +
- 1
- 1
or
{19) [: I[:I_ yls i _ 71sZ 12 1 2 2 2
7s 1- 7 s 7 2
Denoting the matrix of coefficients in (19) by A, we have
(z0)
1Z 1 i
det (A) = (i -ylsl) (I -yZsZ) - y y s s
71 1 Z 2
=i- s -Ts •
Assuming (20) is not zero,
3B-14
(21) A-I = 1
and
(22)
1 -ylsl -T2s 2
] E]1 T 1 - 1_ _ A_12 T2 1
7
(i_yl 2 2 2yl
-s y +s )
1 -ylsl - "/2s2
s -ylsl -y2s2
{1 - y2 _ slyl + s ly2)
I 22 12 1
l--/s ys
y2sl I 1I - ys
After a little algebraic manipulation, w.e can write
(23) - S - S
,[ls
2
Under the assumption sometimes made that the social rate of time pre-
ference is equal to the rate of time preference common to all individuals
in a competitive capital market, and that this is in turn equal to the rate of
1 1
return in the non-corporate sector, r t = it' i. e. y = 1. Notice that, be-
cause some of the throw-off from each sector is invested in the other, even
in this case generally v 1 > 1.
Increasing the number of private inves,tment sectors beyond 2
is evidently a simple matter formally. The government investment test
changes from (16) to
(24) 1 + Pt >
•I + it
m
1 + _ aJ t (vJ t - I)
j=l
• °
m
1 + _ a J + 1 (vJt + 1 - 1)
j=t
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1v2• m ,_(25) v _ _: sJ" j=l
• _yJs
m j--I _"
v
where y j -(1 + rJ)/(1 + i)
For the case in which the various co-where m is the number of sectors.
efficients, and thus the shadow prices, are constant over time we can cal-
culate them in the manner of expression (23) from
yl
y2
ym
Treatment of Mul_lperlod Returns
Thus far, the analysis has been carried on as though the govern-
ment were always in a position of choosing an investment requiring inputs of
$1 in period t and producing its entire output $1 (1 + pt ) in period t +1. This
permitted us to express the investment criterion in terms of the relationship
between a well-defined rate of return (essentially, the one-period internal
rate of return) and corresponding rate of time preference. However, it is a
relatively simple matter to deal with more complex patterns of returns.
We capture most of the interesting aspects of this generalization in
supposing that our typical government project can be described by two time
sequences of numbers: b t denoting the current dollar (consumption equivalent)
value of the government service provided in period t and e t denoting the addi-
tional resources which must be raised in period t to carry out the project.
Note that in any given period either b t or e t or both may be negative. A
negative value of b t corresponds to costs such as environmental damage
caused by the project. A negative value of e t may result when the project
yields a cash return -- for example, its output is sold on the market --
which may be applied toward a reduction in taxes in that period. Negative
values for these variables may occur in another way as well. Our analysis
applies equally to investment and dislnvestment. No___ttundertaking a project
is itself a project; if project A is described by {bt, etl, the project "not
undertaking A" is described by {-bt, -etl
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Note that we are here assuming only one form of benefits and
only one form of finance. More generally, we could describe a project by
(blt, b2t; bJta sequence of vectors brat, clt, . , eRr), where = dollars
k
worth of benefits of the j'th type (of m types in all) in period t, and e t =
dollars required from finance source k (of R sources, e.g., sales tax,
debt issue, etc.) in period t.
Having constructed similar lines of reasoning in the previous
two cases we can move fairly quickly to the appropriate criterion in this
case. Things will be simplified somewhat if we define shadow prices for
benefits and revenues as follows:
m • •
(26) fit = 1 + _ aJ t (vJt - 1)
j=l
m ° °
e t = 1 + _ aJ t (vJt - 1);
j=l
where the sums in (26) are taken over all of the private sector investment
possibilities distinguished by the model. Recall our definition (2) of the
discount factor ST, derived from the social rate of time preference, by
which consumption benefits in period T are to be multiplied in aggregating
a multiperiod consumption stream to period 0 consumption equivalents.
In period t the government project produces b t dollars in
benefits, worth b t _t dollars in period t consumption when the influence on
private capital formation is taken into account. The project requires that
e t dollars in revenue be raised, at a cost of e t Etdollars in period t con-
sumption when the influence on private capital formation is taken into account.
The net effect is b t _t - et et' which iS equivalent to _t (bt_t - et et) units of
period 0 consumption. The project is worthwhile if
T
(27) _ b t (bt_ t - e t _ t ) >0,
t=0
where the project has its last direct payoff or resource requirement in
period T.
u_
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We may check that condition (27) gives us back the criterion
for one-period investments which we have already derived. For such an
investment, we have bt + 1 = 1 :_Pt' b_ = 0 otherwise; ct = I, cr = 0
otherwise. Then (27) becomes
(27a) _t + 1 (1 +Pt)#t + 1 _ _tet _- O.
Recall from the definition of _T
by _t' it becomes
1 +Pt _t
(27b) 1 +i t > _t + 1
1
that /5
t + I t - i + it Dividing (27a)
Substituting definition (26) for e t and_t + 1' (27b) becomes
(Z7c)
m •
1 +Pt 1 + Z a3 t (vJ t -1)
j=l1 +i t -
m " 1( vJ1 + _. a2 t + t + 1-
j=l
1)
which is the previously derived condition (24) for one-period investments.
Condition (Z7) obviously bears a close family resemblence to
Baumol's consition (3). The difference is largely a matter of degree of
explicitness about directly versus indirectly produced consumption streams.
In expression (Z7) a certain amount of prior discounting has gone into the
construction of the shadow prices Bt and _t' since these depend onthe
i of private capital, which in turn represent discounted
shadow prices v t
streams of consumption. Expression (27) thereby makes explicit the
distinction between nominal dollar values of benefits and expenditures and
their values including imputed throw-off. Condition (27) also makes
allowance for outlays by the government in periods other than the initial one.
As usual, special cases do much to reveal the character of the
criterion. If an additional dollar of benefits is divided among consumption
and the different sorts of private investment in the same way every year
and if the shadow prices of the different sorts of private capital are constant,
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then _t = _' a constant. If an additional dollar of financing comes out of
consumption and the different sorts of investment in the same proportions
every year and if the shadow prices of capital are constant, then E t = E,
a constant. Then (27) becomes
(28)
T ¸ T
X _tbt - ' X _tet _ O,
t=O t=O
which, assuming the appropriate expressions are positive, may also be
written
T
(29)
E 8tbt
t=O E .
>
"T
_tet
t=0
Condition (29) says that a project is worth undertaking ifthe discounted
stream of benefits divided by the discounted stream of costs (which are
define_i very precisely to refer to changes in revenue raised by a particular
financing mode) exceeds a calculable critical level, E/_.
Condition (29) is a form of a benefit cost ratio. It is derived
here simply to show how our criterion relates to those put forth by others.
It is probably usually a mistake to use ratio criteria in practice. The net
present value approach is always correct, whereas ratio criteria can lead
to difficulties where there are mutually exclusive or otherwise interrelated
projects in question, or where capital budget constraints are involved.
A special case of case (29) may be of interest, namely that in
which all the financing for the government project d[isplaces a single kind
of private capital, so that a t = 1, and the yield from the project induces no
private investment (usually somewhat misleadingly described as "all yield
consumed"), so that a t = 0. As far as the consumption-investment division
of resources withdrawn by and output yielded by the project are concerned,
these assumptions are those least favoring government investment. Re-
ferring to definitions (26) we see that in this case B = 1 and e = v. -Condition
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(29) becomes
' .,T /
(30) _ 8tbt
t=0
v,T
t_0 8 tet
requiring the benefit cost ratio to exceed the shadow price of private capital.
Interpretation of (30) is facilitated by writing it in the original form of (29),
• (31)
T
X _t(bt- ve t)
t=O
>0.
Here it is clear that to account for these rather extreme assumptions_ to the
disadvantage of government investment what is required is to weigh dollar
expenditures by a factor v in calculating net benefits to be discounted at the
social rate of time preference. Since we have previously calculated a
relatively high value of v to be 1.06 it is clear that the choices made under
rule (31) are in many cases likely to be very close to those made under the
simple rule, "maximize present value of the stream of net benefits (b t - et),
discounting at the social rate of time preference. "
The latter rule becomes precisely correct in the last special
case, in which the investment-inducing effects of an additional dollar of
benefits are exactly the same as those of a reduction ofa dollar in financing
and the shadow prices of the various kinds of private capital are constant
through time. Then we have ¢ =_ , and condition (27) becomes
T
(32) _ _t (bt - et) -_ O.
t=O
Although (32) does represent a special case, its preconditions are not
implausible, requiring simply that extra dollars taxed away and extra
dollars received (usually implicitly) in benefits are treated as about the
same thing by the private sector.
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General Conclusions
In a sense, condition (27) with its associated definitions, is the
general solution to the public investment problem and hence the general
conclusion of this analysis. The next step required is to put empirical flesh
on the theoretical structure, in the form of actual estimates of the various
coefficients of condition (27). However, one should not be over-optimistic
about obtaining a set of coefficients which can be applied to any government
investment problem to lead to a precisely correct choice. The principal
reasons for this are:
A. The precise financing technique providing the source of
funds for any government project is often unclear or not even well-defined,
and these sources vary from project to project. Do the funds to pay for a
subsidy to the merchant marine come from corporation income taxes?
personal income taxes? changes in Federal debt? A strictly correct
answer would not even be assured if expenditure laws specified the source
of finance. For example, Federal highway programs are annually financed
by gasoline taxes, and this may be the end of the story. However, it is also
possible that gasoline taxes would be about what they are anyway. An increase
in highway expenditures in this case forces some other program to find its
financing in another revenue device, say, the personal income tax. Then
the source of finance for the highway expenditure for our purposes is, in fact,
the personal income tax. Furthermore, the source of finance for a project
may well be funds which would otherwise have financed another government
activity. In this case, then, the dollars for the project in question "cost"
the foregone benefits from the alternative activity. We need not labor further
the extreme difficulty of establishing the financing source.
B. Knowing the financing source, we face great difficulty in
establishing how much of an incremental dollar from that source derives
from consumption, how much f_om various forms of private capital (and,
we might add, how much from unemployed resources, in effect, from
nowhere). It is, of course, not sufficient to know simply the nominal payers
of a tax. For example, locating the incidence of the corporation income tax
is the subject of a highly arcane controversy within the economics profession,
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with no settlement in sight.
It is possible that identifying the precise incidence of a financing
mode can be sidestepped. Since we are here concerned not with matters of
distributional equity, but of intertemporal efficiency, we need only worry
about the quantitative reaction of consumption and investment to increments
in financing from each mode. These coefficients might be stable over time
and identifiable by econornetric techniques, but this writer is not sanguine
about this approach.
C. On the output side, matters are not much better. Assuming,
as we have been, that one canreasonably estimate dollar values of the
services from the government project, determining the influence of these
flows on private investxnent is likely to be extremely difficult. Some headway
may be made by examining the character of the flow involved. Is it more
like consumption or more like savings? If the government undertakes to
provide medical care for the aged, presumably this reduces the incentive
for citizens to accumulate a reserve against this possibility. We might
expect, then, that providing an additional dollar's worth of this insurance
protection will lead individuals to reduce their private savings by about a
dollar and to increase consumption by a like amount. At the other extreme,
benefits from public parks may be effectively pure substitutes for private
consumption. A family receiving these benefits reduces its expenditures on
film and baseball game attendance, and increases its savings accordingly.
Note, though, that what a service looks like may tell only part
of the story. The park example illustrates this. While it is true that the
recreational services are of a nature which we would usually label "consump-
tion", there is no guarantee that these services replace other consumption
They may be additive, or worse, they may induce a reduction in labor supply
and a net decrease in private saving (a<0, a case we have implicitly ruled
out for most of our analysis).
Most benefits probably are between these extremes in their
influence, and many no doubt are treated exactly as any other for_ of income,
or the benefits may actually occur as income. An irrigation project, for
example, increases the incomes of landowners in the affected area, and possibly
k_
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the income of cooperating factors as well.
In view of these very serious obstacles to a precise implementa-
tion of (27), we would do well to consider what rules of thumb are likely to make
sense and the circumstances in which they are likely to lead us astray. The
general thrust of this analysis has been supportive of the rule of thumb:
(33) In the absence of reasonably clear evidence to the contrary,
treat v as constant and aJ t and aj as constant and equal.t-
In other words, attempt to maximize present value of net
dollar flows (including dollar equivalents of nonmarketed
effects), discounting at the social rate of time preference.
Assuming v, a t and a t constants, reasonable extremes of condi-
tion (27) are given by the cases of (28) corresponding to/] = v, • = 1 and
= 1, { = v. The latter case we have already discussed, as it leads to the
equivalent criteria (30) and (31). In other words in the case in which all
financing comes out of investment and all benefits increase consumption
we should multiply financing changes by a factor v before calculating net
benefits. If B= 1 and E = v and we nevertheless use our rule of thumb (33)
we will, of course, undertake some socially unprofitable projects. In the
case of a project just barely worthwhile, so that
(34) _- b tbt =_tet
undertaking the project will lead to a net loss equal to (v-1)_te t. By our
'_easonable" value of v, this would amount to approximately 6% of the resources
involved in the project.
At the other extreme is the case in which B= v, E = 1, all yield
from the project leads to an equivalent value increase in private investment
and all finance for the project derives from private investment. Here rule
of thumb (33) is too conservative. The barely worthwhile project for which
(34) holds, will actually generate a net profit of (v-1)_Ste t.
Thus, while the simplification effected by rule of thumb (33) is
extreme and of great practical value,-the risk of error associated with it
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Lappears modest. If this is accepted, attention must next be devoted to
establishing a truly acceptable value for the social rate of time preference,
since the particular number chosen is of greatest consequence for decisions
among projects of any length. Before turning to concluding remarks on this
topic it is appropriate to discus s briefly the particular application of this
analysis to the SpaceShuttle project.
Discounting in the Space Shuttle Project
As it happens, the particular discounting problem posed by the
Space Shuttle is Somewhat simpler than the general problem discussed in the
preceding sections. In this case, the choice is among alternative expenditure
streams, corresponding to different technical methods of producing a given
service stream. In the language of the model above, we have a fixed stream
of gross benefits, bt' and must choose among alternative expenditures
streams e t. Here the appropriate discounting procedure is clearly to follow
the rule of thumb provided it is assumed that the method of financing the
alternative stream is such that the private investment loss per dollar of
financing is the same in every period for every alternative considered
(e t =_) and the shadow prices of private capital stocks are constant. Then
the problem becomes one of finding the expenditure stream to maximize
T
_t (bt_t - et e )
t=0"
which is the one which minimizes
T
X 8re t
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This is obviously the same choice which minimizes
T
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t=0
the present value of the expenditure stream, discounted at the social rate of
time preference.
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What is the Social Rate of Time Preference?
The analysis thus far has led to the conclusion that, under
plausible assumptions second-best optimal government policy calls for
undertaking all projects with positive net present value discounted at "the"
social rate of time preference. It will come as no surprise that this simple
formula hides a large number of difficult problems. In this closing section
it will not be possible to do more than sketch out some of the issues involved
in settling on an actual number to use in calculation.
A. In an ideal capital market in a riskless world, we would
observe all households, able to borrow and lend at the same rate, adjusting
their consumption profiles to equate their rate of time preference at every
period with the market interest rate. In such a world we observe unanimous
agreement about the individual rates of time preference, and this uniform
-;,.
choice would, obviously, be a prime candidate for the job of the social rate
of time preference. Even under the extreme assumptions of certainty and
market perfection there is a difficulty, however. It is argued that the
currently existing households take insufficient account of the welfare of
future generations in making their investment decisions. The government,
by this argument, should, in effect, be accumulating a trust fund on behalf
of unborn citizens.
Tl, is issue is one of income distribution, pure and simple. As
has been pointed out by Baumol and others, the force of the argument is
greatly diminished when we recognize that as a result of current, uncor-
rected, investment choices there is every reason to expect future generations
to be richer than the existing ones. If income is to be redistributed, a much
better case can be made for favoring today's poor..Hence, the interest
rate in a competitive capital market has much to recommend it as a social
rate of time preference.
B. It is somewhat difficult to be precise about the meaning of
capital market "perfection. " We do observe capital rationing, particularly
at the level of the household. Individuals cannot borrow as much as they
wish, and there is generally a divergence between the rate at which they
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can borrow and that at which they can lend.
These phenomena are intimately connected with the presence of
uncertainty. In the case of individual family borrowing and lending, the
fact is that the security it buys when it lends -- say corporate bonds or savings
bank liabilities -- is very different in character from the security it sells
when it borrows -- a personal note. And, in fact, when a family can offer
a safe asset as collateral for the loan, making the note more like the one
it buys when it lends -- the obvious cases being housing mortgages and bank
loans against corporation shares -- we do not observe a larger divergence
•between borrowing and lending rates than transactions costs would lead us
to expect.
However, the fact remains that there are some families who,
by borrowing at high rates, reveal that they are willing to give up more
consumption tomorrow than the average citizen/in order to enjoy an extra
unit of consumption today. The formally correct second'- best method of
dealing with this problem is to identify separate time streams of consequences
for every family and discount each separatel" T at the Mate appropriate for
that family. As a practical matter, some sort of average appears the only
recourse, but where it should lie between the 2°/0or so (real) rate of return
or savings accounts and government bonds and the 9% to 12% (real) rate
paid on consumer loans is not clear.
C. The fact that some families lend at the margin at higher
expected rates of return than are obtainable on the relatively risk-free
securities does not introduce the same difficulties. These lenders are
choosing more risk in exchange for higher return, but generally they also
hold some risk-free securities and, from the point of view of society, the
government activity is risk-free. (This remark depends on simplifying
assumptions which are plausible, though not entirely innocuous. Time does
not permit developing this subject further).
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